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Abstract 
Much has been written about the role of social media in the Arab countries following the 
uprisings of 2011, most of it focused on Tunisia and Egypt. There has been very little 
research, however, that looks at the role of social media and its democratic potential within 
the Libyan context. Drawing on different understandings and critiques of the public sphere 
concept and how internet technology has transformed it, this qualitative study aimed to 
investigate the nature of the emergent Libyan networked public sphere, and traced how it 
has evolved over time. More specifically, this study focuses on three critical phases: 
immediately before, during, and after the uprising, covering primarily the period between 
2011-2016, with a brief glance at Libya’s public sphere in the pre-uprising period.  
This study adopted an interpretative qualitative methodology, relying on multiple research 
techniques as part of a process of triangulation to provide a broader understanding of the 
research questions, and assure validity of claims and arguments. These qualitative methods 
were: (1) semi-structured Skype-based interviews with young Libyans with varying shades 
of political opinion aged between 25-35 years old in three cities, Tripoli, Benghazi and 
Sabha; and (2) qualitative content analysis of two selected Facebook pages, the 
revolutionary-oriented LW Facebook page, and the LI Facebook page, which was anti-
revolutionary-oriented. The interview data were analysed using thematic analysis, while 
content analysis was used to analyse the Facebook data.  
The study revealed that while social media may make it easier to mobilise populations, this 
does not mean it is easier to achieve gains or to sustain movements. The study revealed that 
the social media landscape that opened up suddenly after the uprising, revealing a vibrant 
political environment marked by different forms of political activities and practices, has 
devolved into an environment of conflict and chaos. The enthusiasm and hope for change 
has largely been replaced by frustration, distrust and fear in a way that has disempowered 
people and led many to stay passive recipients rather than active contributors in democratic 
debate and practice. The study also shows how Libya’s pre-existing divisions might have 
exacerbated online polarization. More specifically, it illustrates how Libya’s complex tribal 
composition, and its pre-existing regional cleavages, mainly the East-West divide, have 
been reanimated, and came to characterise the online practices and discussions of publics. 
This division along tribal and regional lines turned social media networks into spaces of 
contention and conflict, that led many to eventually abandon political participation. This 
iii 
 
suggests that although there were some tentative signs of the development of a more 
democratic networked public sphere in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the 
deepening crisis and shrinking space for public debate indicate a complex, shifting and 
uncertain picture of the role of social media in the development of Libya’s post-uprising 
public sphere. 
Because social media landscape in Libya has continued to change and evolve since 2011, 
this study recommends that to understand the nature of emergent networked publics in post-
revolutionary societies, the theoretical framework ought to be longitudinal because 
countries in transition are often experiencing fast-paced changes in a way that makes it 
problematic to generalise from a snapshot moment. This study also recommends that 
recognising and adapting to these changes needs to be at the heart of any social media 
strategy for Libya for some time to come.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and significance 
There have been many debates about the role of social media during the so-called ‘Arab 
Spring revolutions’ in late 2010 and early 2011 (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Castells, 2012; 
Howard & Hussain, 2013). Social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
have been given much credit for playing a crucial role in shifting the balance of power from 
states to the people in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. News headlines and 
catchphrases such as “Twitter Revolution” or “Facebook Revolution” have been used to 
refer to the Arab Spring protests and subsequent ousting of the regimes. Yet, a more 
nuanced examination of the 2011 uprisings reveals that, while social media helped partly 
to promote the uprisings, there was an array of causes and complex factors for these changes 
(Salem & Mourtada, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Tilly & Tarrow, 
2015; Della Porta, 2015). In Libya, for example, the role that social media played might 
have been different from the neighbouring countries, as internet access was still limited and 
the degree of social media use was still in development. Because there is little research – if 
any – on the Libyan context, this study comes to fill the gap in knowledge and contribute 
to the global debate about social media, providing an exploratory qualitative piece of 
research that explores Libya’s digital experience during that watershed year, as well as the 
following transitional years. 
Historically the introduction of internet and social media networks have been noted for 
their role in stimulating political activism and changing the landscape of political 
communication (Norris, P., & Jones, 1998; Shirky, 2011). For some commentators, the 
widespread adoption of the internet and social media has empowered publics to become 
new agents in social movements (Grindstaff, 2007). Technology enables the public to 
communicate faster and more easily, gain greater access to information, and get more 
opportunities to engage in the public sphere (Shirky, 2011; Lynch, 2011). Several examples 
point to information and communication technologies as important tools for supporting 
political participation and social change. The Zapatista movement in Mexico is a significant 
example of the successful use of the internet for political ends (Russell, 2011). In the mid-
1990s, it was Zapatista rebels who pioneered the use of internet technology to achieve their 
political goal, demanding their indigenous land rights (Ronfeldt, Arquilla, Fuller, & Fuller, 
1998; Hussain & Howard, 2013; Russell, 2011). The Zapatistas’ use of the internet to 
2 
 
convey information related to their movement tactics was described by Turner (2005) as 
the world’s “first informational guerrilla movement”, differentiating this new type of social 
revolutionary movement from traditional Latin American revolutionary struggles. This new 
revolutionary type in which technology was employed has significantly widened the 
Zapatistas’ international support network and advanced the movement’s struggle.  
Information technology continues to be used by many contemporary social struggles. The 
‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 is another example of the use of internet for recruiting people, 
coordinating actions and gaining international support (Juris, 2005; Pickard, 2006). 
Thousands of protesters gathered in Seattle, United States, against the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The protests, which lasted for five days, began peacefully but turned 
into violent events. Indymedia, internet-based activism, flourished allowing activists in the 
United States as well as those at a distance to collaboratively organize actions, distribute 
information, and relate stories and experiences regarding WTO demonstrations. The 
internet was used heavily to produce reports documenting the police brutality and abuse 
towards protesters. The Indymedia website provided grassroots coverage of the World 
Trade Organization protests to bring global attention to them.  
Likewise, global attention was also gained through technology during the anti-G8 protests 
in Genoa in 2001. Activists used the internet to organize movements on a global scale ( 
Pickard, 2006). The internet facilitated a horizontal networking logic among activists. 
Through electronic listservs, forums, blogs and websites, activists around the world were 
able to participate, collaborate and circulate information. This way of communicating was 
pioneering and described by Juris (2005) as a “new way of doing politics” (p. 198) because 
it crafted a new culture of practising politics and created new political values.  
However, although the examples discussed above indicate that technology has changed the 
dynamics of social movements and reshaped the nature of practising politics, the successful 
use of the internet for political change is complex. Debate about the role of digital media 
in political change has grown in importance in the light of the recent 2010/2011 uprisings 
that swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); see, for example, Howard & Hussain 
(2011); Khamis & Vaughn (2011); Lynch, 2011; Morozov (2011); Shirky (2011); Tufekci 
& Wilson (2012); and Castells (2012). Two discrete positions emerged from this debate: 
the “cyber-optimists” (Shirky, 2011) and the “cyber-sceptics” (Morozov, 2011). The cyber-
optimists view the internet and social media as potentially powerful in enabling people 
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living in nondemocratic societies, and allowing revolutionaries to adopt new strategies 
(Shirky, 2011). In contrast, the cyber-pessimists downplay the claim that digital media has 
a political power, arguing that technology does not always support democracy. Rather, it 
could be a tool for repression and control (Morozov, 2011). Likewise, Malcom Gladwell 
(2010), in his New Yorker article, ‘The revolution will not be tweeted’, further criticised the 
role of technology in relation to collective actions. Gladwell's claim rests on two main 
points: firstly, social media is built around ‘weak tie’ relations between people, whereas 
high-risk activism is driven by ‘strong ties’. Secondly, digital networks inherently lack the 
hierarchical logic that he deems crucial to the success of any collective action. 
Beyond black and white, academic scholars have more recently attempted to study the 
relationship between technology and collective actions in more complex ways. Wolfsfeld, 
Segev, & Sheafer (2013), for example, believe that there is a relationship between the 
political environment and the impact of digital media on the success of social movements. 
To better understand the role of social media in collective action, they argued that one 
should take into account the various political environments and how these technologies 
resonate in their local contexts. This line of thinking to understand the complex relationship 
between digital technologies and modern protests was also embraced by Zayani (2015).  In 
his book Networked Publics and Digital Contention, Zayani moves to ask the question of 
how, rather than whether, activists use social media networks for political expression in 
Tunisia. Zayani believes that although some scholars (e.g. Lynch, 2006) argue that the 
increase use of digital media in the Arab region over the 2000s has created an online space 
of interaction that is akin to the Habermasian public sphere—an inclusive space of 
interaction centred on rational-critical discussion (Habermas, 1989), efforts to theorise the 
political implications of digital media in non-democratic contexts are challenging because 
they are embedded in the normative functions of media in democratic politics. To 
understand the Tunisian experience, Zayani linked between the changes in Tunisian society 
and the political implications of media by drawing attention to a multifaceted and rich 
culture that is woven into everyday digital experiences in the country.  
More recently, Tufekci (2017), in her book, The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest, 
uses the concept of the “networked public sphere” for comprehending the complex online 
and offline interaction of publics in contemporary protest events, rather than returning to 
Habermas’s ideal concept of the rational public sphere. From her perspective, although 
digital networks have the power to focus people’s attention on certain topics, and thus 
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challenge the control of traditional elites over the flow of information, they are not 
necessarily conducive to a functional public sphere or a successful movement due to issues 
such as credibility, hate speech and polarisation (Tufekci, 2017). As an activist who 
participated in a number of protests (e.g. Istanbul’s Gezi Park protesters in 2013), Tufekci 
believes that this historical transformation in digital connectivity is complex, and that 
perhaps the best approach to understand it is to identify trends and describe dynamics 
introduced by these new media technologies and how they intertwine with political, social, 
and cultural forces. 
While much has been written on the role of digital networks in the Arab uprisings, mainly 
focusing upon Egypt and Tunisia, relatively little is known about the extent to which these 
networks played a role in the Libyan revolution and its aftermath. There has also been little 
attention paid to how the role of digital networks varies over time and circumstances. For 
example, in relation to the days of the Libyan uprising, Libya had very low internet 
penetration compared to the neighbouring countries Tunisia and Egypt (Salem & Mourtada, 
2011). After the revolution, however, the country experienced an explosive growth in social 
media use. Social media reaches a far greater audience than it ever did at the time of the 
2011 uprising, particularly among youth, driven by the growth of smartphones (Schäfer, 
2015; Freedom House, 2015). According to Internet World Stats (2017), the number of 
Facebook users in Libya reached around 3.5 million in 2017 (just over half of the country’s 
population), up from 260,400 in 2010 (Salem & Mourtada, 2011)1.  
This rapid growth is certainly worth exploring as it could potentially form the basis for a 
nascent democratic networked public sphere. Yet, due to the country’s complex situation 
that is rife with political conflicts, Libya has fallen into chaos resulting in violence and 
threats specifically against activists and bloggers (Freedom House, 2015). These 
unexplored dynamics are worth studying. Our assumptions and understanding of how 
publics experienced and used social media during this period of change requires deep 
investigation. Central to this in-depth investigation is the consideration of digital 
technology use in the years leading up to the revolution. Calling for some historical depth 
helps to better understand multiple dimensions and various dynamics of the digital turn in 
Libya. According to Axford (2011), “the affordances supplied by communication 
                                                          
1 It could be difficult to confirm the actual number of users due to the unstable situation that could lead 
users to have more than one Facebook account.     
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technologies in general and participatory media in particular impact differently in countries 
with diverse histories, constitutions, political cultures, and policies towards freedom of 
expression” (p. 683). This thesis, therefore, attempts not only to focus on a single period of 
time, but aims to advance our understanding of the nature of the emergent networked public 
sphere in Libya during three critical phases: immediately before, during, and after the 
uprising. Studying specific contexts is valuable in order to move beyond a pervasive 
tendency to consider the complex Arab digital experience as homogenous (Zayani, 2015). 
Highlighting the specificity of certain contexts or experiences allows us to create the basis 
for a desirable comparative theorisation of digital practices and experiences.  
1.2 Research aim and research questions 
Based on the research context presented above, the present study aims to answer the 
following main research question: What is the nature of the emergent Libyan networked 
public sphere, and how has it evolved over three complex phases, before, during and after 
the uprising. The study covers primarily the period between 2011-2016, with a brief a 
glance at Libya’s public sphere in the pre-uprising period.    
In order to answer the main research question, the following sub-questions are posed:  
1. To what extent did social media play a role in facilitating political change and 
creating a space for political discourse in the governmental-controlled public sphere 
during the Libyan uprising? 
2. To what extent has social media facilitated the emergence of a networked public 
sphere in Libya’s post-uprising period: has it helped foster a more democratic 
environment?  
 
In order to achieve the research aim and answer the research questions, five objectives are 
established:  
1. To develop a thorough understanding of the relationship between internet 
technology and public participation in politics, particularly in the MENA region, 
through undertaking a literature review of the academic material. 
2. To explore debates about the concept of the public sphere and consider how such 
an idea may need to be adapted to make it suitable to apply to the Libyan context. 
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3. To find out how the use of internet and social media by Libyans for political 
purposes has evolved over time and circumstances, through conducting in-depth 
interviews with young Libyan citizens.  
4. To gain insights on young Libyans’ actual use of social media for political purposes, 
and how this has developed over time through conducting content analysis of a 
sample of public Facebook pages. 
5. To interpret these developments and practices within the existing body of 
knowledge in relation to the democratic potential of internet and its related-
technologies.  
1.3 Personal encounter with the uprising and its aftermath 
In this research, the researcher acknowledges herself as part of the environment rather than 
detached. When Libyans chanted “the people demand the fall of the regime” in February 
2011, nobody would have expected that Libyans, who had lived under Muammar Al-
Gaddafi’s control for forty-two years, would be capable of raising their voice and 
overthrowing the regime. While revolutionaries had succeeded in removing the regime, the 
country since then has engulfed in war, where militias, some backed by foreign powers, 
have replaced the central state and Islamic State put down its roots in Libya. As a Libyan 
female who lived through these fast-moving and violent events unfolded since 2011, the 
experience was and is still intense and emotional, creating a desire and motivation to 
conduct this research. Native knowledge of the Libyan culture and language give the 
researcher a more nuanced perspective on a complex mix of political, economic and social 
issues in a country that is currently in the throes of change.   In qualitative studies, 
researchers are encouraged to be aware of their own biases and assumptions, rather than 
acting as if they can be eliminated. Following the criteria proposed by Lincoln & Guba 
(1986), credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, the researcher 
remained reflexive throughout this project in pursuit of a trustworthy study (see Section 
4.8). 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter introduces the general concept of this research, 
discussing its significance and justification. In addition, it states the research aim and 
questions, followed by the appropriate objectives to satisfy them.  
Chapter 2: Literature review. This chapter provides a critical review of the existing 
literature in relation to the use of internet and social media in the MENA uprisings, with a 
particular focus on the Libyan case.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework.  This chapter provides a theoretical discussion of 
different conceptualisations concerning the internet and its relation to the public sphere and 
democracy. The discussion starts with Habermas’ (1989) notion of the normative public 
sphere, giving a historical account of the development of the concept and discussing 
different conceptualisations and debates surrounding it. The chapter then moves to discuss 
how the internet and its related technologies have transformed the public sphere concept, 
exploring the promises and limits of these technologies.    
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology. This chapter presents the methodology 
of this study, by justifying the significance of the qualitative approach and the choice of 
each method used: semi-structured interviews and content analysis. The chapter then 
reflects on ethical and other challenges encountered throughout the study, before discussing 
criteria used to evaluate the quality of the research.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7: The study findings. Chapter five analyses the interview findings in 
relation to two phases: the pre-uprising period and at the time of the uprising. In this 
chapter, young people’s experiences and social media practices are presented. Chapter six 
continues the analysis of interviews. It deals mainly with presenting findings on themes 
related to post-revolutionary Libya, showing how young people’s social media use and 
experiences vary over time and circumstances. Chapter seven presents findings from 
content analysis of two selected Facebook pages, revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, 
exploring the nature of the discussion and how this shifted over time.     
Chapter 8: Discussion. This chapter consolidates and interprets the findings presented in 
the above chapters in the light of the literature review and the theoretical framework. This 
chapter is organised into two main sections: the first section focuses on technology usage 
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and young people’s lived experiences during the uprising and time leading up to it. It 
discusses how digitally savvy young people revolted in a repressed environment, and how 
they scaled up from Facebook online calls for actions to a bloody revolution. The second 
section focuses on their technology use and experiences after the uprising, discussing the 
limits and opportunities of technology in promoting a nascent public sphere in Libya. Each 
section starts with a summary of the key findings.  
Chapter 9: Conclusion. This final chapter re-visits the study research questions and how 
they have been answered. It presents how the study contributes to knowledge, theoretically, 
methodologically and practically. The chapter concludes with recommendations and 
suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a critical review of how the internet and social media networks have 
altered the dynamics of social movements and created new possibilities for political change. 
It does so by discussing the role of these technologies in the context of the recent uprisings 
that swept the MENA region. The review first discusses the literature on the Iranian Green 
Movement before discussing the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
highlighting the role played by technology and how it resonates in each context. Special 
attention is paid to the Libyan case.  
2.2 Search strategy 
In order to find high quality and relevant references, The University of Sheffield’s Primo 
Central search engine was used to locate literature, which incorporates a wide range of 
journal articles and databases, including Scopus, ProQuest, Springer Link, and Web of 
Science. Google Scholar’s search engine was also employed, as well as citation analysis of 
journal articles (i.e., following up references in bibliographies). Search terms were also 
entered into Google. Since the impact of internet and social media on political change has 
received substantial research attention, the initial search revealed a large volume of 
literature covering various countries. While literature regarding key cases from other 
countries was collected from these initial searches to give context e.g. Mexico, Seattle etc., 
the researcher then performed a structured literature review mainly in relation to the MENA 
region, in order to keep the literature focused and specific.   
The search strategy involved multiple combinations of search terms and Boolean operators 
among keywords linked to the use of social media for political communication during the 
so-called “Arab Spring”, where social media is assumed to be the ignition spark for 
uprisings. Sets of keywords for the literature search were developed, which later were 
evaluated and revised several times. Key words searched were:  
(“Social Media” OR “social network” OR “new media” Or “digital media” OR “Facebook” 
OR “Twitter” OR “YouTube”) 
AND 
(“Arab revolutions” OR “Arab Spring” OR “Tunisia” OR “Egypt” OR “Libya” OR “Tahrir 
Square” OR “Jasmine revolution” OR “17 February Revolution” OR “2011 protests”) 
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By using the keywords “social media” and “social networks”, it was ensured that different 
social media platforms were taken into account. The inclusion of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya 
ensured that no articles were missing related to the events of the “Arab Spring”.  
With a main emphasis on MENA region, a wide range of items were obtained (e.g. Journal 
articles, eBooks, reports, conference proceedings). As a basis for their theoretical 
framework, the authors of these items often refer to the concept of the public sphere, where 
political communication unfolds new forms of expression, diverse and pluralised narratives 
(e.g. Lynch, 2006; Lynch, 2011; Shirky, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Papacharissi & 
De Fatima Oliveira, 2012). This led to develop further sets of keywords around the concepts 
of “democratization”, “public sphere”, “networked publics”, “digital publics”, “affective 
publics”, “networked society”, “political transformation” and “social change” for further 
literature search in order to establish a theoretical framework for this study (see Chapter 2). 
Given the up-to-date nature of the topic, it was important to continually monitor sources 
over the course of study for new relevant material. 
2.3 The use of internet and social media for political change in the MENA 
region 
Based on the search findings, it can be stated that there is a considerable amount of literature 
dealing with the revolutions in the MENA region. Despite the multiple opportunities of 
social media for political communication and interaction (Lotan et al., 2011), the literature 
suggests that political usage of social media does not automatically lead to political change, 
although it offers a “leaderless” way of communication (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012). Neither the so-called “Twitter Revolution” in Iran in 2009 was successful 
(Howard, 2010; Morozov, 2011a), nor can the direction of the social change in the Arab 
countries be predicted yet (Zayani, 2015). Studies also suggest that these uprisings were a 
specific response to a form of capitalism in the region rather than movements for 
democracy as often portrayed (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015; Della Porta, 2015). A more detailed 
account of this is given in the following sections while investigating the use of social media 
during the MENA uprisings, with a special focus on the Libyan revolution that to date has 
received very little attention.  
2.3.1 Iranian Green Movement: a “Twitter revolution”? 
In 2009, Iran experienced massive protests after the day of election, June 15, when it was 
officially announced that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won amidst allegations of the 
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election being rigged. Many Iranians who doubted the outcome of the election joined the 
street protests that spread across the country (Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011). Much 
discussion has broken out over the degree to which the internet and social media facilitated 
the Iran protests. According to many commentators (e.g. Howard, 2010; Aday, Farrell, 
Lynch, Sides, & Freelon, 2012), digital media technology played an important role during 
the Iranian events. Protesters were able to use digital media to organize and record the 
protests, and to exchange online content locally between one another and internationally to 
gain support from the international community. The internet was flooded by hostile images 
and videos taken from the street.  
The Iranian opposition as well as tech-savvy members of the international community 
provided Iran-based users with tools of secure communication such as proxy servers and 
encryption software, allowing them to bypass the government censorship (Wojcieszak & 
Smith, 2014). In addition, volunteers from around the world campaigned to launch cyber-
attacks against the government’s website, disabling its services and thwarting their ability 
to spread misinformation and propaganda. The U.S State Department also intervened to 
stop a temporary shutdown of Twitter because the company planned to undertake 
maintenance work for its service during the time of protests. A request was made by the 
Obama administration asking Twitter to remain open in order to keep the protesters 
recording and sharing their experiences. Moreover, big companies such as Facebook and 
Google launched Farsi translation support tools to facilitate communication between 
Iranians and the world, and vice versa, in a way that increased and eased access to 
information (Howard, 2010).    
Yet, many scholars (e.g. Schectman, 2009; Morozov, 2011a; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013) believe 
that it is unlikely that technology, particularly Twitter itself, played a major role in those 
events. In their opinion, the role of Twitter in the Iranian revolution is overestimated. They 
also doubt the validity of claims that consider the Iran protests as a “Twitter Revolution”. 
Morozov (2011a), for example, stated that the cyber-attacks launched by international 
volunteers against the government slowed down the internet in Iran, making it difficult for 
the public inside the country to upload photos and share information. The Iranian 
government blocked foreign news sites and turned off internet service for short periods; 
they struck back at the protesters, using high-tech surveillance and censorship programs. 
As a result, many people who were involved in the protests were identified and arrested. 
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New internet regulations and rules were proposed, imposing more restrictions and 
limitations on Iranians (Morozov, 2011a; Aday et al., 2012; Yli-Kaitala, 2014).  
Furthermore, statistics also show that Twitter was not a popular platform in Iran during the 
protests. In 2009, a minority of less than 9000 users were registered with Twitter in Iran, 
out of a total population of seventy million (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). Howard (2010) also 
expressed uncertainty regarding the significance of Twitter on the Iran protests. He stated 
that although Twitter was an important communications tool for protesters, an unknown 
number of the new Twitter accounts were created by outside supporters who claimed to be 
in Iran. There were also local users who identified themselves as being abroad to avoid 
government surveillance. This suggests that the significant role claimed for Twitter during 
the Iran protests seems to be largely overstated, and all the above discussed issues must be 
taken into account when evaluating the impact of Twitter on the Iran protests.  
2.3.2 Tunisian uprising (the ‘Jasmine revolution’)  
Tunisia was the first country to be linked to the internet in the Arab world, in 1991. Since 
internet technology became available to the public in the mid-1990s, the Tunisian 
government have applied an extensive censorship program to block websites that include 
opposition political content (Howard, 2010; Lim, 2013). However, this firm control over 
the internet has not stopped activists from engaging with politics. The Tunisian blogosphere 
was, to some extent, politically active a long time before the outbreak of the ‘Jasmine 
revolution’. According to Sami Ben Gharbia, a Tunisian blogger activist, “The role of the 
internet in the Tunisian revolution and [in] building the spirit of protest and change is the 
work of at least a decade” (Randeree, 2011). Before the revolution, many bloggers engaged 
in digital activism against the government censorship, defending human rights and freedom 
of expression. In 2004, for example, a group of human rights activists established an 
independent blog called Nawaat.org. This blog turned out to be a key platform for political 
opposition. This site, however, was frequently blocked by the Tunisian authorities. 
However, this was not the only anti-regime blog. Another example of active and influential 
blog was Tunisian Girl, which was established by Lina Ben Mhenni, a Tunisian activist. 
Ben Mhenni used her blog to challenge and write against the Ben Ali regime. She was one 
of a few bloggers who wrote blog posts under her real identity (Salanova, 2012). 
In December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after being harassed by a 
police officer, many people gathered and took to the streets in massive demonstrations 
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against the state. The internet and its related technology was flooded with images and 
political news (Lotan et al., 2011). Many communication tools such as cell phones and 
video cameras were used to record events and share news stories online (Howard & 
Hussain, 2011). Ben Mhenni, with other Tunisian bloggers and activists, played an 
important role in calling for and organising further anti-regime protests. Through blogs 
such as Nawaat.org and Tunisian Girl, they contributed to the flow of information about 
the protests and challenged the state censorship (Lim, 2013). These blogs later became a 
source of information and news for regional as well as international media outlets. 
Traditional media outlets such as Al Jazeera made a significant contribution in publicising 
these events, giving more visibility to the protests both locally and globally (Gladwell, 
2011). 
In Tunisia’s history, the 2010 protests were not the first movement against the regime. The 
country had experienced large protests in 2009 in Gafsa city (Lim, 2013). Although the 
Gafsa protests lasted for around six months, they did not spread elsewhere in Tunisia as the 
2011 protests did. The government banned journalists from entering the city, resulting in a 
scarcity of information and reports about the events. Online coverage was also limited. 
Unlike the 2010 protests, only a few videos related to the protests were circulated on social 
media (e.g. YouTube and Facebook), making the protests hard to be recognized by local 
and international media. This limited online coverage, according to Tufekci (2017), could 
potentially be due to the small number of social media users. At the time of the Gafsa 
protests, for example, the number of Facebook users in Tunisia was only 28,000. By the 
end of 2010, however, the number of users on Facebook had exploded to 2 million.  
However, although it might be true that internet technology played a key role in triggering 
and facilitating the Tunisian revolution, “it would be a mistake to tie any theory of social 
change to a particular piece of software” (Howard, 2010, p. 11). York (2011), for example, 
viewed the revolution as a ‘people’s revolution’ which would have occurred with or without 
digital media. Gladwell (2011) argues that “people with a grievance will always find ways 
to communicate with each other”. History abounds with examples of successful revolutions 
which occurred before social media became available, such as “[b]ooks and newspapers in 
the abolitionist movement; the telegraph in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution; the independent 
radio in the first People Power in the Philippines in 1984; Xerox copies of information first 
circulated on the web in the 1998 anti-Suharto movement in Indonesia” (Lim, 2013, p. 
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922). Therefore, one should be careful when evaluating the role of social media in relation 
to the contemporary movements.  
Yet, the idea of the ‘people’s revolution’ as discussed above was doubted and questioned. 
While some scholars think that the Arab Spring revolutions were spontaneous, popular and 
leaderless events (Landolt & Kubicek, 2013; Lotan et al., 2011), others believe that the 
Western countries, particularly the US, had interfered in these events through training many 
activists who later became key leaders of the Arab uprisings (Gana, 2013; Cavanaugh, 
2016). This training involved strategies and tactics on how to handle and manage protests 
using the internet and social media. The U.S interest and influence in political actions is 
not something new. Serbian activists of the Otpor! movement were also trained in using 
the internet by the Americans to overthrow Slobodan Milošević in 2000, and were 
themselves involved in training Arab activists (Gana, 2013; Cavanaugh, 2016). In  Antonio 
Gramsci’s perspective, “collective action is never completely spontaneous given that pure 
spontaneity does not exist” (cited in Gerbaudo, 2012, p.21).   
2.3.3 Egyptian uprising (the January 25 Revolution) 
Following the ousting of the Ben Ali regime, Egyptians were influenced and highly 
motivated to achieve their goal of bringing the Hosni Mubarak regime to an end. As in 
Tunisia, the internet emerged as an integral element of political change in Egypt. The 
number of internet users in Egypt reached more than 23 million users by the end of 2010, 
out of the total population of 84.11 million. Around 10.7 million of those internet users (the 
23 million) accessed the internet through their mobile phones (Kassem, 2013). Cell phone 
penetration was high in Egypt, reaching more than 80% in 2010 (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). 
This high number of internet users in Egypt, together with the growing use of mobile 
devices, enabled people to interact and communicate with each other during the Egyptian 
protests (Howard & Hussain, 2011). 
The call for protests on January 25, 2011 was launched through a Facebook page called 
“We are All Khaled Said”. This page was set up by Wael Ghonim, an internet activist, in 
response to Khaled Said’s death. Said, a blogger activist, who was believed to have posted 
a video clip online showing police officers engaging in an illegal drug deal, was beaten to 
death, leaving his corpse on the street in June 2010 (Hussain & Howard, 2013). Said’s 
horrific photo in the morgue, with a photo of a healthy Said, was posted by Wael Ghonim 
online. These photos provoked outrage in the Egyptian streets and attracted more than 
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350,000 members to the Facebook page before January 14th 2010. This page became a 
platform for Egyptians to discuss topics regarding police officers’ illegal practices as well 
as government corruption, paving the way for people to come together to protest against 
the government in 2011 (Khondker, 2011). Based on a survey of participants in Egypt’s 
Tahrir Square protests, Tufekci & Wilson (2012) demonstrated that social media in general, 
and Facebook in particular, was a source of information on the protests the regime could 
not easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual decisions about 
participating in protests. 
During the events, digital media was used heavily to share revolutionary information and 
to document protests either by individuals or organizations. For example, Nawara Negm, a 
female activist, used her blog to post solidarity messages to encourage people protesting 
against Mubarak’s regime. Moreover, members of the April 6th youth movement, an 
Egyptian activist group, relied extensively on different types of social media platforms to 
organize and coordinate demonstrations. Like Tunisian activists, the April 6th movement 
members were also inspired by Otpor!, the Serbian youth movement, for whom the internet 
was an important tool in their protests against the government. In Serbia, before the 
outbreak of the Egyptian revolution, the April 6th leaders met their peers from Otpor! in 
order to learn from their experience in ending Slobodan Milošević’s dictatorship 
(Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). 
While activists and protestors in Egypt were tweeting, sharing, documenting, and videoing 
the protests (Lotan et al., 2011), the regime in turn attempted to shut down the internet to 
interrupt the flow of information from Tahrir Square, the focal point of the protests (Khamis 
& Vaughn, 2011). However, despite the internet cut-off which lasted approximately one 
week, the flow of information did not completely stop. Citizens continued to share 
information and document events from the ground. In fact, a special feature established by 
Twitter and Google called “speak to tweet” allowed protestors to overcome the internet 
blackout. This services enabled Egyptians to send tweets by simply leaving a voicemail on 
certain phone numbers that was then automatically sent out as a tweet (Kassem, 2013). 
Moreover, during the Egyptian revolution, the government became more concerned about 
the impact of TV channels such as Al Jazeera on information dissemination. In the light of 
this, the government went on to shut down Al Jazeera channel bureaus and impound its 
reporters’ equipment (Miles, 2011). However, despite all the regime’s attempts to shut 
down information and communication channels, the protests had already been triggered. 
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According to Khamis & Vaughn (2011) the regime’s strategy of shutting down the internet 
seemed to empower activists and the public to take the streets to protest against the 
government.  
Young people in Egypt suffered for a long time from inequality, a growing disparity 
between the rich and poor, low wages, censorship, repression and corruption (Howard, 
2010; Fuchs, 2012). According to Della Porta (2015), the Arab Spring targeted not only the 
region’s repressive regimes but its growing poverty as well as the social and geographical 
inequalities introduced by various waves of neo-liberal reforms that had cut public services 
and subsidies and created high unemployment, especially among the young. Christensen 
(2013) describes these politico-economic conditions or what he called ‘meta-events’ 
provided a fertile ground for youth to protest against the regime.  
However, Hussain & Howard (2013) described the people who participated in Tahrir 
protests as ‘unusual’, meaning that not only people with a sense of grievance joined the 
protests, but also people with a high level of education and social class. According to 
Musolf (2003), “[a]gency was always there in emerging collective definitions of the 
situation and actions of resistance, arising and overthrowing structures of oppression. No 
matter what breakwaters we build to structure out social change, the time and tide of human 
agency may disrupt all” (p. 8). 
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2.4 Libyan uprising (17 February Revolution) 
“My name is freedom; born in Tunisia, raised in Egypt, studied in Yemen, fought 
in Libya and I’ll grow up in all the Arab world” 
                                                A tweet by @alitweel, a Libyan blogger (22 February 2011)2 
2.4.1 Background information on Libya  
Libya is one of the Arab Spring countries which geographically lie on the Mediterranean 
coast of North Africa. The country’s population is approximately six and a half million 
people that are largely Arab but with a minority of Berber, Tebu, Greek, Turkish, Italian 
and Sephardi Jewish3. Sunni Islam is the dominant religion in Libya (Bearman, 1986). The 
social structure of the Libyan society is based on the forms of tribes, clans, and families. In 
fact, there are around 140 main tribes forming Libyan society (Bell & Witter, 2011). Due 
to the small size of the Libyan population and the tribal nature of the society, Libyan society 
has remained remarkably homogeneous, involving strong and profound relationships with 
people who live either inside or outside the country (Scott-Railton, 2011).  
Libya historically was divided into three provinces: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan 
(see figure 2.1 below). These three provinces were surrendered to Italy by Ottomans in 
1912 after the Italians launched a military invasion of Libya in 1911. Italy’s concern with 
overpopulation influenced their colonialism; they referred to Libya as "The Fourth Shore" 
to promote Italian settlement there. However, the Libyans resisted across the country. Umar 
al Mukhtar راتخملا رمع, a national hero, was the leader of resistance that lasted many years 
against the Italian colonization before his capture and execution in 1931. After World War 
II, Italy’s defeat seemed to create an opportunity for Libyans to gain independence. Libyans 
showed their support to the British (Britain was against Italy during the war) through Idris 
Senussi, the headquarters of the Senussi movement based in Cyrenaica (a Muslim political-
religious tariqa ‘Sufi order’). Idris was recognized by the British, who supported the move 
towards independence. In 1951, Libya declared its independence as the Kingdom of Libya. 
Following its independence, the three provinces enjoyed federal rule, until the country 
converted to a unitary system in 1963. King Idris Senussi ruled Libya for around 17 years 
                                                          
2 Informed consent received from @litweel for the reproduction of his tweet 
3 Libya's Jewish population was subjected to anti-Semitic laws by the Fascist Italian regime and 
deportations by German troops during World War II. 
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before Muammar Al-Gaddafi came to power in 1969 after leading a bloodless military coup 
against the British-backed King Idris (Bearman, 1986; Bell & Witter, 2011). 
Figure 2.1 Map of the traditional provinces of Libya 
 
 
During Al-Gaddafi’s rule, the country’s political and economic power was to some extent 
shifted away from Cyrenaica to Tripolitania, where Gaddafi “built his base of support 
among the tribes and elite of Tripolitania and Fezzan that had been neglected under the 
Sanusi” (Bell & Witter, 2011, p. 16). Politically, Al-Gaddafi did not rely on existing forms 
of political systems. Rather, he set out his own system of government based on his personal 
political philosophy that he outlined in his Green Book in 19754, the Third Universal 
Theory. The system was a “combination of socialism and Islam derived in part from tribal 
practices and was supposed to be implemented by the Libyan people themselves in a unique 
                                                          
4 The Green Book (Arabic: رضخلأا باتكلا al-Kitāb al-Aḫḍar) is a short book setting out the political 
philosophy of Libyan leader Muammar Al-Gaddafi. 
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form of “direct democracy” (Margo, Bonning, & Neighbor, 2012, p. 8). In 1977, Al-
Gaddafi declared the Libyan Jamahiriya (the state of the masses). In theory, it “empowered 
ordinary citizens through local ‘people’s committees’” to allow for direct political 
participation but in practice, however, “it centralised much of Libya’s decision-making in 
the hands of a few select officials” (Al Jazeera English, 2012). Within this system, political 
parties and political activism were forbidden, ‘unsound’ publications were banned, and the 
rights of freedom of speech and assembly were repressed and restricted (Bell & Witter, 
2011).  
In 1999, Libya emerged from around a decade of economic sanctions placed by the UN 
Security Council, resulting in a period of economic hardship. This economic isolation was 
due to the involvement of the regime’s intelligence service in bombing Pan Am Flight 103 
over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Following the removal of the international sanctions, 
Libya gradually moved to make reforms within the state, as a part of improving its 
international relations. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the second oldest son, emerged as his father’s 
likely heir, presenting himself as a defender of human rights and media freedom through 
his project ‘Libya Al-Ghad’ (Libya tomorrow). Within this project,  he made efforts to 
reconcile with the regime’s opponents, release political prisoners and propose a constitution 
(Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012).    
Saif al-Islam also made efforts to open and liberalize Libya’s economy, particularly the oil 
sector, attracting foreign investment and encouraging the private sector. Libya’s potential 
was huge. In 2010 alone, annual oil revenues reached 44 billion dollars. Yet, this wealth 
derived from oil did not seem to improve the country’s economic condition; Libya still 
relied heavily on imports for food and other main commodities. Such economic conditions 
seemed to contribute to increasing the unemployment rate, which was reported to exceed 
25 percent, although this statistic could be misleading as some Libyans work outside the 
formal employment structure  (Bell, Anthony & Witter, 2011). 
Within his reformist schemes, Saif al-Islam also established a main TV channel (al-
Libiyya), two newspapers (Oea and Quryna) and a news agency (Libya Press), aiming for 
an independent media that imposed fewer restrictions on public speech, and thus, allowed 
for a freer flow of information. However, in a 2007 speech, which was given to a crowd of 
youth, Saif identified four “red lines” that could not be crossed: “Islamism, the security and 
stability of Libya, Libya’s territorial integrity and finally, Muammar Gaddafi himself” 
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(Issawi, 2013, p. 20). All other issues were no longer immune to criticism. Despite these 
steps towards relative reform, the regime, however, did not seem to attempt to overhaul the 
system. In fact, “Al-Ghad was nationalised in 2009 and Saif al-Islam relatively side-lined” 
(Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012, p. 62). The country remained under the control of Muammar 
Al-Gaddafi for 42 years until the regime was brought down in 2011. 
2.4.2 The Libyan media landscape before the uprising 
To give an overview of the Libyan media landscape before the uprising, it is important to 
provide a background on both 1) old media such as TV stations, newspapers and their 
respective owners and/or ideological affiliations. 2) internet connectivity and new media.   
2.4.2.1 The old media landscape  
Libyan media is known for a long-standing tradition of heavy-handed state intervention. 
Gaddafi’s Green Book, which setting out his political philosophy, explained that “the press 
is a means of expression of society and is not a means of expression of a natural or a 
corporate person. Logically and democratically, the press, therefore, cannot be owned by 
either of these” (Gaddafi, 1975, p. 35). All public organizations, including the media and 
press, were linked to and tightly controlled by the regime (Issawi, 2013), and journalists 
worked in a climate of fear and self-censorship (Freedom House, 2010). Put differently, 
state media and press had no real political function other than to publish information 
provided by the regime. Even with the efforts of Saif al-Islam to open and liberalize media 
through his project, Libya Al-Ghad, which involved the establishment of a television 
channel (al-Libiyya TV), two newspapers (Oea and Quryna), and a news agency (Libya 
Press), there was a limited degree of freedom to be found within this structure (Issawi, 
2013). Despite this, however, the introduction of satellite TV stations (e.g. Al-Jazeera), and 
to a lesser degree the spread of internet connectivity in the 1990s allowed many Libyans 
access to a wide spectrum of uncensored news prior to 2011 (Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012).  
2.4.2.1 Internet connectivity and new media landscape  
Internet was first introduced in Libya in 1998 and became available to the public in 2000 
(Freedom House, 2015). The number of new users increased steadily between 2000 and 
2009. According to Scott-Railton (2011), the total number of internet users reached around 
350,000 in 2010. Of these, 260,400 were Facebook users; most were male at 70% while 
females made up 30%. Young people, aged between 15-29 years old, made up 67% of total 
Facebook users. Compared to neighbours Egypt and Tunisia, these statistics reflect a very 
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low penetration rate. While the estimated internet penetration rate in Libya was only 5.5% 
in 2010, the estimated rate in Egypt and Tunisia was 24% and 34% respectively (Salem & 
Mourtada, 2011). 
Initially, access to the internet was mainly available to the Libyan elite before internet cafes 
sprang up after 2000 (Freedom House, 2015). This slight improvement was due to the 
gradual introduction of different internet technology services such as dialup, DSL, satellite 
and WiMax. WiMax, for example, was introduced in 2009 by Libya Telecom and 
Technology (LTT) (which was chaired by Mohammed Al-Gaddafi, the oldest Gaddafi son) 
(OpenNet Initiative, 2009). Cell phone penetration was also high in the country. In fact, 
Libya was the first among African countries to reach 100 percent mobile phone penetration 
in 2008, which further increased in 2011, with more than 10 million mobile subscriptions, 
representing a penetration rate of 161 percent (Freedom House, 2015). Despite this 
prevalence of mobile phone usage, internet services remained limited, particularly for those 
in rural areas, due to the poor telecommunications infrastructure (OpenNet Initiative, 
2009).  
Despite the low level of internet access, the Libyan government attempted to retain some 
control over the flow of information and communications. In fact, there were a few 
examples of the regime’s attempts to apply online censorship during the 2000s. The regime 
was actively seeking filtering tools and equipment to monitor and apply surveillance over 
citizens. For example, in late July 2008, the government installed a Western-made system, 
Amesys EAGLE, an interception package created by French company Amesys5, to capture 
internet traffic. Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE)6 was another system sold 
to the regime by a Chinese company. The purpose of these systems was to provide the 
government’s intelligence services with comprehensive access to a wide range of citizens’ 
online activities (Scott-Railton, 2011). However, despite these attempts, the regime’s new 
trend towards political reforms that coincided with Saif al-Islam’s plans to modernize Libya 
seemed to allow for a limited space of freedom. In 2009, for example, it was evident that 
the regime applied only a selective filtering on a few political opposition websites rather 
than comprehensive filtering, while opening access to previously blocked ones (OpenNet 
Initiative, 2009). However, these relative steps towards openness that push the boundaries 
                                                          
5 A French computer company that sold spy tech to Libya  
6 One of China’s largest telecommunications companies 
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of what was permissible has failed as it ran into resistance at the top (Quintanilla & Dajani, 
2012).  
2.4.3 The Libyan uprising 
Inspired by the wave of protests that swept neighbouring countries Tunisia and Egypt 
Libyans began their protests on February 15th, 2011 (See Libya profile – Timeline in 
appendix 1). The protests were initially triggered in Benghazi due to the arrest of Fethi 
Tarbel, a lawyer and human rights activist, who represented the relatives of around 1,200 
prisoners believed to have been killed by the regime’s security forces in Abu Salim prison 
in 1996. Following his arrest, hundreds of people turned to protest in the eastern city of 
Benghazi calling for his release, which quickly escalated to a large-scale protest that spread 
across the country, reaching the west of Libya, where the grip of the regime was much 
tighter (Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012; Scott-Railton, 2011).  
The call for the protest in fact circulated on social media platforms even before the arrest 
of Tarbel. Hassan Al-Djahmi, a young Libyan activist living in exile, launched an online 
appeal to protest against the regime almost two weeks before the revolution started. This 
was through a Facebook page he established named “The Day of Rage”. This Facebook 
page was considered one of several that emerged as a key focal point for anti-Gadaffi 
feeling. Calls for the “Day of Rage” were scheduled for February 17, a date historically 
associated with opposition to the regime. On February 17, 1987, regime forces killed 
around nine people who were accused of having plotted against the regime. In addition, on 
17 February 2006, more than ten people were reported to have been killed by the regime 
forces after they protested in front of the Italian embassy in Benghazi. The eruption of these 
protests was due to a television broadcast showing an Italian cabinet minister wearing a t-
shirt depicting an offensive cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh)7 (Bruguière, 2011).  
Before February 17, the regime took several proactive steps to stop the wave of protests 
that had swept the neighbouring countries from reaching Libya. It was reported that the 
regime released around twelve political prisoners, which was interpreted as a conciliatory 
step toward its nascent opposition movement. The regime also sent two key official figures 
to Benghazi in order to promise reform, but in fact it led to more anger and tension. 
Conversely, the regime arrested a number of activists involved in online activities. Not only 
                                                          
7 Peace be upon him; an honorific phrase used by some Muslims after any mention in speech or print of 
the Islamic prophet Muhammad. 
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that, Al-Gaddafi himself delivered a speech on 13 February 2011, warning Libyans not to 
use Facebook. Despite all this, the protestors took to the street on 15 February 2011 (Scott-
Railton, 2011; Bell & Witter, 2011).   
The regime attempted to crack down on protests. These crackdowns initially started with 
rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protestors, before the situation evolved seriously into 
an armed conflict between the regime forces and poorly armed rebels (before different 
actors supplied weapons to the rebels soon after). In the early days of the uprising, Saif Al-
Islam called for dialogue with the regime’s opposition but he simultaneously promised to 
fight “to the last man standing” (Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012, p. 62). He also warned 
Libyans of ending up in civil war and chaos as a consequence of these protests (Quintanilla 
& Dajani, 2012). Despite this, the protests continued across the country. In late February 
2011, the opposition forces claimed control over a big part of the east of Libya, where they 
established the National Transitional Council (NTC), which immediately gained 
recognition from several Arab and Western countries as Libya’s legitimate governing body 
(Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012). 
In March 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation 
Odyssey Dawn, led by the US, against the regime forces, following the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 that primarily demanded a ceasefire and imposed a no fly-zone 
over Libya. NATO allies claimed that the purpose of their interference was only to protect 
Libyan civilians from the regime’s attacks (NATO, 2015). However, some commentators 
contested this view, arguing that NATO’s claim was an unjust and illegitimate cover to end 
the Al-Gaddafi regime. For example, Newman (2011) and Muhammad (2011) questioned 
the real reason for international interference in Libya, putting forward the idea that Al-
Gaddafi’s new plan of selling oil and other resources for gold dinar rather than the 
American dollar was a possible reason for NATO interference. A similar reason was also 
suggested to be behind the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, linking the U.S interference 
in Iraq to Saddam’s plans to sell oil for euros instead of dollars (Heard, 2003). 
At this time of NATO control, rebels eventually managed to enter Tripoli on August 20th 
after six months of heavy fighting with the regime forces in many cities across the country. 
On October 20th 2011, Al-Gaddafi was captured and killed by the rebels. This was after 
NATO exceeded its mandate of protecting civilians and bombed Al-Gaddafi’s convoy of 
vehicles in his hometown, Sirte. A few days after Gaddafi’s death, Saif al-Islam was also 
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captured in the Sahara, south of Libya, while he was trying to flee the country. On 23 
October 2011, the NTC officially declared the liberation of Libya (Scott-Railton, 2011; 
Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012). NATO also ceased its military operations on 31 October 2011 
(Scott-Railton, 2011), abdicating its responsibility of protecting civilians from violence that 
continued after the regime fell (Bachman, 2015). 
2.4.3.1 Libyan diaspora and the use of social media during the uprising 
The Libyan diaspora played a high-profile role in the 17th February revolution, organizing 
different online and offline activities. As discussed above, the online calls for the revolution 
were initially set up by Libyans in exile, and spread widely on social media. These calls 
reached those at home and triggered them to protest against the regime. Besides the ‘Day 
of Rage’ Facebook page, the Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) also emerged as one of the 
most popular Twitter accounts that was widely followed during the revolution. Known as 
@ShababLibya on Twitter, LYM was established on 2 February 2011. The founders, Ayat 
Mneina (based in Canada) and Omar Amer (based in the UK), wanted to take part in the 
Libyan revolution by helping people inside the country to globalize their voices. During 
the protests, both founders relied on their networks of families and relatives on the ground 
to update them with the latest information and news. When events accelerated, the founders 
needed to expand their team to be able to cover the unfolding events. More people were 
recruited from inside the country, who were close to the events on the ground and were 
able to give accurate information. LYM quickly became “a nexus” for local information as 
well as news updates (Scott-Railton, 2011). Despite communication difficulties due to the 
regime’s interruption of internet and telecommunication services, LYM successfully called 
the media’s attention to the events unfolding inside Libya, making it the international 
community’s duty to respond to such an issue (Mogul, 2012). ShababLibya’s Twitter feed 
remains active at the time of writing, with more than 231,000 followers (Twitter.com). 
The Libyan diaspora did not only use internet and social media for the sake of covering and 
providing updates about the events. They also utilized digital networks to provide logistic 
support to the rebels inside the country. For example, Sifaw Twawa, a freedom fighter, 
learned how to use the Grad rocket, a type of weapon, through a Skype conference call with 
exiled friends with military knowledge. By giving him certain instructions, these friends 
enabled Twawa to launch the rocket (Pollock, 2012).  
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2.4.3.2 Libya Alhurra: a key information network 
In addition to the digital anti-regime focal points that were established outside Libya such 
as the ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page and LYM Twitter account, Libya Alhurra was an 
internet TV channel that emerged from inside the country and was founded by Mohammed 
Nabbous, an activist (Scott-Railton, 2011). Nabbous, with sufficient equipment and digital 
knowledge, launched his online channel. This online channel ran 24/7 on Livestream.com, 
broadcasting videos and sharing news updates from the ground. It started broadcasting live 
through a series of cameras which were installed at the court square in Benghazi, where 
people gathered and marched to protest against the regime on February 19th. Through a 
live-streamed video, Nabbous demanded international support, hoping to reach and grab 
global attention. His online channel became quickly popular; in its first six weeks it served 
25 million “viewer minutes” (Pollock, 2012) to more than 452,000 unique viewers. 
Nabbous became a key contact for many international media outlets. For example, he was 
interviewed frequently by TV channels such as CNN, Al Jazeera, and the BBC via Skype. 
He provided unique and high-quality information through documenting and reporting on 
real-time events using his camera. Nabbous also built connections with many activists and 
supporters from different countries, who emerged as a cadre of information warriors. For 
example, Andy Carvin, a former National Public Radio digital media strategist, relied on 
Nabbous as a key point of contact to seek information and news to cover the uprising, 
building an online archive of events about Libya by tweeting and re-tweeting information 
and different local materials (Scott-Railton, 2011; Pollock, 2012; Hejazi, 2014). Carvin had 
used this approach before to cover the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings on Twitter, relying 
on public activists as a source of information and giving activists a space and opportunity 
to comment, share, and disseminate information from the ground (Hermida, Lewis, & 
Zamith, 2014).  
On March 19, Nabbous was shot dead while he was reporting from front lines on the 
ground. Carvin made the assumption that NATO’s operation was a response to Nabbous’ 
death (Hejazi, 2014). However, this assumption regarding NATO’s intervention seemed to 
be unrealistic. Such a heavy military operation with many countries involved cannot, of 
course, be spontaneous or only in response to someone’s death (although NATO allies 
claimed that the purpose of their interference was only to protect Libyan civilians from the 
regime’s attacks) (NATO, 2015). 
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While Nabbous was reporting from Benghazi, Ali Tweel was reporting from inside Tripoli 
where the regime kept a firm grip. Ali, with a small group of other Libyan Twitter accounts, 
was listed by the UN Dispatch as one of nine Twitter accounts to follow for the rawest news 
and information on the Libyan protests (Albon, 2011). The following are examples of how 
Ali Tweel’s tweets8 were appreciated as an important source of information, and how 
international activists supported and engaged with his activities.  
Figure 2.2 Replies and mentions to Ali Tweel's tweets 
 
However, despite the seemingly active use of social media, Dahan (2014) downplays the 
role played by social media in the Libyan context. He states that the claims that “have made 
the use of such social media a phenomenon appear to be missing in the case of Libya” (p. 
8). This view was mainly due to the fact that Libya historically had little internet access. In 
comparison to Tunisia and Egypt, which had the largest proportion of internet users in the 
Arab region, Libya experienced lower scores in the number of internet users (Hussain & 
Howard, 2013; Salem & Mourtada, 2011). In addition, #Libya tweets, reported to be one 
of the top three Twitter trends in early 2011 (Biswas & Sipes, 2014), were most likely to 
be posted by people outside Libya rather than inside. A study conducted through R-Shief’s 
Twitterminer to analyse #Libya found that tweets in Arabic were coming in at a rate of 
                                                          
8 Informed consent received from @litweel for the reproduction of his tweet 
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around 2,500 a day, while tweets in English were coming in at a rate of 20,000 a day (R-
Shief, 2011). As Libya is an Arabic speaking country, this may increase the validity of the 
above statement that #Libya tweets were most likely to be posted from outside the country.   
Additionally, the country witnessed a complete internet outage on March, 3, 2011. The 
regime also interrupted the telecommunication services while Libyan Electronic Army 
(which emerged during the revolution and were likely to led by Gaddafi’s son Mutassim) 
hijacked and defaced opposition social media sites (Scott-Railton, 2011). Furthermore, the 
regime also accused of jamming some TV channels such as Al Jazeera to interrupt the flow 
of information (Scott-Railton, 2011). 
With regard to the internet shutdown, the BBC World News editor Williams (2011) 
commented:  
“the flow of video—the so-called “user-generated-content”—has dwindled to a 
trickle as the authorities have periodically turned off the Internet. That means we 
have an additional responsibility—to be clear with our audiences not just what little 
we do know, but perhaps more significantly, what we don’t” 
This shows how getting information out of Libya was a difficult task after the internet cut 
off, although a range of ways and tools were used across the county to bypass the blackout 
of the internet (e.g. the system of two-way satellite) (Scott-Railton, 2011; Russell, 2011). 
Additionally, traditional media outlets played an important role during the Libyan uprising. 
For example, the first YouTube video of the early demonstrations that took place in 
Benghazi on February 15th, 2011, was picked up by Al Jazeera and re-broadcast on its TV 
channel and also its live website. Although the regime, through the Libyan intelligence 
agency, attempted to jam  the Al Jazeera signal throughout the course of the events (Reuter, 
2011), the channel managed to continue broadcasting and avoid the regime’s interference 
(Beaumont, 2011). In addition, it was reported that digital materials such as videos and 
images were smuggled out of the country in order to be sent to the Al Jazeera channel to 
distribute them to the world and to Libyans who were not internet users (Scott-Railton, 
2011). As the events escalated, internet technology was not only used to amplify and spread 
timely information on the events, it was also used to collaborate with NATO to intensify 
its airstrikes against Gaddafi’s forces. The Libyan opposition made extensive use of the 
Internet and various online tools to increase the accuracy of NATO strikes by sending 
targeting information using various online tools (Scott-Railton, 2011). The section below 
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describes this collaboration between Libyan opposition and NATO’s use of social media in 
more details.  
2.4.3.3 The use of social media to get targeting and tactical information to NATO  
NATO played a vital role in the Libyan uprising, facilitating the overthrow of the regime. 
NATO, on many occasions, used social media to identify potential targets for attacks 
through collaborating with many opposition actors, who provided NATO with intelligence 
information about the regime forces. The regime opponents used different digital tools such 
as Twitter and Skype. Google Maps and Google Earth were also used to locate the regime 
forces and create a targeting list, which was then sent to NATO through certain key contacts 
(Scott-Railton, 2011). For example, Rida Benfayed, a Libyan orthopaedic surgeon based in 
Denver, went back to Libya during the uprising and was involved in the coordination and 
mobilization process. Using two-way internet satellite, he created a large network by 
contacting many people via Skype (including doctors, diplomats and journalists), building 
his own operation. Through his networks, Benfayed worked as a bridge between NATO 
and Libyan rebels, transmitting strategic and intelligence information. The vibrant 
information environment that he created was described as “just like Al Jazeera!” (Pollock, 
2012).  
NATO officials acknowledged the importance of social media in contributing to their 
targeting process. One French naval officer stated that the information obtained from online 
Libyan networks was more accurate, precise and efficient in comparison to reports received 
from his other traditional intelligence methods (Pollock, 2012). In this regard, Mike 
Bracken, NATO Wing Commander also commented: 
“We get information from open sources on the internet; we get Twitter, you name 
any source of media and our fusion center will deliver all of that into usable 
intelligence” (Gabbat, 2011).  
NATO reported that its members were aware of the possibility of receiving inaccurate 
reports as well as disinformation (Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, 2011). Therefore, tactical 
information derived from social media feeds was tested and assessed against other reliable 
and trusted sources before being used (G. Smith, 2012). However, despite the NATO 
announcement that they would check the quality of targeting information, NATO was 
accused of bombing civilian targets. While NATO refused to investigate these incidents, 
Human Rights Watch (2012) conducted an investigation and found that dozens of civilians 
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were killed and wounded in their private homes as a result of NATO air strikes. Marina 
(2011) also doubted the legality of a number of air strikes conducted by NATO, pointing 
out that these strikes might amount to war crimes if NATO did not take the necessary 
precautionary measures stated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to verify targets. After the 
revolution, NATO continued to provide military support to the rebels despite an increase 
in violence and human rights violations (Bachman, 2015). According to Marina (2011), 
“Libya was a theatre of atrocious crime” by many actors including NATO, the regime 
forces, and the insurgents (p. 85).  
2.4.4 Post-revolution Libya  
2.4.4.1 Background  
After the revolution, in July 2012, a General National Congress (GNC) was elected in a 
relatively peaceful and democratic atmosphere to become the first legislative authority of 
Libya, taking power from the National Transitional Council in order to transition Libya to 
a permanent democratic constitution (ARC, 2013). However, the GNC passed its deadline 
without fulfilling the task of writing a constitution. Thus, a new election was organized 
following demonstrations and squabbles against extending the GNC’s mandate. This 
election resulted in the House of Representatives taking power in August 2014, with a very 
low election turnout at 18%, down from 60% in the first election of July 2012. After this, 
Libya remained awash with weapons and embroiled in a civil war, involving a number of 
rival armed groups that emerged in 2014. The two political bodies remained competitive, 
claiming legitimacy: the House of Representatives (HoR), based in the eastern city of 
Tubruk, and the Tripoli-based (GNC) (Freedom House, 2016). 
In 2015, the United Nations facilitated a political dialogue and negotiations to establish a 
Government of National Accord, reconciling the two rival political and military authorities 
under a single administration. However, the Government of National Accord failed to unify 
the country’s competing bodies, resulting in Libya having three rival governments from the 
end of 2015 to the time of writing in 2018. The security situation has worsened leading to 
human rights violations. Libya’s economic situation has continued to deteriorate in recent 
years. The main source of revenue, oil production, has witnessed a massive decline amid 
ongoing crisis (Freedom House, 2017). See appendix 1 (Libya profile – Timeline) for 
presenting a chronology of key events of the uprising and the post-uprising period.     
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2.4.4.2 The old Libyan media landscape 
After the fall of the regime, private media outlets have rapidly flourished, including print 
and satellite TV, radio, multiple online collaborations, and other forms (Quintanilla & 
Dajani, 2012; Dowson-Zeidan, Eaton, & Wespieser, 2014). The emergence of these new 
media outlets is considered an unprecedented exercise of public debate for a society 
repressed and heavily censored for decades (Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012). Yet, media 
regulation and legislation have been highly fluid with laws being passed and then abolished. 
For example, in May 2012, the NTC passed Law No. 37, which bans the glorification of 
Muammar Gadhafi or his sons, as well as any criticism of the 17 February revolution, 
‘insulting Islam, or the prestige of the state or its institutions or judiciary. Law No. 37 
caused a storm of outrage among international and local advocacy organisations before 
eventually being abolished by the Libyan Supreme Court in early July 2012 (Wollenberg 
& Pack, 2013).  
In agreement with Wollenberg & Pack, Issawi (2013) also stated that the media sector in 
Libya lacked a clear vision and planning. She also stated that it is not clear who controls 
the new Libyan media outlets. While most of the media outlets are thought to be controlled 
by factions and armed militias or linked to political agendas (e.g. pro-liberal and pro-
Islamic parties), it is unclear which media outlets are representing the state. Issawi (2013) 
summarised the challenges of the new Libyan media reconstruction in three points; 1) a 
lack of strong structures, 2) a lack of transparent funding models 3) and a lack of regulatory 
frameworks, shedding light on its chaotic developments.    
2.4.4.3 Internet connectivity and new media landscape 
According to figures from different sources (e.g. Schäfer, 2015; Freedom House, 2015), 
Libya experienced a massive increase in number of the internet and social media users after 
the revolution, mainly among young people. Despite this increase, there has been many 
obstacles to internet access. As stated in the Freedom House report, internet access has been 
badly affected by the ongoing conflict that erupt from time to time across the country. 
Power outages and physical damage to infrastructure have also limited the internet 
connectivity (Human rights watch, 2013; Freedom House, 2015).  
In terms of government(s) censorship, Freedom House (2015) stated that there is little 
transparency and lack of legal framework related to the blocking of websites in Libya, as 
regulations have yet to be formulated. While social media platforms such as YouTube, 
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Facebook and Twitter are reported to be freely available for publics, the first instance of 
political censorship since the revolution was the government's blocking of news website al-
Wasat in February 2015 as a result of its frequent anti- GNC government views, which 
triggered anger among activists and social media users. Despite the above issues, internet 
and social media remain an important part of the media environment in post-revolution 
Libya (Dowson-Zeidan et al., 2014), and therefore requiring for a better understanding.  
2.4 Chapter summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to draw a detailed picture of the Middle East and North 
Africa uprisings. It investigated each revolution separately, covering four revolutions: The 
Green Movement in Iran, the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the January 25th Revolution 
in Egypt, and the February 17th Revolution in Libya, giving the Libyan revolution a special 
focus. The chapter paid great attention to the role played by new technology in each 
revolution, addressing different arguments and debates about the impact of these 
technologies in each context. In general, two main arguments were highlighted. The first 
argument focused on the importance of new technologies for serving as sources for 
information flows, challenging state-controlled media and transforming the public sphere 
in the MENA region. The second argument focused on their dark side, and how these 
technologies might be used as a tool of repression against free speech and activism to 
control the public sphere. However, while much has been written on the role of digital 
media in the 2011 uprising, its democratic role remains debatable and still needs to be 
examined particularly in under researched contexts such as Libya. In light of this, the 
following chapter dedicated to discuss various theoretical perspectives and critical debates 
surrounding the internet and its relation to the public sphere and democracy.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the critical debates surrounding the internet and its related 
technologies in relation to the public sphere and democracy. The starting point for this 
discussion is the public sphere concept of Habermas (1989), who presented criteria and 
assumptions for the notion of the public sphere and discussed the rise and fall of the 
bourgeois public sphere in eighteenth-century Europe. Since Habermas’ public sphere 
concept was developed in the Western liberal context, some may argue that the concept 
may not be relevant to non-Western societies such as the Arab countries, where the flow of 
information and political communication are restricted and controlled by the governments. 
However, with the current transformations created by new interactive digital technologies, 
revisiting the public sphere concept has become essential to explore its relation to non-
western contexts and non-liberal polities. According to Lynch, (2003), the public sphere 
model still offers a uniquely useful way to think about non-democratic societies such as the 
Arab world, allowing for analysing the complex formation and articulation of public 
opinion. McNair (2006) also suggest that “the evolution of a public sphere is... part of the 
process by which democracy evolves within nation-states. The public sphere can come into 
being without democracy… but democracy cannot come into being without a public 
sphere” (p. 140). Given that, this chapter examines the value and sustainability of the theory 
in light of the new technological advancements, and also discusses the concept’s validity 
and applicability in the Arab world, particularly in relation the recent social movements.   
3.2 Habermas’ public sphere: definition and history 
Since Habermas’ book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was translated 
into English in 1989, the concept of the public sphere has remained not only a key concept 
for democratic theories but also a critical approach for understanding the relationship 
between media and democracy nationally and globally. Habermas developed his concept 
of the public sphere around the formation of bourgeois society, a new power class, which 
emerged during the Enlightenment period in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in 
England, France, and Germany. This period was characterised by modern values of 
equality, liberty and justice that came to replace traditional standards of hierarchy and 
respect for authority (Habermas, 1989).  
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The central feature of the public sphere, as is said to have existed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, was the public use of critical reasoning in deliberation and debate. 
Rational-critical debate occurred mainly in institutions such as salons and coffee houses 
where the bourgeois gathered to discuss public issues and common concerns. The ideal 
public sphere as Habermas conceived, which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable 
space, is “made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs 
of society with the state” (Habermas, 1989, p. 176). This space as envisaged by Habermas 
should exist between the state/economy and the private realm where individuals are 
independent from the state and market forces (Habermas, 1989).  
In Habermas’ public sphere, media developments, particularly the rise of the press, 
facilitated the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere. For Habermas, media was vital 
for the public engaged in critical debate because it provided them information and news 
about the state. He noted that the press in its several forms (e.g. newspapers, radio and 
television) helped to foster the public sphere by enabling the public to communicate with 
each other around matters of common interest in order to reach agreement and consensus. 
However, in the nineteenth century, the conditions and foundations that brought into 
existence the bourgeois public sphere had undergone a transformation that led to its decline. 
The boundaries between the state and civil society, the public and private began to blur. 
The media press lost its critical function because of commercialisation. Media became 
commercialised and dominated by powerful actors. Habermas goes on to claim that the 
media “became a gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public sphere” 
(Habermas, 1989, p. 185). Media companies were privately owned by those who were part 
of the capitalist economy or run by the state, and thus, they did not only produce public 
information, but capital and profit through advertising business. For Habermas, these issues 
of media ownership and political economy affected the quality and free flow of information 
and communication, leading people to become “simple consumers of the information” 
(Habermas, 1991, p. 184). This resulted in less informed citizens and consequently caused 
a decline and transformation in the rational-critical public sphere (Habermas, 1991). With 
the affordances of internet communications, people have therefore questioned whether 
some of these challenges of the broadcast model might be surmountable.  
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3.3 Criticism of Habermas’ ideal public sphere 
At the core of the Habermasian ideal public sphere, citizens have the right to exchange 
information and debate their opinion, in a free, rational, equal and open manner that leads 
to reaching consensus and formulating public opinion. Habermas (1991) elaborates on the 
domain of the public sphere as: 
“a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. 
Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens… Citizens act as a 
public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to 
coercion” (p. 398) 
As such, Habermas’ public sphere was envisioned as a universal system that would “never 
close itself off entirely” (Habermas, 1989, p. 37) to any member of society. All members 
of the public, with interest to participate, can enjoy free access to a variety of ideas, 
arguments, and information that are separate from political and economic power to improve 
society and influence decision-making policy (Habermas, 1991). According to Dahlgren 
(2005, p. 48) a functioning public sphere is understood as “a constellation of 
communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, 
debates— ideally in an unfettered manner—and also the formation of political will (i.e., 
public opinion)”. Universality or inclusivity in the sense of “presupposing the equality of 
status” (Habermas, 1989, p. 36) was also central to Habermas’ theory, so that participation 
is inclusive, free and open to all in an equal manner regardless of their positions or 
identities. For Habermas, public discussion and contribution are not based on citizens’ 
socio-economic status or their identities. Rather, they are based on the strength of their 
argument and persuasion that is formed around rationality and logic of speech.  
However, Habermas’ idealized concepts of equality, rationality, inclusiveness and 
openness are not really represented in his notion of the public sphere. Habermas was subject 
to considerable criticism immediately after publishing the English version of his book, 
leading to revisions in his later writings. In her seminal article, Rethinking the Public 
Sphere, Fraser (1990), from a feminist perspective, questioned the Habermasian concept of 
a single public sphere which was formulated around the interests of the male-dominant 
bourgeoisie. Fraser criticised the concept of the public sphere as it was “a masculinist 
ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule” (p. 62). She 
argued that Habermas fails in recognizing the non-bourgeois public spheres, resulting in 
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excluding what she referred to as “subaltern counterpublics” or “competing publics” such 
as women, working class and other ethnicities (p. 67). Fraser proposed that by excluding 
these alternative publics, the egalitarian principle in society that Habermas implies in his 
ideal notion of the public sphere therefore is not represented, and the subordinate groups 
therefore could not express or communicate particular needs, concerns and interests 
(Fraser, 1990). Fraser believed that in stratified and multicultural societies “the ideal of 
participatory parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of publics than by a single public” 
(p. 127). For her, an egalitarian and multi-cultural society is premised on the idea of 
plurality of public arenas that involve participation of a multiplicity of groups with diverse 
values and beliefs. In agreement with Fraser, Finlayson (2005) also points out that the core 
elements of the Habermasian concept such as rationality, equality, openness, freedom and 
inclusiveness, were simply ideologies or illusions. Moreover, he suggests that the concept 
of the public sphere remained “merely Utopian, an inclusive and egalitarian vision of 
society worthy of pursuit, but never fully realised. The concept of bourgeois public sphere 
remained ideological in that sense too” (p. 12). 
Another point of concern was that Habermas assumes that a functioning democratic public 
sphere requires a sharp division of civil society and the state (Habermas, 1989). However, 
Fraser (1990) believes that drawing a line between the two realms is not relevant because 
the line between civil society and state is blurred.  Fraser also believes that the blurring line 
between the two realms does not undermine democracy. Rather, it represents a democratic 
advance through the relationship of what she called ‘weak public’ and ‘strong public’. The 
former are members of the public who discuss issues, but have less chance to make a 
decision, while the latter refers to the public who have the ability to take decisions. In her 
perspective, the weak public can have a representative from the strong public who can 
translate their opinion into authoritative decisions. Thus, the sharp separation between the 
state and civil society that Habermas suggested for a functioning public sphere is not 
consistent with how Fraser views it. 
Despite all these criticisms, scholars do not reject the whole concept of the public sphere. 
Fraser herself, for example, argued that Habermas’ bourgeois model could be developed 
and reformulated to produce an alternative post-bourgeois conception. In fact, Habermas 
himself modifies and reformulate his initial idea of the public sphere in response to different 
critiques and evaluation of his idea. In this regard, Habermas conceded that he presented a 
“stylized picture of the liberal elements of the bourgeois public sphere” (Habermas, 1989, 
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p. 44) rather than an exact historical explanation. In his book Further Reflections on the 
Public Sphere, he noted that “he should have made it clearer that he was establishing an 
‘ideal type’ and not a normative ideal” (Hahn, 2000, p.266). However, critical debates and 
discussions continue to surround Habermas’ conception of the public sphere, focusing on 
the current alterations and transformations brought about by the emergence of the internet 
and other advanced technologies. A more detailed account of the internet and its democratic 
potential is given in the following section.  
3.4 Internet, social media and the networked public sphere 
The Habermasian concept of the public sphere has triggered much debate in relation to the 
potential of internet and social media for changing the social structure and transforming the 
public sphere (Boeder, 2005; Castells, 2008; Papacharissi, 2009; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). 
Currently, this debate about the internet as a medium of interaction and communication 
involves both criticism and praise for its democratic potential. In the contemporary high-
tech networked society, developments in information technology evoke massive changes 
in the ways people communicate and obtain information. One important characteristic of 
the internet that promotes its role in reviving the public sphere is that the internet can 
provide the conditions for a more universal environment, especially in light of the reduction 
in physical public spaces in modern urban planning (Davis, 1999). The internet establishes 
a virtual public space in which individuals can interact, exchange content, share and 
produce information not only on a local scale but also globally. Anyone with internet access 
and basic digital literacy could potentially participate in an equal manner without any major 
barriers to entry. Castells refer to this virtual environment enabled by the new technological 
developments as “the new global public sphere” (Castells, 2008, p. 90). Unlike the past 
format of technology that was based on one-to-one interaction (e.g. telephone, telegraph) 
or on one-to-many interaction (print media, radio and television), the internet allows for 
many-to-many model interactions in which individuals can be both receivers and producers 
of information (Castells, 2008).  
Individuals, therefore, are no longer passive recipients. Rather, they are in a dialogic 
relation with the creator of the message; thus, they participate in defining the agenda of the 
conversation. This interactive feature of the internet revives the participatory nature of the 
ideal public sphere and empowers individuals to take part in public debate at low cost 
(Dahlberg, 2001). In this regard, Murru (2009) states that “in online contexts anyone can 
potentially take the role of speaker with practically no cost, thus multiplying the source of 
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news and freeing the flux of communication and information from any sort of system 
control (economic or political)” (p.134).  
In addition, the internet is a tool of great flexibility because it allows individuals to interact 
anonymously. Several studies find that the anonymity afforded by internet and social media 
empowers individuals and promotes participation. Norris (2004, p. 5), for example, states 
that “textual communication via the Internet strips away the standard visual and aural cues 
of social identity—including those of gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status—
plausibly promoting heterogeneity”. This affordance of anonymity, therefore, may 
encourage many people to contribute to online discussions because their contributions are 
not based on the social status or characteristics of the individual. Rather, they are based on 
the weight and rationality of their discussion. In repressive regimes, such anonymity is also 
vital for providing more freedom of speech because it allows citizens who may feel 
marginalized or may be at risk to express their dissenting views and opinions (Stromer-
Galley, 2006). As such, the internet can lead to a more inclusive and participatory 
environment of interaction which is significant for fostering the public sphere (Dahlberg, 
2001; Howard & Hussain, 2011). According to Stumpel (2009), the recently-emerged 
digital networks such as blogs and Twitter constitute some aspects of Habermas’ public 
sphere, because they allow for new alternative communicative spaces to develop.  
However, although anonymity of cyberspace leads to more participatory contributions, it 
can simultaneously promote division and isolation. According Sunstein, (2002) 
communicating anonymously may disperse the communication process rather than 
developing a common ground between the various lines of debate and points of view. In 
fact, Sunstein believes that the internet has a tendency to be a breeding ground for 
polarization: people who share the same views and beliefs isolate themselves by interacting 
only with like-minded people, in a way that resembles something like an echo chamber. 
This is something common in the online environment (Fuchs, 2010; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). 
Habermas himself points out that “in the context of liberal regimes, the Internet serves to 
fragment focused audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics” (Habermas, 2006, 
p. 423). boyd (2010) has a similar point of view. She stated that in a networked society, 
people have a tendency to connect with others like themselves so that information is likely 
to flow in ways that create and reinforce social divides rather than disintegrate them. As 
such, users might become intellectually isolated because they get significantly less contact 
with challenging viewpoints. As boyd puts it, “we all live in our own worlds with people 
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who share our values; with networked media, it can be hard to see beyond that if we are not 
looking” (p. 34).  
In this regard, Tufekci (2017), in her recent book, Twitter and Tear Gas: the Power and 
Fragility of Networked Protest, discussed the role of algorithmic filtering in creating this 
isolated environment. She demonstrated how algorithmic filtering, which results from 
personalized searches in digital environment, could isolate people in their own worlds, and 
provide them selective information resulting from their past activities. As a result, 
confirmation bias and the echo-chamber effect could be fostered and promoted. Tufekci 
(2017) also discussed how algorithmic filtering could lead to the creation of homogeneous 
clusters, who “then go on undertake vicious battles online, increasing polarization and thus 
turning off many people from politics” (p. xxix).  
As far back as 1999, Davis discussed a similar case in point in his book The Web of Politics. 
He argued that the aggressive and hostile discussion that often dominates online forums 
tends to lead the well-mannered to eventually withdraw from political participation. For 
Davis, such aggressive and uncivil discussion is likely to be a result of the anonymity 
afforded by the web. Being anonymous may make some users behave in a socially 
unacceptable way without having to take responsibility for their actions. According to more 
recent work exploring social media and political polarisation (e.g. Fuchs, 2010; Iosifidis, 
2011; Vaidhyanathan; 2018), the open democratic space afforded by the internet could 
alternatively turn into a space of chaos, partisanship and irrationality. An example of such 
a chaotic online environment is the audience’s responses to the Oscar Grant shooting 
incident where a young African-American man was fatally shot by a police officer. In this 
case, Antony & Thomas (2010) analysed the audience’s comments posted in response to 
the video of this incident, and found that the majority of content around the video was 
“inflammatory and derogatory” (p.1292), meaning the online sphere is not truly 
democratic. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind the strong racial undertones of this 
case.  
Yet, although such emotionally charged or polarised content may not necessarily be 
compatible with the Habermasian notion of rational critical discourse, these modes of 
expression are not considered as irrelevant to the public sphere. In fact, such forms of 
content construct a viable aspect of political engagement. According to Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough (1999) the aim of public discussion is not the exclusion or elimination of 
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difference, but rather its continuous deliberation and recognition of divergent points of 
view. In this regard, Chantal Mouffe (2005) stated that passion is an important aspect of 
democratic practice. She emphasised that passion should not be excluded from the rational 
public sphere. For her, the public sphere is about bringing to the fore passion and 
disagreements in order to confront them (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006). Many recent 
studies also emphasised the same point of view (e.g. Atton, 2002; Carroll & Hackett, 2006; 
Dahlberg & Siapera, 2007). They argue that the main contribution of the internet to 
democracy is its potential to promote a free and open dialogue, where oppositional and 
conflicting opinions can exist. This way of understanding the democratic potential of the 
internet, according to Moussa (2013), has been clearly demonstrated in the recent Arab 
spring uprisings. In her perspective, the internet enabled different political groups to 
interact, conflict and express their dissent during the events. However, the role of new 
technology in the Arab Spring is a hot topic that has initiated controversial discussions 
among many scholars since 2010/2011. The following section, therefore, moves on to 
discuss some of these arguments, shedding light on the networked Arab public sphere and 
its potentials and challenges in the light of the Arab Spring.  
3.5 The emergence of the new networked Arab public sphere: its potential 
and challenges 
The Arab world has a long history of building up an extensive censorship system over the 
mass media, the most powerful means of disseminating information in the region. The Arab 
public sphere was tightly controlled, closed, and characterised by repression (Howard, 
2010; Lynch, 2003). In this repressive climate, many people avoid talking about politics 
mainly due to their fear of government repression (Lynch, 2003; Aouragh, 2011; Issawi, 
2013). However, since the introduction of the satellite TV channel Al Jazeera in the 1990s 
(established in Qatar and first run by BBC-trained professionals), the information 
environment in the Arab world has been transformed (Lynch, 2003; Tufekci & Wilson, 
2012). Through covering sensitive issues and hot topics, Al Jazeera helped to create the 
beginning of a new Arab public sphere, and give Arab publics unprecedented access to 
various information and knowledge about different aspects of Arab political life (Lynch, 
2003). Al Jazeera, as such, established a new space for political communication, posing 
serious challenges to states’ hegemony in controlling information flow in the region.  
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Along with satellite TV channels, the introduction of the internet and its related 
technologies in 1991 has also shaped and transformed the information environment in the 
Arab region (Howard, 2010; Lim, 2013). Hudson (2001) predicted that information 
technology was “beginning to exert a revolutionary force across the Arab world... 
transforming Arab political culture”. Lynch (2006) also speculated that the internet held 
the prospect of a new kind of Arab public sphere that might shape the dynamics of Arab 
public opinion and political activism in the decades to come. According to Tufekci & 
Wilson (2012), one of the most important events in the transformation of the Arab public 
sphere, particularly in Egypt, was the introduction of the Arabic version of Facebook which 
began in March 2009. It enabled millions of users for the first time in modern Arabic history 
to discuss political issues different from the mainstream, including poverty, human rights 
and corruption. It also led to a number of small protests, specifically in Egypt, but remained 
firmly under control until the breakout of the Arab Spring. This suggest that although new 
internet technologies do not substitute for democracy, they provided means for Arabs to 
express themselves and challenge state censorship long before the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring (Randeree, 2011).    
During the Arab Spring uprisings, Aouragh, (2011) argued that social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter had become an alternative public sphere. In Egypt, for example, 
these platforms became a means for an important segment of Egyptians, who had similar 
interests, to express their dissent and exchange information about demonstrations 
(Aouragh, 2011). Alec Ross, Hillary Clinton’s senior adviser, called the internet the “Che 
Guevara of the twenty-first century” in his comment on the way digital media was used 
during the Arab Spring uprisings, crediting these technologies with facilitating 
overthrowing the long-standing regimes in the Arab region (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 6). 
However, without emphasising such overly optimistic views of social media, it is important 
to state that its role during the Arab Spring cannot be understood without taking into 
account the impact of the old media. Throughout the events, both forms of media, old and 
new, enhanced each other and shaped complex interrelationships (Aday, Farrell, Lynch, 
Sides, & Freelon, 2012). Due to the dangerous situation on the ground and the fast flow of 
events, traditional press and other media organizations relied on citizens as a source of 
information to produce their news. Using social media networks to convey news to the 
world, ordinary citizens became news creators (Hermida et al., 2014). The announcements 
of TV channels such as Al Jazeera and BBC TV are a good illustration of this collaboration 
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between citizens in politically hot places and editors in newsrooms. When the Arab Spring 
sparked, Al Jazeera, for instance, reactivated its platform Sharek (share) (Scott-Railton, 
2011), which was first introduced in 2008, which allowed people to upload their amateur 
footage and videos. These online materials were then aired on the Al Jazeera channel, after 
going through verification processes. It was reported that more than 1,600 videos per day 
were uploaded to the site during the Arab Spring events (Scott-Railton, 2011). In the same 
way, a short film was made by the BBC to guide users in documenting and sharing their 
experiences from the ground. Once the required content was submitted, procedures were 
applied to confirm the news before being circulated on the channel (Hänska-Ahy & 
Shapour, 2013). 
These new practices have led to a fundamental shift in the traditional ways of generating 
information and news. Chadwick (2011) has previously termed this phenomenon of news 
production “The Political Information Cycle” in which ‘old’ and ‘new’ media is seen as 
part of an increasingly hybrid media system rather than binary. Chadwick showed how the 
“Political Information Cycles” are built on news-making assemblages that combine older 
and newer media logics, presenting new opportunities for non-elite actors to shape media 
and political agendas through timely interventions and interactions with professional 
journalists. This integrative aspects of hybridity shapes power relations among actors and 
ultimately affects the flows and meanings of news.  
Tufekci & Wilson (2012) also recognized the connectivity infrastructure as a complex 
ecology that involves interrelated components rather than focusing on any particular device 
or platform. While social media was a source of information on the protests, they found 
that just under half of the participants found out about the demonstrations face-to-face. 
Tufekci & Wilson view the internet and social media as one portion of the emergence of a 
new system of political communication. Through this concept, they emphasise the 
importance of a mix of traditional and digital tools in the emergent new media ecology, 
stating that: 
 “events in North Africa and the Middle East are now being shaped by a new system 
of political communication which sets into sharp relief the importance of digitally 
mediated interpersonal communication. This system is characterized by the 
increasingly interrelated use of satellite television, the Internet (particularly social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter), and the widespread use of Internet-
enabled cellphones capable of transmitting photos and video” (p. 377). 
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This hybrid media system according to them contributed to the formation of a new kind of 
public sphere in the Arab world, and therefore, offers new opportunities to those seeking 
change and enhance their ability to undertake collective action. The widespread use of cell 
phone cameras improved citizens’ ability to document events and record pictures and 
videos, allowing them to act as watchdogs to convey information and spot government 
misconduct. 
This practice of watching was termed by Steve Mann as “sousveillance”, meaning that 
citizens can employ their camera devices to observe, monitor and gather information about 
higher authorities (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003). During the Arab Spring, the wide-
spread images and video footages that showed how protesters were violently repressed by 
their government is a good example of this. It proved successful in drawing international 
attention, particularly when these user-generated content gained further spread through 
global news networks such as Al-Jazeera (Lynch, 2011). As stated by Castells (2011, p. 
413), “the powerful have been spying on their subjects since the beginning of history, but 
the subjects can now watch the powerful, at least to a greater extent than in the past. We 
have all become potential citizen journalists who, if equipped with a mobile phone, can 
record and instantly upload to the global networks any wrongdoing by anyone, anywhere”.  
Yet activists, and regular citizens who choose to document regime violence and 
misconducts by posting images and releasing videos online are risking much to contest 
authoritarian governments. As Evgeny Morozov and other sceptics point out, regimes are 
increasingly developing their adaptation strategies of internet technologies to crack down 
on protesters on- and off-line (Morozov, 2012). This is evident in the case of the Arab 
Spring and the Green movement in Iran, where many activists and demonstrators were 
harassed or arrested by their governments (Morozov, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013). 
Morozov called these practices of arrest and abuse “the post-protest clean up” (Morozov, 
2012). In this way, even anonymous online communications cannot entirely create a freer 
and safer environment to communicate around politics or organize social actions. Emerging 
technologies such as facial recognition, voice analysis, and mobile tracking could call into 
question online anonymity as a parameter of safety when used by repressive regimes 
(Morozov, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013). These tendencies of surveillance, therefore, 
could limit people’s participation in taking actions towards social or political change due 
to fear of government repression. According to Iskandar (2006), in non-democratic 
societies, fear of government retaliation often results in apathetic political attitudes among 
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citizens. As mentioned previously, long before the Arab Spring, citizens in the Arab region 
suffered from strict surveillance on the internet. In 2008, for example, Egypt introduced 
regulations for using internet cafes, requiring users to submit personal details such as a 
name and phone number before logging in (Bailly, 2012). In Saudi Arabia, although 
citizens have easy access to the internet, the country has applied a comprehensive internet 
censorship system, similar to the system applied in Iran and China (Hussain & Howard, 
2013). Likewise, in UAE, despite its rank as the Arabic nation with the highest percentage 
of new Facebook user penetration in 2010, the country received the lowest score for internet 
freedom (Salem & Mourtada, 2011).   
In addition, communicating anonymously using fake identities to avoid government 
surveillance considered a violation of some social media companies’ user agreement 
(Howard & Hussain, 2013). During the Egyptian revolution, for example, some protest 
group pages were shut down by the Facebook company before activists successfully 
reinstated them. The reason was because the company requires its users to use real 
identities, while the company, as public information infrastructure, fails to recognise the 
needs of those living in dictatorships, who need levels of anonymity to avoid government 
surveillance (Howard & Hussain, 2013).  
In addition, while the United States, the home of these big companies such as Facebook 
and Google, has announced a new approach to promote internet freedom overseas in 2010 
by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Shirky, 2011), it has often been accused of 
applying different ways of surveillance and censorship (Howard, 2010; Tufekci, 2017). 
Edward Snowden revealed details of the existence of a massive U.S. government 
surveillance program at a large scale including spying not only on its citizens but also on 
leaders of other foreign countries (Inkster, 2014; Tufekci, 2017). Another example of the 
U.S surveillance and censorship approach was in relation to 2003 invasion of Iraq. As stated 
by Elmer (as cited in Howard, 2010), in 2003 the US government added the word “Iraq” to 
a list of excluded search words on the internet to ban large companies such as Google from 
archiving information related to the Iraqi security situation. This process prevented citizens 
around the globe from learning about political life in Iraq. 
This discussion clearly shows the contradictory approach of US media policy, which as 
Chomsky observes often involves spreading manipulative news, while ignoring reporting 
on government operations, and engendering necessary public illusions until the populace 
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take no heed of these incidents, which are then portrayed as scandals (Chomsky, 2004). 
The processes of surveillance which is often interrelated with censorship, therefore, is not 
simply a problem of government agencies trying to control online content; it is a complex 
activity that often involves different actors such as the U.S. based firms, 
telecommunications policy makers from international agencies, cultural elites, and even 
foreign governments (Howard, 2010).  
In addition to the surveillance and censorship issue, the development of the networked Arab 
public sphere, as elsewhere, carries several other challenges. The internet, in theory, is open 
to anyone, allowing subaltern groups to voice their views and build solidarity (Harlow & 
Harp, 2012). In practice, it is essential to say that not all publics have the internet access or 
the required skills to participate equally, particularly in developing societies. For instance, 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), showed that the percentage of internet 
users in Arab states was 24.3% in 2010 and 37.0% in 2015; while in Europe, the figure was 
66.6% in 2010 and 77.6% in 2015. The gap between the “information-rich” and the 
“information-poor” is aggravated in contemporary society, the result being that the internet 
has generated a more segmented model of the public sphere as opposed to the inclusive one 
introduced by Habermas (Gitlin, as cited in Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 34). 
However, the digital divide is not the only challenge to the public sphere. According to 
many scholars (e.g. Papacharissi, 2009; Fuchs, 2010; Vaidhyanathan, 2018), although 
online media enables and empowers citizens, it simultaneously reproduces gender, class, 
and race inequalities of the offline public sphere. They argued that greater access to 
information could mean greater access to political elites which could lead to shape and 
influence public opinion. In this regard, Rheingold (2000, p. 297) argued that “the 
telecommunications industry is a business, viewed primarily as an economic player. It gives 
certain people access to means of influencing certain other people's thoughts and 
perceptions, and that access – who has it and who doesn't have it – is intimately connected 
with political power”. Gerhards & Schafer (2010) suggest that the internet can be 
dominated by those already politically active rather than being a space for marginalised 
people. The internet is similar to traditional media in terms of being controlled by 
traditional gatekeepers. This means that the minority can control opinions and shape the 
actions of publics. According to Gerbaudo (2012), the contemporary movements such as 
the Arab Spring uprisings were not entirely leaderless. He asserts that social media 
platforms are strongly characterized by hierarchical structure exemplified by the emergence 
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of soft leadership and liquid forms of organization. For him, influential Facebook 
administrators and Twitter users are considered new forms of leadership, playing a vital 
role in contemporary collective movements. He argued that the forms of social media 
communication during the 2011 events were characterised by “a power law distribution” 
meaning that most of the communication flow was controlled by a handful of people such 
as activists and powerful actors. For example, the activist Wael Ghonim in Egypt played a 
pivotal role in initiating and sustaining events in their countries through the use of social 
media.  
This discussion presents the concept of the logic of connective action introduced by Bennett 
& Segerberg (2012). In their interesting study, they distinguish between the logic of 
collective and connective action. The former involves high levels of organisational 
resources and hierarchical institutions, while the latter centres on personalised content 
shared across social media, where individuals are able to join protests without having to 
buy into an ideological perspective. Bennett & Segerberg stated that the latter model applies 
to the recent contemporary large-scale protests (e.g. Arab Spring, los Indignados in Spain 
and Occupy Wall Street) where internet and social media took the role of conventional 
organizations and enabled personalized engagement. According to them, the personal 
slogans that spread across social media networks (e.g. ‘we are the 99 per cent’ of the 
Occupy movement) had the potential to retain people’s emotional commitment to action, 
leading them to scale up events more quickly and get larger audiences. 
According to Gitlin (2003), movement activities are likely to involve drama and spectacle, 
passion and emotion, conflict and threat aspects. In contrast to the rational-based public 
sphere, many scholars acknowledged the importance of emotions in the public sphere, 
particularly in relation to social movements. Melucci (1996), for example, views emotions 
as an important element of collective actions. He argued that “there is no cognition without 
feeling and no meaning without emotion” (p. 71). Similarly, Jasper (2011) described 
emotion as a means of action to achieve political goals, where it is used to recruit new 
participants and sustain movement.  
More recently, there has been increased scholarly attention paid to the emotional public 
sphere in relation to the contemporary movements. In their study of Twitter posts with the 
#egypt hashtag in the period pre- and post-resignation of Hosni Mubarak, Zizi Papacharissi 
& De Fatima Oliveira (2012) demonstrated the importance of Twitter in affording 
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individuals opportunities to share affective news and personal stories, that contributed to 
driving the movement and sustaining publics’ involvement in the events. Papacharissi 
(2015) developed her work further in her recent book “Affective Public”, which examines 
the use of Twitter hashtags including the cases of Egypt and Occupy Wall Street. In this 
book, Papacharissi defines affective publics as “networked public formations that are 
mobilized and connected or disconnected through expressions of sentiment” (p. 125). She 
states that affect may result in driving a movement forward but it may simultaneously 
entrap publics in a loop of sustained spectatorship. Papacharissi concludes that discourses 
produced via Twitter present a departure from the ideal rational discussion to a form of 
discussion that combines “news, fact, drama and opinion into one, to the point where telling 
one from the other was impossible and doing so missed the point” (Papacharissi, 2016, p. 
318).  
Castells (2012) and Gerbaudo (2012, 2016) also discussed the emotional dimension of the 
public sphere in relation to recent movements, mainly the Arab uprisings, the Indignados 
movement in Spain, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US. Both stressed the 
importance of the internet in creating shared feelings and a sense of togetherness that 
motivated dispersed participants to come together and rise against their regime. However, 
Gerbaudo (2012) stated that once the protests reached public spaces, the role of social 
media declined and face-to-face communication took over and became more effective. He 
also argued that although moments of digital enthusiasm are considered a key factor in 
motivating protest participation, they may run the risk of evanescence in the aftermath of 
events. He illustrated this point by stating that “once these events are over, the messages 
linked to them disappear into the electronic dustbin and become of interest only to the 
researcher or the abnormally curious, not to mention very difficult to retrieve” (p. 166). 
This evanescent character of social media messages and the ever-changing communicative 
flow could be linked to Morozov’s influential work The Net Delusion (Morozov, 2011a). 
He argued that describing the contemporary events as a “Twitter Revolution” was simply 
a “wild fantasy”. The reason for his argument is that much of the momentum of the Iran 
movement, for example, was lost in the months subsequent to the election. Morozov (2009) 
views online political activity as a mere “slacktivism”, a concept which points to people 
being required to exert only the small effort of just clicking on online political topics rather 
than actively engaging in different forms of productive activism. He believes that 
slacktivism is “feel-good activism that has zero political or social impact” but it creates “an 
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illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without demanding anything more 
than joining a Facebook group” (Morozov, 2009, para.1). Overall, Morozov disagrees with 
the optimistic vision of the democratic potential of the internet, and often criticises Western 
interpretations of describing information technology as liberator (Morozov, 2011). 
This pessimistic vision of the impact of social media on political activism has also been 
taken up by Malcolm Gladwell (2010). Gladwell believes that offline activism is a “strong-
tie” phenomenon, where people feel more secure beside their close friends and family in 
standing up and voicing their opinion, particularly in dangerous situations. Online activism, 
characterised by “weak-tie” connections, is seen by him as having low impact in the real 
world, and as being less likely to result in high risk activism. However, these arguments 
are contested by Tufekci (2017). She views online activism as not simply “just clicking.” 
She believes that even a mere act such as changing a profile picture on Facebook to protest 
discrimination against a certain cause may over time contribute to changing culture and 
make social change possible. In her perspective, “in a repressive country, tweeting may be 
a very brave act, while marching on the streets may present few difficulties in a more 
advanced democracy” (Tufekci, 2017, p. xxvi).  
The networked public sphere is fraught with considerable challenges. Very recently, 
Facebook, as part of its “Hard Questions” series, published a set of blog posts to assess the 
platform’s impact on democracy in relation to elections, uprisings, partisan politics, and 
fake news. The company admitted that social media can be bad for even a well-functioning 
democracy. The widespread amount of misinformation and hoaxes on social media poses 
a real challenge for the company. Samidh Chakrabarti (2018), the product manager for civic 
engagement at Facebook, stated that the company is fighting the downside of the platform 
on democracy, working with third party fact checkers to identify false information and 
stories. However, this is not an easy task to achieve. Chakrabarti (2018) writes, “Even with 
all these countermeasures, the battle will never end” (para, 19).  
In this complex networked public sphere, too much content competes for attention, and 
being able to generate and disseminate information on social media does not mean equal 
distribution of resources and opportunities (boyd, 2010; Tufekci, 2017). According to boyd 
(2010), messages which include highly stimulating content (e.g. violence, anger or gossip) 
often find their way easily to people and create emotional responses. Therefore, people 
have to learn how to consume such content because distinguishing between what is fake 
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and what is true is a real struggle in our networked society. Tufekci (2017) described this 
situation as “futile” because people become suspicious of everything, and this feeling is 
likely to lead them to follow information that resonates with their existing views and 
ideologies. As a result, people are likely to be isolated and excluded in their own worlds, 
leading us back to Habermas’ (2006) concerns about the quality of discussion on the web, 
and how the internet serves to fragment focused audiences into isolated publics.  
3.6 Chapter summary  
This chapter has examined the existing literature with the aims of reviewing the public 
sphere concept in the existing body of knowledge and establishing an area of contribution 
to knowledge. Through engaging with different debates around the Habermasian public 
sphere concept, the chapter demonstrates that Habermas’ concept of a single, universal 
public sphere has remained an unreachable ideal, and has evaporated in favour of multiple 
competing publics (Fraser, 1990). Studying the literature also shows that the internet and 
its related technology do not constitute a public sphere in the Habermasian sense. It can be 
seen that although these technological advancements have transformed the public sphere, 
their impact upon democratic politics reveals a complex picture that warns against over-
simplistic or celebratory accounts of technology. The two false positions of the earlier 
experiments in digital democracy, optimism versus pessimism, were found to be not 
relevant anymore (Shirky, 2011; Morozov, 2011). This thesis, therefore, moves to embrace 
a more complex way of thinking to understand the relationship between technology and 
society, taking into account political, social and cultural context.  
While much of the research so far has focused mostly upon Egypt or Tunisia, very little is 
known about the extent to which sites such as Facebook played a role in the Libyan 
uprising. The Libyan uprising has received limited attention despite its rich digital 
experience. The growing adoption of digital technologies in the country along with 
considerable political, social and security challenges are introducing complex dynamics 
that require a better understanding. Rather than generalising the Arab digital experience, it 
is valuable to focus on specific cases to highlight the specificity of certain contexts (Zayani, 
2015). This study aims to make a contribution to fill this gap in knowledge.  
The study also aims to find out how the use of internet and social media has evolved over 
time and circumstances, which is something not previously investigated. Previous studies 
have mainly focused on the time in which uprisings occurred rather than following how 
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everyday uses, routines and experiences has changed over time. The post-Arab Spring 
period is expected to provide rich and interesting cases that are worthwhile for study. This 
thesis, therefore, attempts not only to focus on a single period of time, but aims to advance 
our understanding of the nature of the emergent networked public sphere in Libya during 
three critical phases, before, during and after the uprising. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the methodology used for this study. It explains the choices that have 
been taken in order to conduct the research, introduces the research philosophical 
paradigms, and provides a review of the methods chosen for data collection and analysis. 
It offers the reasoning behind the choices made in order to achieve the study aim, 
highlighting the factors and challenges in conducting the study in a dynamic, fast-paced 
and war-zone environment.  
4.2 Research philosophical paradigms 
This section discusses a number of philosophical paradigms that are widely used in the 
social sciences to then focus on the one selected for the current study. Pickard (2007) 
defined a paradigm as a “world view that is accepted by members of a particular scientific 
discipline which guides the subject of the research, the activity of the research and the 
nature of the research (p. 5). Creswell (2013) stated that a paradigm can be thought of as 
“abstract ideas and beliefs that inform our research” (p. 16). Philosophical paradigms are 
important because they affect the practice of the research, which in turn might influence 
knowledge that researchers attempt to develop; thus, they require recognition (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011). According to Crotty (2003) research philosophy can help researchers to: 1) 
identify the most appropriate research design; 2) assess and evaluate methodological 
choices; 3) enhance their creativity. 
In social science, the philosophical assumptions that underline all research are ontological, 
epistemological and methodological. The term ontology is concerned with the nature of 
reality (Guba, 1990). It relates to “the nature of social phenomena – are they relatively inert 
and beyond our influence or are they a product of social interaction?” (Bryman, A. & Bell, 
2015, p. 6). These two ontological questions are referred to as objectivism and 
constructivism. Objectivism implies that social phenomena exist independently or 
separately from social actors (Neuman, 2011). In this position, objectivists believe that 
there is a single and pre-given reality that can be measured or observed following a 
scientific model (Merriam, 2009; Bryman, 2012). This means that there is only one way to 
understand any subject. Constructivism, on the other hand, asserts that social phenomena 
are subjective and reality is multiple rather than single. The social world, in constructivism, 
is seen as the product of human interactions and participation in social life (Martens, 2005). 
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The researcher, in this position, attempts to see things from human actors’ point of view in 
order to grasp the meanings of their behaviour (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, the reality 
requires the need for active interpreting and constructing individual knowledge 
representations in order to understand how they act and make sense of their everyday 
actions.  
While ontology is associated with the nature of reality, epistemology is concerned with the 
nature of knowledge, and the ways of understanding and explaining reality. In short, 
epistemology addresses the question of ‘how do we know something?’ (Guba, 1990; 
Merriam, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Creswell, 2013). To understand social 
phenomena, there are three basic epistemological paradigms in research, namely 
positivism, interpretivism and pragmatism. The three positions tend to follow different 
methodological procedures and strategies to discover knowledge (Merriam, 2009; Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011). According to Silverman (2005, p. 99), methodology “refers to the 
choices we make about cases to study, methods of data gathering, forms of data analysis, 
etc., in planning and executing a research study”. Positivists usually employ a quantitative 
approach, and it is typically associated with the testing of theory using highly structured 
methods such as experiments and questionnaires (Bryman, 2012). Interpretivists prefer a 
qualitative approach, and this is usually associated with the generation of theory using in-
depth investigations (Creswell, 2013), while pragmatists tend to use a mixed methods 
approach to better understand and solve the problem (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). The 
table below provides a detailed overview of the most common paradigms in social science 
research and explains key beliefs about them.  
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Table 4.1. Summary of most common paradigms in social science research 
Paradigm  Ontology  
What is reality?  
Epistemology  
How do you know reality? 
Methodology  
How do you go about 
finding it out?   
Positivism  There is a single reality 
(Merriam, 2009). 
Reality can be objectively 
measured and observed 
(Merriam, 2009). 
It is usually associated 
with quantitative methods 
of data collection and 
analysis such as 
questionnaires and 
experiments  (Merriam, 
2009; Creswell, 2013). 
Interpretivism/ 
constructivism  
There is no single 
reality. “reality is 
socially constructed” 
(Martens, 2005, p. 12).  
Reality is seen through 
individuals’ lenses, 
which are shaped by 
their experience and their 
subjectivity (Neuman, 
2011). 
Reality needs to be 
interpreted in order to 
discover underlying 
meaning of events and 
actions through accessing 
multiple perspectives of 
individuals or groups 
(Neuman, 2011).  
It is usually associated with 
qualitative methods of data 
collection and analysis 
such as qualitative 
interviews, observations, 
case studies, and narrative 
analysis (Creswell, 2003).   
Pragmatism  Reality is changeable 
and constantly 
renegotiated, debated 
and interpreted.  
Pragmatism tends to 
focus on the ‘what’ and 
‘how’ of the research 
problem (Creswell, 
2003, p.11). 
Therefore, the best method 
to use is the one that solves 
the problem (Creswell, 
2003).  
It is usually associated with 
mixed methods of data 
collection and analysis 
(Creswell, 2003).   
 
In the light of the above considerations, the interpretivist/constructivist position is applied 
because it offers an appropriate route for this research. The aim of this study is to advance 
our understanding of the nature of the emergent Libyan networked public sphere, and its 
evolution over the past few years. In order to do so, in-depth interviews with young people 
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and qualitative content analysis of a sample of popular Facebook pages are conducted. In 
the interpretivist/ constructivist position, the researcher believes that people’s stories, 
experiences, interactions and uses are value laden, subjective and differ from one to another 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). In other words, they are social phenomena constructed 
through social interaction between humans and their world. By accessing multiple 
perspectives and realities, this study seeks to bring into consciousness hidden structural 
forces such as political and cultural values that are an integral part of the social phenomenon 
(Crotty, 1998). The interpretation and understanding of the meaning inherent in those social 
realities can then define the social phenomena of the emergent networked public sphere in 
Libya.  
What is also important about taking the interpretivist/ constructivist position is the ability 
to use qualitative methods under this paradigm. The reason for preferring a qualitative 
rather than quantitative approach is that the former is more suitable for understanding a 
complex social phenomenon. Unlike a quantitative approach which views social reality as 
external and uses standardised tools to discover it, qualitative methods offer the opportunity 
to explore beliefs, meanings, and thoughts from the studied individuals’ perspectives 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). A qualitative approach helps to answer the questions of how and 
what, giving the researcher the advantage of gaining in-depth understanding of the situation 
(Seidman, 1991).  
The wealth of detailed data that emerges from employing qualitative research is described 
by Patton (1990) as the “fruit” of qualitative methods. It provides a fuller picture of the 
issue under study, enabling the reader to experience the phenomena as if they were there 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). This kind of exploration of the social world is considered a 
valuable feature of qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Therefore, a qualitative 
approach is best suited for this study to better understand, explore and capture nuanced 
details of the role of technology in the Libyan context. 
4.3 Deductive and inductive reasoning 
There are two common research approaches of reasoning, which are known as deductive 
and inductive (Patton, 2002; Merriam, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The deductive 
approach is often associated with quantitative methods (testing theory). Researchers in 
deductive reasoning processes use a top-down approach driven by prior theories or 
hypotheses to test their validity (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2011; William M K Trochim, 
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Donnelly, & Arora, 2014). By contrast, the inductive approach is more exploratory and 
open-ended (building theory), and often associated with qualitative methods (Bryman, 
2012). Researchers who employ inductive approach aim to develop and build theory from 
data obtained from the fieldwork using a bottom-up approach (Crotty, 1998; Patton, 2002). 
According to Braun & Clarke (2006, p. 83), it is “a process of coding the data without 
trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame”. The diagram below provides an illustration 
of the differences between inductive and deductive reasoning process.  
Figure 4.1 Deductive and inductive reasoning process 
  
           Adapted from: (Bryman, 2012; William M K Trochim, Donnelly, & Arora, 2014) 
Since the present study aims to advance our understanding of the nature of the Libyan 
networked public sphere, through exploring how technology was used and experienced 
over three critical phases, before, during and after the uprising, an inductive approach is 
more suited for the nature of this study than the deductive. Soiferman (2010) stated that 
proper selection of the research approach is highly dependent on the nature of the research 
arguments. He argued that “arguments based on experience or observation are best 
expressed inductively, while arguments based on laws, rules, or other widely accepted 
principles are best expressed deductively” (p. 3). However, although this study is deemed 
to be primarily inductive in orientation, one cannot ignore the impact of the pre-existing 
Deductive reasoning 
Theory 
Hypothesis  
Observation  
Confirmation or rejection 
Inductive reasoning 
Pattern 
Observation 
Tenantive hypothesis 
Theory 
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theories in this research. It is important to acknowledge that in reality the distinction 
between deductive and inductive approaches can be vague because inductive reasoning can 
involve some deductive elements and vice versa (Bryman, A. & Bell, 2015). According to 
Gray (2014), existing theories and literature can have an impact on inductive research in 
terms of formulating the research problem and starting with an area of study. Duneier et al. 
(2002) in this respect also stated that the pure deductive or inductive approach does not 
exist because some questions are “brought to the site from the beginning”, while others are 
“discovered through various routes” (2002, p. 1566). However, what needs to be 
understood is that in inductive research, the researcher does not aim to confirm or refute 
theory. Rather, he/she seeks to make sense of the social world through establishing themes 
and patterns from the collected data (Shereier, 2012). 
In this research, the existing theories and literature help to develop an understanding of the 
democratic potential of technology in order to address the research problem. As discussed 
in the literature and the theoretical framework chapter, much uncertainty still exists about 
the relationship between technology and society. Therefore, forming hypotheses through 
reviewing the existing body of literature would be an inappropriate plan, particularly in a 
dynamic, fast-changing environment such as Libya. Equally importantly, the exploratory 
nature of this study makes it more suited for following an inductive approach to analyse 
the collected data, to allow for new themes and patterns to emerge from analysis. According 
to Markham & Baym (2009), qualitative Internet research involves the “study of the 
multiple meanings and experiences that emerge around the Internet in a particular context. 
These meanings and experiences can relate to contexts of use (by individuals, 
organizations, networks, etc.) and/or to contexts of design and production processes” (p. 
34). The researcher then has to inquire into those meanings and experiences to discover 
their importance.   
4.4 Research methods  
This section explains and seeks to justify the methods and techniques used to collect data 
for this research. According to Norris (2001, p.36), “research methods are better drawn 
from a variety of disciplines as no single methodology can hope to capture the rich 
complexities of life on the Internet”. In this research, therefore, multiple qualitative 
research techniques were adapted as part of a process of triangulation to provide a broader 
understanding of the research questions, and assure validity of claims and arguments. These 
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qualitative methods were: (1) semi-structured interviews; and (2) qualitative content 
analysis of selected Facebook pages.  
Epistemologically, interviews can “give access to the manifold of local narratives 
embodied in storytelling and opens the way for a discourse and negotiation of meaning of 
the lived world” (Kvale, 2007). In research, there are three common types of interviews 
that can be adopted: unstructured, structured and semi-structured. The unstructured 
interview is essentially an informal type of conversation.  The interviewer has only a list of 
issues to be covered, and the phrasing of questions can vary from interview to another. 
Therefore, it requires an experienced interviewer to remain on topic (Kvale, 2007). On the 
other hand, structured interviews tend to rely on prearranged questions and each participant 
is given the same set of questions in the same order (Bryman, 2012). By contrast to the 
previous two forms of interview, the semi-structured interview gives more freedom to 
researchers and participants because it has a tendency to be “fluid rather than rigid” (Yin, 
2013, p. 110). The researcher conducting this type of interview usually has a list of 
questions to guide him/her during the course of the interview. This interview guide helps 
to make the interviews more “systematic” and “comprehensive”, while simultaneously 
offering an open, flexible process of conversation, allowing the interviewer to expand on 
certain questions or skip others (Bryman, 2012). The flexibility of conversation allows the 
interviewer to elaborate on issues related to a particular study while gaining in-depth 
understanding of the interviewee’s experience (Bryman, 2012). Among these three forms, 
in-depth semi structured interview is best suited for the exploratory nature of this study. Its 
open-ended questions enable the researcher to discover emerging themes related to how 
technology was experienced and used over the past few years in Libya.  
The second method used in this research is qualitative content analysis of selected 
Facebook pages. Analysing Facebook data can provide a rich description of the 
phenomenon under study, especially in unique studies of this type. According to Riffe, 
Lacy, & Fico (2005), analysing social media data is important because it allows the 
researcher to analyse online messages posted in a natural environment by individuals of 
their own volition, unlike surveys where individuals may potentially employ selective 
memory or inaccurately report their uses or experiences (Smith, 2010). In this study, the 
triangulation of data collection techniques helped to gain in-depth insights into the topic 
under study. The following sections describe the process of data collection and analysis. 
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4.5 Data collection procedure 
This section offers an explanation of the data collection procedure for both interviews and 
Facebook content, such as the rationale for selecting the study population, sampling and 
recruitment process, and difficulties and challenges faced while collecting the data.  
4.5.1 Interviews 
4.5.1.1 Rationale for choosing young people  
A demographic bulge resulting in large numbers of young people was one of the 
characteristics common to the MENA region at the time of the 2011 uprisings, where young 
people between the ages of 15 and 29 made up around one-third of the population, and 
people under 30 made up about two-thirds of the population (Salem & Mourtada, 2011; 
USAID, 2011; Grim & Karim, 2011). In the UK, for example, the comparable figure of 
young people between the ages of 15 and 29 was about 12 per cent (Grim & Karim, 2011). 
During the Arab Uprisings, it was evident that young people participated in the protests in 
large numbers, and the events themselves have been dubbed “youth revolutions” (Bossio 
& Bebawi, 2012; Dahan, 2014; Cole, 2014; Abdalla, 2016). Studying young people, 
therefore, was highly relevant and helped to develop a focused area of research, particularly 
as the majority of social media users were young people (Salem & Mourtada, 2011). In 
Libya, for example, it was indicated that the majority of Libyans below 35 used the Internet 
daily in 2014 (Schäfer, 2015). The broad definition of youth used in this study includes 
anyone between 25 and 35 who has been a social media user, and was involved in one way 
or another in the 2011 events and the aftermath. The reason for choosing participants who 
at the time of data collection were no younger than 25 was to guarantee that they would be 
at least 18 years old when the revolution was occurring. Henceforth in this study it can be 
suggested that in 2011 the participants were mature, aware of their surroundings, and likely 
to be at the core of the revolution standing against or with the regime.   
Young participants in this study was chosen from three different cities across Libya. Taking 
in consideration that Libya historically was divided into three provinces: Tripolitania, 
Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (Bearman, 1986; Bell, Anthony & Witter, 2011), the study chose to 
recruit participants from the main cities of these three regions to allow the researcher to 
obtain a variety of ideas and views. These cities are Tripoli, the capital, which is located in 
the north west of Libya; Benghazi, which is located in the north east of Libya; and Sabha, 
located in the south. The researcher’s choice to recruit participants from different cities also 
fits with Fraser’s argument in relation to her understanding of egalitarian and multi-cultural 
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society to recruit participants. For her, an egalitarian and multi-cultural society is premised 
on the idea of plurality of public arenas that involve participation of a multiplicity of groups 
with diverse values and beliefs. As such, the study sample were considered a diverse 
representation.  
4.5.1.2 Sampling procedure  
The recruitment process began by contacting a number of young people through the 
personal network of the researcher. Two initial contacts were identified purposively in each 
city. The researcher took into account that these initial individuals were sufficiently diverse 
in terms of their political involvement so that the study did not include only a more 
politically active and engaged cohort. After deciding on this, the sampling proceeded 
through ‘snowball’ sampling. Bryman (2012) defines snowball sampling as a “technique in 
which the researcher samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research 
questions, and these sampled participants propose other participants who have had the 
experience or characteristic relevant to the research” (p. 424). The reason behind choosing 
two initial contacts in each city was to form separate snowball samples in order to enhance 
the sample diversity, and avoid the risk of interviewing people who might have similar 
views or narratives. To further ensure diversity and inclusion in terms of gender, social 
class, geographic location, ethnicity (Arab or Berber) and political ideology, initial contacts 
were encouraged to recommend the study to more than just their closest acquaintances. 
Table 4.2 summarises the demographic features of the study sample. 
In terms of sample size, Patton (2002, p. 242) argued that “there are no rules for sample 
size in qualitative inquiry”. However, there are many approaches can be used to decide on 
the sample size in qualitative research. Klenke (2008) recommends a sample size of 2 to 25 
individuals. Similarly,  Creswell (2007) suggests 5 to 25 participants for qualitative studies. 
Other scholars (Bowen, 2008; Mason, 2010) suggest that it is best that the researcher 
continue conducting interviews until data saturation is reached, meaning that new themes 
will stop emerging by further investigation. In this study, the later approach of data 
saturation was applied, that led to conducting 25 interviews.   
Within the approach explained above, the researcher managed to recruit 25 young 
partcipants, consisting of (13) from Tripoli, (8) from Benghazi and (4) from Sabha. The 
sample is composed nearly equally of male (12) and female (13). Arabs constitute the 
majority of the sample (21), while Amazighs constitute a minority (4), which is reflective 
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of the country as a whole. In terms of political stance, the researcher managed to recruit 
(16) pro-revolutions, (6) anti-revolution and (3) uncertain. It is important to mention that 
participants’ stance was associated to their opinion back in 2011 and many of them (mainly 
pro-revolution) have, to some degree, changed their opinion over time.    
Table 4.2. Demographic characteristics of the sample 
Participant  City  Gender  Ethnicity  Level of education 9 Political stance  Code  
01 Tripoli  Female  Arab  Postgraduate education Pro-revolution  (T-F-01-PRO) 
02 Tripoli  Female  Amazigh High school  Pro-revolution  (T-F-02-PRO) 
03 Tripoli  Male  Arab  Diploma Anti-revolution   (T-M-03-ANTI) 
04 Tripoli  Male  Arab  Diploma  Pro-revolution  (T-M-04-PRO) 
05 Tripoli  Female  Arab  Undergraduate education  Pro-revolution  (T-F-05-PRO) 
06 Tripoli  Female  Arab Master’s degree  Uncertain  (T-F-06-UNC) 
07 Benghazi  Male  Arab  Undergraduate education Pro-revolution  (B-M-07-PRO) 
08 Benghazi  Male  Arab  Master’s degree Pro-revolution  (B-M-08-PRO) 
09 Sabha  Female   Arab  Master’s degree Pro-revolution (S-F-09-PRO) 
10 Benghazi  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Pro-revolution  (B-F-10-PRO) 
11 Benghazi  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Anti-revolution (B-F-11-ANTI) 
12 Benghazi  Male  Arab  PhD Pro-revolution  (B-M-12-PRO) 
13 Benghazi  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Pro-revolution (B-F-13-PRO) 
14 Tripoli   Male  Amazigh Bachelor's degree Pro-revolution   (T-M-14-PRO) 
15 Tripoli   Male  Arab  Diploma  Pro-revolution  (T-M-15-PRO) 
16 Tripoli  Male  Arab  Master’s degree  Pro-revolution  (T-M-16-PRO) 
17 Sabha  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Pro-revolution (S-F-17-PRO) 
18 Tripoli  Male  Amazigh Bachelor's degree Pro-revolution  (T-M-18-PRO) 
19 Tripoli  Male  Amazigh High school  Pro-revolution  (T-M-19-PRO) 
20 Sabha  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Anti-revolution  (S-F-20-PRO) 
21 Sabha  Male  Arab  Master’s degree Uncertain  (S-M-21-UNC) 
22 Benghazi  Male  Arab  Bachelor's degree Anti-revolution  (B-M-22-ANTI) 
23 Tripoli  Female  Arab  Bachelor's degree Anti-revolution  (T-F-23-ANTI) 
24 Tripoli  Female  Arab  Master’s degree Anti-revolution  (T-F-24-ANTI) 
25 Benghazi  Male  Arab  Bachelor's degree Uncertain   (B-M-25-ANTI) 
 
4.5.1.3 Recruitment difficulties  
Although the nature of a snowball sample can help to provide a friendly and reliable 
environment for potential interviewees, recruiting process was very challenging due to:  
 Unwillingness and suspicion 
                                                          
9 Education is compulsory from 6 to 15 years in Libya, and youth literacy rate was 99.9% in 2015 (Rose, 
2015).  
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Although political topics have become ordinary conversations in everyday life in 
Libya after the revolution, suspicion towards the research and the sensitivity of the 
topic seemed to lead some potential interviewees to be reluctant in participating in 
the study. One of the potential contacts, for example, has blocked the researcher on 
Facebook after being invited to take part in this study, leaving a message saying 
that she does not understand politics. Another participant received the invitation but 
has never replied or provided an explanation, although he saw the invitation 
message. The very idea of doing academic research, specifically when mentioning 
signing the consent form, seemed to make the researcher a suspicious person for 
some potential participants. Within the increased deterioration in the security 
situation in the country, this behaviour was expected and understandable. However, 
it cost the researcher a lot of time and energy to overcome these obstacles and reach 
more participants.   
 
 Technical issues 
Technical issues were an inevitable result of the ongoing conflict. The violent 
clashes that erupted from time to time during the data collection, the electricity 
outages, the telecommunication infrastructure damage – factors that limited the 
internet connectivity, lead to delays in interview arrangements. For example, it was 
very difficult to recruit participants from Sabha city due to the frequent electricity 
cut off and poor telecommunication infrastructure in the city. The following section 
shed light on technical problems in more detail.   
4.5.1.4 Skype as a tool for conducting interviews 
Conducting the interviews while the conflict was going on was very challenging. In conflict 
zones, the situation is unpredictable, dynamic and unstable. Therefore, the researcher took 
into consideration ethics in practice, or situational ethics (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) to 
build contingency plans for any unforeseen developments, e.g. difficulty in recruiting 
participants. According to Ellis (2007, p. 4), ethics in practice, or situational ethics deals 
with “the unpredictable, often subtle, yet ethically important moments that come up in the 
field”. Initially, the plan for interviewing participants was to conduct interviews in person. 
During the time leading up to data collection, however, the deterioration in the security 
situation in the country required the need for new methodological and ethical 
considerations. After constantly monitoring the security situation and analysing risk, 
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specifically through listening to local information and news, it was decided to change the 
approach and conduct online interviews to reduce safety risks  (Hanna, 2012).  
Skype was the main medium used in the interviews. It enabled the researcher to conduct 
interviews over a long distance. According to O’Connor, Madge, Shaw, & Wellens (2011), 
online interviews can be valuable for researchers to communicate with participants, who 
may otherwise be difficult to reach, such as people living in isolated or dangerous places. 
It is also suggested that online interviews can be a beneficial forum for discussing sensitive 
topics. They can also allow for greater flexibility because interviews can take place during 
any time convenient for both the interviewer and interviewee. In online interviews, using 
video can also be an option. Video calling allows the researcher to not just talk to their 
interviewees but to see them in real time (Deakin & Wakefield, 2014). In this study, 
however, it was not possible to use video calling in all interviews for two reasons. First, a 
number of participants did not give consent to use a video call (13 participants). Second, 
‘technical hitches’ (P. Hanna, 2012) were experienced (e.g. the screen was frozen; call 
disconnection). Therefore, the audio and text options were used in order to continue the 
discussion or rearrange the call. One interview was re-arranged the next day due to an 
electricity cut-off that led to internet disconnection. In addition, three interviews were 
conducted over Facebook messenger due to the fact that participants were not on Skype.   
4.5.1.5 Conducting the interviews 
In this study, no pilot test policy was used. According to Van Teijlingen, Rennie, Hundley, 
& Graham (2001), although it might be useful to pilot the interview protocol before 
conducting the main study, there is also the possibility of making inaccurate assumptions 
or predictions on the basis of pilot data. In qualitative research, pilot studies are not 
necessary because “qualitative data collection and analysis is often progressive” (Van 
Teijilingen & Hundley, 2001), meaning that a following interview in a series should be 
‘better’ than the previous one as the researcher might have gained valuable insights from 
previous interviews which are used to improve the interview guide. In this study, it can be 
said that data collection was a learning process for the researcher. The order and structures 
of some questions were refined to invite more description and explanation. In addition, 
collecting the Facebook data before the interviews took place gave the researcher more 
insights into what to explore, refine and focus the interview questions. Although she was 
already familiar with the contested Libyan context, the nature of the Facebook discussion 
reflected an increased polarization and division within the Libyan society. This observation 
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led the researcher to be more mindful to probe interviewees’ experiences and memories, 
and establish an understanding of their social media activities and patterns of use in relation 
to this issue. 
The researcher was also mindful and took careful considerations in order to use balanced 
language with each participant, particularly when asking sensitive questions or mentioning 
the revolution. The reason for these considerations was to establish a friendly conversation 
climate during the interviews. For example, ‘the revolution’, ‘the uprising’, ‘the civil war’ 
and ‘the 2011 events’ were used interchangeably to refer to the Libyan uprising. To 
illustrate, if the interviewee was pro-regime, the researcher preferred to use ‘the 2011 
events’ or ‘the civil war’ instead of ‘the revolution’, taking into account each participant’s 
stance. However, despite these considerations, the researcher encountered one participant 
who was confrontational. Although the aim of the study was fully explained to him and 
consent was gained, he interrupted the flow of the questions and insulted the researcher, 
making it difficult to continue the discussion. Therefore, the researcher withdrew from the 
conversation and this incomplete interview was excluded from the analysis.  
Interviews were conducted between August 2016 and February 2017. Taking more than six 
months was the inevitable result of the challenges and difficulties in recruiting and 
interviewing participants. However, the researcher successfully managed to interview 
twenty-five participants from different areas of the political spectrum and different 
locations across the country.  Each participant was contacted informally via Skype or 
Facebook to explain the aim of the research and arrange a time. During the interview, the 
researcher began by introducing herself and briefly describing the purpose of the interview 
to refresh the participant’s mind about the research project. All interviews were audio 
recorded, and conducted in Arabic language. The average interview duration was 60 
minutes.  
The interview questions were categorised into chronological order to discuss participants’ 
experience in using technology over three critical phases: before, during and after the 
uprising. This chronological organization was important in order to capture any changes in 
how technology was used and experienced over time. Although most participants were able 
to speak about their experiences openly, some needed patience and considerable prompting 
to tell their stories. The researcher also showed her genuine interest in participants’ 
experiences and stories at all times during the interview through concentrating, listening 
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carefully and asking follow up questions. The researcher ended the conversation when there 
were no more stories or topic to discuss. The decision to stop recruiting more participants 
was made when the theoretical saturation was reached. In other words, the additional data 
did not result in new themes or different ideas. The records were immediately transcribed 
after the interviews had been conducted. The transcription was made in Arabic and 
according to the principle outlined by both Chen & Boore (2010) and van Nes, Abma, 
Jonsson, & Deeg (2010), translation was only performed for quotations to preserve original 
meaning where possible. 
4.5.2 Facebook content  
4.5.2.1 Rationale for selecting Facebook over other platforms   
Facebook was chosen over other platforms due to its popularity in the country (Salem & 
Mourtada 2011). In December 2011, for example, Facebook statistics showed that 
penetration rates increased dramatically, demonstrating that Libya became the fastest 
growing country in terms of national Facebook users (Silverwood-Cope, 2011; Scott-
Railton, 2011). After the revolution, the number of Facebook users continued to increase. 
Recently, Facebook reaches a far greater audience than it ever did at the time of the 2011 
uprising, particularly among young people below 35 (Schäfer, 2015), driven by the growth 
of smartphones (Freedom House, 2015). According to Internet World Stats (2015), the 
number of Facebook subscribers reached around 2.4 million in 2015, up from 260,400 in 
2010. This number continues to increase. In 2017, statistics showed that more than half of 
the country’s population are on Facebook. More precisely, Facebook followers reached 3.5 
million users (Internet World Stats, 2017). However, it is important to acknowledge that it 
could be difficult to confirm the actual number of users due to the possibility that users may 
have had more than one Facebook account. It is also important to admit that although this 
thesis focuses on young people, there was no absolute confirmation that the Facebook 
messages were posted by young people. In other words, it is difficult to verify users’ 
personal information such as age and geolocations because they might not be real.    
 4.5.2.2 Sampling procedure  
Identifying Facebook pages is a challenging process due to the fluid nature of the platform 
that allows for easy creation and disappearance of pages and groups. The initial plan for 
this study was to analyse content posted on the ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page, one of the 
popular pages that emerged during the revolution as a key focal point for anti-Gadaffi 
forces. However, this page had disappeared from Facebook for some reason. The 
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disappearance of ‘Day of Rage’ reflects the high turnover of these Facebook pages. 
Previous research by SalahEldeen & Nelson (2012) titled Losing My Revolution 
demonstrated the fragility and fluidity of social media sites. By analysing six different 
event-centric dataset resources shared on social media between June 2009 and March 2012, 
they found an average of 27% lost after two and a half years of the Egyptian revolution. 
Issues such as removal of content by the authors, blocking users from the site or shutting 
down websites were suggested as possible reasons behind losing social media content.   
Since this was the case with the ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page, a new strategy was adopted 
which involved a selection of a sample of the most popular public Facebook pages, where 
online discussion is mostly of a political nature. To obtain a deeper understanding of how 
Facebook was used by different groups, it was decided to purposely select pages with 
different stances, pro-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary. This allows for broader 
understanding of different publics and different spheres rather than limiting our 
understanding of the subject matter to a single group.    
In order to select the Facebook pages, Socialbakers website (http://www.socialbakers.com) 
was used to identify the most popular political Facebook pages (pro- and anti-revolution) 
based on the number of followers they had. Accordingly, two pages were identified. First, 
LW Facebook page, which was known for its revolutionary stance, with 1,389,914 
followers. Second, LI Facebook page, which was known for its anti-revolutionary stance, 
with 183805 followers. In order to confirm the choice of the study, a group of potential interview 
contacts were asked to nominate some Facebook pages that they were using or popular for political 
discussion. As a result, these two pages were named among others as popular political Facebook 
pages in Libya.  
After deciding on this, these selected Facebook pages were anonymised for ethical 
purposes. After identifying the pages, the next step was to decide on time frame to extract 
relevant data. As the study focuses on exploring the nature of the emergent digital public 
sphere in Libya, and its evolution over time, the researcher decided to extract content at a 
specific time in each year between 2011-2016. It was purposely decided to coincide with 
the early days at which the uprising unfolded, followed by certain days of its anniversary 
in the following five years. 
At this point, it was not clear yet how many days the researcher wanted to extract data from. 
However, it was important as an initial step to check the availability of content around the 
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targeted time because the popularity of the selected Facebook pages alone could not 
guarantee how active they were. The researcher, therefore, had to check the selected pages 
based on daily updates three days before the day of the revolution and three days after. By 
manually searching the timeline of each selected page, it was found that both pages had 
daily updates in the targeted time each year except in 2011. This was possibly because there 
were no messages posted in that time, or the messages were removed for some reason. 
Therefore, this study only examined the content around the first five anniversaries of the 
revolution (2012-2016). Focusing on the anniversaries was important because it allowed 
for a highly active period of time to be examined in which users could be expected to 
actively discuss political issues and reflect on the revolution and its aftermath. 
4.5.2.3 Data extraction  
After deciding on the time frame, the next step was to learn how to retrieve Facebook data. 
There are several software tools requiring no programming knowledge that can be used to 
collect social media data including, but not limiting to, Mozdeh, NVivo, Netlytic, NodeXL 
and DiscoverText (Ahmed, 2015). After undertaking an experiment to find out which 
software tools and APIs were capable of collecting historical data, DiscoverText, a cloud-
based program, was chosen to be used in this study. DiscoverText is widely used in 
academic research by many scholars (e.g. Reilly & Trevisan, 2016; Edgerly, Thorson, 
Bighash, & Hannah, 2016; Ahemd, 2018). After conducting some experiments, the 
software was set up to collect data from the two selected Facebook pages over three days 
of each anniversary: the day of the revolution, the day before and the day after. The data 
collection took place in February 2016, and primarily consisted of 17,357 messages 
comprising posts and comments. These messages were exported into Excel for manual 
analysis. According to De Graaf & Van Der Vossen (2013), applying manual annotation is 
more likely to achieve a high level of validity than automated content analysis because the 
latter might make measurements noisy or misleading.  
4.5.2.4 Data preparation difficulties  
After downloading the Facebook data, the content was unintelligible in the Excel CSV 
formatted file. According to the DiscoverText support team, there can be an issue if the 
data is encoded in a language such as Arabic. Detailed instructions on how to make the 
spreadsheet data readable were given by the team. Full details of the instruction were 
published later, and can be found here under the DiscoverText FAQ section:  
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https://texifter.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/216721048-Why-does-Facebook-data-
collected-using-DiscoverText-look-unreadable-or-unintelligible-or-missing-in-the-Excel-
CSV-formatted-file- 
Having solved this issue, another technical challenge was faced. Microsoft Excel was 
unable to open some downloaded Facebook posts when clicking on the posted link to the 
message (see figure 4.2 below). However, when searching these posts, which were 
supposedly unavailable, using their downloaded caption text, most messages were still 
available on the Facebook site. In order to not miss important content or have gaps in the 
data, efforts to re-check/re-search these problematic posts were made manually. In other 
words, this means that the researcher did not depend solely on the software and did manual 
searches for corrupted data, although it was very time consuming. 
Figure 4.2. Screen shot of the unavailable Facebook items 
 
The types of these problematic messages were mainly posts due to the fact that the majority 
of the data was text-based comments. According to Gerbaudo (2016) text-based messages 
are very important in social media, as being often the primary medium of expression makes 
this an important subject of study in its own right.  
Of 17365 messages downloaded to Excel, only 130 items were unavailable, including 
messages that contained broken links and those where there was no text caption added to 
them, thus it was not possible to go back to find them. However, a decision was made to 
include messages in the analysis as long as they were still meaningful even though they 
included broken links, particularly if the message contained a text or description which 
conveyed a meaning of them. Of the 130 corrupted messages, only 38 messages were 
excluded and not coded. Accordingly, 17327 were retained for analysis. 
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Figure 4.3 Screen shot of the corrupted Facebook messages 
 
4.6 Data analysis strategy 
The purpose of analysing data in qualitative research is to make sense and generate meaning 
out of it (Merriam, 2009). To do so, the researcher has to develop meaningful themes and 
highlight important patterns as well as decide how to present them (Patton, 2002). In this 
study, data collection and analysis are conducted alongside one another, using two different 
approaches to generate themes and codes. First, thematic analysis approach, which was 
used to analyse the interview data. Second, content analysis approach, which was employed 
to analyse the Facebook data. The following sections explain the procedure followed in 
each approach to analyse the research data.   
4.6.1 Thematic analysis     
Thematic analysis is one of the most common means used to analyse qualitative interviews 
(Bryman, 2012). According to Braun & Clarke (2006) thematic analysis is a “method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes 
and describes your data set in rich detail” (p. 79). It is also considered by Alhojailan (2012) 
to be the most appropriate for “any study that seeks to discover using interpretations” (p. 
10). Based on the above, the thematic approach was chosen to analyse the study interview 
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data. The model of Braun & Clarke (2006) which consists of six phases was implemented 
for this analysis.  
4.6.1.1 Familiarization with the data 
According to Braun & Clarke (2006), the step of data familiarization involves “transcribing 
data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas” (p. 87). In 
this study, after listening carefully to the interview record, the researcher transcribed the 
interviews personally into written form using Microsoft Word. By merely preparing and 
organizing collected data for examination, familiarity with the data increased and some 
analytic ideas and interests began to be formed. To further immerse in the data, the next 
step was to read and re-read the transcripts for initial ideas and thoughts. As a result, notes 
of emergent themes and patterns were taken and some initial codes were created.  
4.6.1.2 Generation of initial codes  
This phase involves “coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across 
the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 87). To 
achieve this step, interview transcripts were entered into NVivo, a qualitative data analysis 
software package available freely through the University of Sheffield. However, after 
playing around with the software to create initial themes, it was found that NVivo does not 
operate as expected when using right to left languages such as Arabic. Therefore, the 
researcher turned to the old-fashioned method of manual coding using highlighter pen 
paper and pencil because: 1) other software tools that support Arabic language such as 
Atlas.ti were not freely available through the University of Sheffield; 2) the time it would 
take for the researcher to become capable in using this software would be lengthy. In 
addition, Blair (2015) argued that manual coding gives the researcher more control over 
the data, unlike a computer screen. By spreading out strips of paper and cards over a desk 
or a floor, the smaller pieces of the larger puzzle can be seen, thus links and connections 
are easy to make.  
Having decided the coding approach, the process then began with open coding where key 
ideas are created inductively to allow data to speak for itself (Bryman, 2012). However, 
some insights from the literature review were used to come up with themes and ideas. In 
the initial stage of analysis, a set of 121 codes was first generated based on three selected 
interviews. The list of codes was then separated according to the chronological order of the 
three phases under the study: before, during and after the revolution. These codes were then 
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revised and checked in order to remove repetition and group overlapping codes. The coding 
process was iterative and continuous to produce meaningful themes. Notes were also taken 
to create links and connections between different ideas and concepts. After analysing the 
remaining transcripts, new codes emerged, some of which were more accurate and specific 
compared to the previous ones. At this stage, most of the codes were labelled with the 
corresponding time period as seen in the example in the table below.    
Table 4.3. Example of data extracts, with codes applied  
Data extract – the uprising period  Coded for  
 
1- Finding out about the 
uprising using internet  
 
2- Connecting with 
Libyans in exile through 
the internet to coordinate 
protests      
Data extract – post-uprising period Coded for 
 
 
 
1- Attempts to use social 
media as a tool of 
persuasion  
  
2- Targeting political 
content at specific 
audiences 
 
 
4.6.1.3 Searching for themes  
According to Braun & Clarke (2006), this phase “re-focuses the analysis at the broader 
level of themes, rather than codes, involves sorting the different codes into potential 
themes, and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes” (p. 
89). To do this, different codes were combined or separated to form overarching themes, 
taking into account the chronological order of the three phases under the study, before, 
during and after the uprising. A constant comparison and reflection of the emerging themes 
was carried out to identify relationships between different codes and themes. By the end of 
this phase, a collection of initial themes and sub-themes were labelled with corresponding 
extracts of data. The main emerging themes were: 
Pre-uprising period  
1. Types of everyday online activities and political use.  
2. Government surveillance.  
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During the uprising  
1. Finding information on the uprising. 
2. The fear barrier. 
3. Government surveillance. 
4. Information blockage. 
Post-uprising  
1. Social media as information portal and a tool for political activities. 
2. Freedom of speech  
3. Credibility of social media information. 
4. Attitudes and opinions towards social media use. 
5. Returning back to everyday social media activities. 
4.6.1.4 Reviewing themes 
The purpose of this stage according to Braun & Clarke (2006) is to “consider the validity 
of individual themes in relation to the data set, but also whether your candidate thematic 
map ‘accurately’ reflects the meanings evident in the data set as a whole” (p. 91). Therefore, 
the list of candidate themes created previously were refined and reworked. This refinement 
process included breaking down a few themes into separate themes, while organizing others 
under one theme. The outcome of this refinement process is presented below:   
Understanding young people’s social media use before 2011 
1. Social media, politics and everyday life. 
Understanding young people’s social media use during revolutionary times 
2. Finding out and communicating about the protests. 
3. The fear barrier and social media access and use for protest purposes. 
4. Government surveillance. 
5. Information blockage. 
Understanding young people’s social media use after the uprising 
6. Social media, a newfound freedom of expression and a vibrant political 
environment. 
7. Social media, misinformation and political polarisation.  
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4.6.1.5 Defining and naming themes 
Having decided on satisfactory themes from the data, the researcher had to further define 
and refine themes by “identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well as the 
themes overall), and determining what aspect of the data each theme captures” (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 92).  
The first theme is about young participants’ everyday online practices and experiences prior 
to the uprising. It focuses mainly on to what extent social media was politically used, and 
to what extent the political environment was restricted.  
The second theme is about how participants found out and communicated about the 
protests, before the internet was cut off. It presents participants’ experiences in using 
different sources of information ranging from old to new media.  
The third theme, which was collapsed into three, describes different dynamics and levels 
of emotional intensity and how this motivated different participants to overcome the fear 
of government repression, while leading others to remain cautious and maintain the fear 
barrier.  
The fourth theme is about government surveillance. It highlights how the government was 
adept in targeting those young activists who were likely to be influential in expanding the 
protests’ reach. 
The fifth theme is about information blockage. This theme presented the old regime’s 
attempts to demobilise protestors by blocking information sources such as shutting down 
the internet, jamming satellite TV channels and interrupting telecommunication services. 
It also presented participants’ experiences and stories of how they responded and 
circumvented the government censorship. 
The sixth theme describes how the social media landscape opened up suddenly in the 
immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime (late 2011-2014), revealing a vibrant political 
environment marked by different forms of political activities and practices.  
The seventh theme describes how the vibrant political environment has devolved into an 
environment of conflict, chaos and confusion. It also describes a set of practices and 
dynamics that emerged in response to the country’s unsettling dynamics between 2014-
2016. 
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4.6.1.6 Producing the report 
This phase involves write-up of the report to provide “a concise, coherent, logical, non-
repetitive and interesting account of the story the data tell within and across themes” (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006, p. 93). The analysis was written using illustrative extracts to convey the 
story of the data in a way that convinced the reader of its merit and validity (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 93). Chapters five, six and seven are a presentation of the overall findings, 
whilst the broader theoretical view of this research is discussed in chapter eight. 
4.6.2 Content analysis  
Content analysis is a research technique that has been widely used in both quantitative and 
qualitative researches to investigate media content (Krippendorff, 2013), and to analyse 
political movements and activists’ internet use (Meikle, 2003; Harwood & Garry, 2003; 
Papacharissi, 2015). According to Hsieh & Shannon (2005), qualitative content analysis is 
“a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the 
systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 1278). 
Conducting a qualitative content analysis allows the researcher to “pay attention to unique 
themes that illustrate the range of the meanings of the phenomenon rather than the statistical 
significance of the occurrence of particular texts or concepts” (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, 
p. 2). However, this definition does not mean that qualitative content analysis cannot 
include quantitative aspects. In fact, quantitative aspects such as frequencies of coded 
categories can also be analysed within a qualitative approach and an interpretive paradigm, 
which is important to capture common patterns and key trends of the phenomenon under 
the study (Mayring, 2000). Content analysis is also useful if the aim of applying it is to 
compare categories at different periods (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In light of these 
considerations, content analysis was best suited for examining the Facebook content in this 
study despite the many similarities between content and thematic analysis in qualitative 
studies (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi, Turunen, & 
Bondas, 2013). 
To ensure a high quality of content analysis, eight steps explained by Zhang & Wildemuth 
(2009) were followed. The first step is to prepare data for analysis in a way that fits 
researchers’ needs. This preparation step often includes organizing data manually or using 
a computer analysis program (e.g. NVivo, SPSS) to make it ready for analysis (see section 
4.5.2.4 on data preparation). Following data preparation, the second step is to define the 
unit of analysis. According to Long (2011), the units of analysis may be the same as or 
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different from the unit of measurement/observation. To illustrate, communities, groups, 
organizations and individuals are often the units of analysis in qualitative studies, and then 
the researcher uses his/her methods to examine an aspect of that (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). In this study, since the scope was to explore the nature of the emergent networked 
public sphere in Libya, and its evolution over time, the timelines of the two selected 
Facebook pages were identified as the units of analysis. Individual posts and comments 
were served as the unit of examination, which were assigned to certain codes relevant to 
the study.  
After deciding on the unit of analysis, the third step is to develop a coding scheme through 
generating categories inductively or deductively or both of these approaches. This study 
followed inductive reasoning to generate codes (see section 4.6.2.1). In step four, testing a 
sample of the developed codes is essential using an intercoding reliability test. Once a 
sufficient level of intercoding reliability is achieved, the coding scheme, therefore, can be 
applied to the entire corpus of data as a fifth step. The sixth step involves rechecking the 
consistency and reliability during the coding process, which is likely to lead to the creation 
of new codes (see section 4.6.2.2). At this stage, the coding process can also be 
accompanied by taking notes, which according to Myers (1999) is a useful way to offer a 
more nuanced interpretation of the collected data. For example, the researcher notes down 
potential emerging codes to be added to the coding scheme during data analysis, and also 
takes notes of the most interesting comments to be used as examples when presenting 
findings.  
In step seven, the researcher starts making sense of the identified categories, finding links, 
and exploring common patterns and trends, before moving to the final step of reporting 
findings. To present findings in qualitative content analysis, the researcher uses selected 
examples from the data to provide readers greater depth of understanding of the emerging 
context. In this study, the selected examples were purposively chosen, attempting to present 
the most representative Facebook messages in relation to the asked research questions. 
According to Zhang & Wildemuth (2009), “samples for qualitative content analysis usually 
consist of purposively selected texts which can inform the research questions being 
investigated” (p. 2). 
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4.6.2.1 Coding strategy 
The aim of the content analysis is to contribute to answering the second research question 
of this study:  
To what extent has social media facilitated the emergence of a networked public sphere in 
Libya’s post-uprising period: has it helped foster a more democratic environment? 
As discussed in the literature, one of the most common critiques of Habermas’ public 
sphere theory is that the ideal concept of the public sphere is centred on rationality rather 
than emotionality. While Habermas considers rational and critical public communication 
as a driving force for a functional public sphere, many scholars (e.g. Melucci, 1996; Gitlin, 
2003; Mouffe, 2005; Jasper, 2011; Castells, 2012; Papacharissi & De Fatima Oliveira, 
2012), acknowledge the importance of the emotional dimension of the public sphere. For 
them, emotions are deemed as being an important element in public life and political 
communication. In her recent book, Papacharissi (2015), for example, suggests that there 
is no pure cognitive or affective communication but that both elements are interconnected 
and overlapped. Based on her analysis of Twitter hashtags in relation to Hosni Mubarak’s 
resignation and the Occupy movement, she demonstrated that “the practices of networked, 
affective publics present a departure from the rationally based deliberative protocols of 
public spheres and help us reimagine how we may define and understand civic discourse 
among networked crowds in a digital era” (Papacharissi, 2016, p. 320).  
In light of the above considerations, it is assumed that the Facebook content in this study 
cannot be entirely rational but will always characterised by both cognitive and affective 
elements to varying degrees. During the data preparation phase, the emotional aspect was 
obvious and frequently represented in the data. Therefore, a decision was made to 
categorise the Facebook content based on the nature of the messages, broadly classified as 
either cognitive and/or affective, following a non-mutually exclusive approach. Breaking 
down the collected Facebook data into cognitive and emotional forms could provide a 
greater level of detail, and allow us to understand how rational or emotional the two 
Facebook pages are. More specifically, the following questions were posed in relation to 
the Facebook data:  
1- How do users articulate their political views on Facebook in the post-revolutionary 
period? i.e. how rational are their discussions? Are their messages informational/ 
emotional in nature? What are the dominant types of these messages? 
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2- Does posting behaviour differ between the two pages or change over time in terms 
of diversity and inclusivity? and how are different actors (admin vs users) using the 
platform? 
In order to answer these questions, the study relied on an inductive approach to generate 
sub-codes under the broad coding classification, allowing for new codes to emerge, and 
reducing the possibility of limiting or hiding any important issues. According to Hanna 
(2013), the field of social media has evolved so rapidly in a way that people’s uses of these 
online platforms are changing simultaneously as researchers are developing approaches to 
study how they are being used. She also stated that “theoretical expectations about how 
people are using media are following rather than preceding data collection” (p. 369). 
Therefore, it was necessary to use a bottom-up approach to generate relevant codes. These 
codes were then grouped into four main themes. As mentioned above, the generated codes 
were not mutually exclusive. Methodologically, assigning a particular text to more than one 
category is allowed within qualitative content analysis approach (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). Yet, the coding scheme should consist of codes’ names, definitions and examples, 
in a way that maintains a high level of internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity of 
the definition of each category (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).  
4.6.2.2 Intercoding reliability 
As outlined previously, one of the important steps during the coding process is assessing 
the coding consistency after developing an initial coding scheme. Therefore, a pilot test of 
intercoding reliability was conducted on a sample of 300 Facebook messages. According 
to Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Campanella Bracken (2002), “the appropriate sample size 
should not be less than 50 units or 10% of the full sample, and it rarely will need to be 
greater than 300 units” (p. 601). Once the sample was obtained, a second independent coder 
was trained to examine the messages in order to help achieve accurate measurement. The 
agreement between the two coders was 84.7%. Neuendorf (2002) states that a coefficient 
of .70 is considered reliable in some exploratory studies, while Joyce (2013) suggests a 
higher threshold of .80 or 80% for percent agreement in social science research. Cohen's 
Kappa test was 0.821 which is at a substantial level. According to Mayring (2000), Cohen's 
Kappa test is considered sufficient if it is over 0.7.  
This process of assessment allowed the researcher to gain feedback on the coding scheme, 
which then improved, based on this process. For example, the disagreements between the 
coders mainly resulted from the overlap between some categories, mainly Criticism and 
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Anger. Disagreements were found to depend upon differences in opinion between the two 
coders, which were then resolved via discussion and consensus. Some definitions of certain 
categories were also improved and refined at this stage. Following this step, the coding 
scheme was applied to the entire corpus of data.  
During the coding process, new codes and concepts emerged and needed to be added to the 
coding scheme. These new codes were Distrust social media information and Sarcasm. The 
updated coding scheme were checked iteratively. After coding the entire data (N=17327), 
1732 randomly-selected Facebook messages10, which made up 10% of total sample size 
was coded by a second coder. An instruction sheet and the data to be coded was provided 
to the coder. The same process of the pilot test of intercoding reliability was followed. 
Agreement between the two coders was 86.8%, while Cohen's Kappa test was 0.847. 
Disagreement were resolved via discussion and consensus. Table 4.4 shows the final 
version of code book analysis with description and examples for each category. 
Table 4.4. Code book for the analysis 
Category  Description  Examples 
Cognitive posts  
Information-related  
Giving 
information   
The Facebook message contains factual or 
informational messages (e.g. announcement, 
leadership speeches, situational updates, reporting on 
events, first-hand information, media monitoring e.g. 
links to media sources such as online newspapers, 
blogs or websites) 
- I hear an aircraft flying over Tripoli now 
- Follow this link for the UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s speech about Libya 
http://www.facebook.com/...  
 
Requesting 
information   
The Facebook message contains queries (e.g. asking 
for clarification, fact checking) 
- Hi all! Updates needed. Your place and security 
situation Plz? 
- Did anyone else just hear that loud bang? My 
room windows rattled!  
Opinion-related  
Posting 
criticism  
The Facebook message expresses criticisms or 
complaints regarding specific ideology, group (e.g.  
rebels, militias, tribes, public figures, government)   
- This terrorist has no official position. Who gave 
him the right to make decision on our behalf?!  
- Today is the anniversary of the military coup led 
by NATO!  
Distrust of 
social media 
information 
The Facebook messages expresses doubts about the 
credibility of social media information 
- It is a photoshopped photo!  
- I want to see a video of Saif-al-Islam otherwise 
I won’t believe that he is still alive.  
Stating an 
opinion  
The Facebook message expresses a sort of balanced 
view or opinion (e.g. analysing the situation by 
defining a problem or suggesting possible solutions) 
- Yes, true. This important point. The government 
should be transparent about the 2013 
expenditure. 
                                                          
10 Selecting the random message was through using the feature of data analysis Toolpack embedded in 
Excel 
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or showing a willingness to discuss an issue with 
other users in a respectful manner.    
- Look, I agree with you to some degree but I am 
against this political isolation law. It is just 
unfair and could create more chaos and division 
in the country.  
Action-related  
Calling for 
action  
The Facebook message includes calls for online or 
offline action (e.g. calls for protests, tactics and 
strategies, signing petition or changing profile 
picture)  
- Please vote! follow the link below: three years 
after the Libyan revolution, Is Libya better off?  
http://arabic.rt.com/...  
- Coordinators please write any possible target! 
Emotional posts  
Emotion-related   
Concern  The Facebook message conveys a worried or nervous 
feeling about the instability in Libya (e.g. concerns 
about the security situation, the country’s political or 
economic future problems)  
- Corruption is sweeping like we've never seen 
before! Don’t know what will happen to us 
next! 
- It seems we will be soon reaching the stage of 
Iraqi situation oil-for-food…  
Sarcasm The Facebook message contains remarks to mock or 
convey contempt or humour  
- The better is yet to come!  
- NATO is gone dear rebels! You are fighting 
alone now haha 
Solidarity  The Facebook message expresses solidarity and 
support for a certain ideology or group (e.g. pro- and 
anti-regime) 
- Libya free! Allahu Akbar 
- Jamahiriya forever!  
Optimism The Facebook message conveys a feeling of hope and 
confidence about the future, and emphasises the good 
parts of a situation 
- We’re all looking forward to the new Libya! 
- Good morning Libya! Good morning freedom! 
Good morning our bright future! 
Sympathy The Facebook message conveys understanding and 
care for someone else's suffering (e.g. displaced 
people, martyrs’ families) 
- My heart aches when I see some people forced 
to flee their homes because of this civil war.  
- My thoughts with those martyrs’ families.  
Sadness The Facebook message shows a feeling of sadness 
and frustration (e.g. photos of war, bloody scene) 
- The stones would cry out after seeing this photo.  
- How sad to see the revolution we fought for 
turned to be a symbol of everything negative!   
Anger The Facebook message conveys a strong feeling of 
annoyance, displeasure, or hostility (e.g. flames, 
insulting words, personal attacks, serious 
disagreements)  
- It is better to divide the country than living with 
someone like you! 
- It is really p***ed me off when they deny that 
there is no ISIS…  idiots!  
Words of 
comfort 
(expressions)  
The Facebook messages conveys peaceful 
expressions, or includes words to ease feelings of 
distress (e.g. prayers, calls for peace) 
- Everything will be fine InshaAllah. 
- May Allah bring us together. Amen! 
Other The Facebook message conveys ambiguous meaning 
or irrelevant comments (off-topic)  
- There is a good restaurant near this place.  
- Follow us on this page for the best footwear 
brands  https://www.facebook.com/...  
 
4.7 Ethical consideration 
This section outlines considerations regarding ethics that preceded the design and 
implementation of the study for both interviews and Facebook data analysis. Since research 
involves working with human subjects, ethical principles must be considered (Bryman, 
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2012). As mentioned previously, the researcher applied ‘situational ethics’ (Ellis, 2007), 
which resulted in building contingency plans for any unanticipated problems with data 
collection and analysis, taking into consideration their ethical implications in relation to all 
stages of the research. These plans and strategies for both interviews and Facebook data 
analysis were checked and then approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Sheffield on 14/09/2015. The ethics policy of the University of Sheffield provided guidance 
and advice on key aspects on every aspect of research involving human participants.  
4.7.1 Ethical issues in interviews  
Since this study dealt with vulnerable groups, conducting interviews in person was laden 
with many ethical dilemmas. First, discussing such a sensitive topic would likely be 
problematic if no private venue was found to conduct the interview in. Public places would 
be very risky and uncomfortable for participants to talk about their personal experience and 
political views. Second, the frequent armed clashes that erupted across the country during 
the time leading to data collection made it difficult to conduct interviews in person. Third, 
as the researcher is from Tripoli and she has never been to Benghazi and Sabha, travelling 
around unfamiliar places might be very dangerous particularly with the increase of fake 
checkpoints that were set up for different reasons (e.g. kidnapping/murdering civilians, 
stealing vehicles, etc.). This unpredictable and highly risky environment required the need 
for bearing responsibilities to people who would be involved in this research, including the 
researcher herself. Therefore, the plan was shifted and a decision was made to conduct 
online interviews to reduce the risks (Hanna, 2012). According to O’Connor & Madge 
(2001: 11.2), online interviews might be helpful to conduct interviews with vulnerable 
groups because they can function as an “anonymous, safe and non-threatening 
environment”.  
To make participants aware of their rights, a Study Information Sheet and a consent form 
were sent to each participant, either via email or social media channels. Participants were 
not asked to sign the consent forms in their real names but were asked to use pseudonyms 
to protect confidentiality. However, prior to each interview, oral consent was also obtained 
and a summary about the study was explained due to the fact that some participants were 
delayed in viewing the forms or returning their consent because of internet connection 
issues. Interviewees were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they 
could withdraw from the interview at any point.  
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Attempts were also made to ensure that no emotional harm came to study participants by 
pacing the interview so that topics emerged gradually during the interview, while offering 
them rest breaks if needed. The material was not disclosed to anyone other than the 
researcher. The responses were uploaded immediately to the Google Drive of the 
University of Sheffield once the interviews were conducted. To further ensure the 
anonymity of participants, codes were used when reporting quotations in the findings. 
These codes include information about the city, gender, a simple serial number and the 
participant’s political stance such as (T-M-18-PRO). In this instance T stands for Tripoli, 
M for male, 18 the serial number and pro for pro-revolution stance.  
4.7.2 Ethical issues in Facebook data analysis  
It is important to note that the question of whether social media data is considered public 
is currently an area of debate (Beninger et al., 2014; Reilly & Trevisan, 2016). The blurring 
of boundaries between private and public in the online spaces, or as Baym & boyd (2012) 
called it, a ‘context collapse’, raises important ethical concerns. Therefore, different ethical 
guidelines were reviewed and considered before conducting this research, including but not 
limited to the University of Sheffield Ethics Policy, AOIR Association of Internet 
Researchers and the British Psychology Society. Accordingly, the present study took the 
stance that Facebook data can be considered public, where entry is without any form of 
barrier. As stated in the Research Ethics Policy Note no. 4 of the University of Sheffield, it 
may be possible to use social media data without consent - when the material is already in 
the public domain. Therefore, informed consent was not sought. Alternatively, a medium-
cloaked approach towards data anonymization was employed (Kozinets, 2010; Reilly & 
Trevisan, 2016). This approach entails paraphrasing online messages of unaware users to 
protect their privacy and avoid disclosing personally identifiable information. 
Due to the fact that the Facebook data came in Arabic language, the quoted examples were 
translated into English, with a little paraphrasing in a way that retained the meaning. To 
further ensure that these examples could not lead to the identification of their authors, the 
second coder was asked to translate the examples back into Arabic, which resulted in 
content that was different enough so as not to be searchable. Furthermore, these examples 
were not assigned to their authors so that they could not be traced back to them. Instead, 
they were presented using codes. These codes were designed to distinguish between years 
and the two selected Facebook pages in which these messages originated. This description 
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is to make clear to the reader how the Libyan emergent networked public sphere has 
evolved over time in relation to different groups.  
An example of these codes which are stated at the end of each quoted message in findings 
is as follows: “finally we smell the freedom” (LI123/12). The LI stands for the name of the 
anti-revolutionary page, 123 refers to the number of the cell in Excel where the messages 
were downloaded, and 12 refers to the year in which the message originated. The decision 
to anonymise the name of the Facebook pages was taken during the time of writing in 2018 
because one of the pages disappeared from Facebook. According to Bryman (2012), 
“ethical issues arise at a variety of stages in social research” (p. 130). For further privacy 
protection, the researcher decided to anonymise the name of these two selected Facebook 
pages, taking also into account users’ ‘right to be forgotten’ (Sarikakis & Winter, 2017). 
Finally, it is important to note that the extracted Facebook data was kept on a secure 
password-protected laptop, and saved on the University of Sheffield Google Drive.  
4.8 Research quality 
The criteria for assessing quality of quantitative research differs from that applied in 
qualitative research due to differences in nature between the two approaches. In quantitative 
studies, validity and reliability are important concepts used to address the quality of 
research. The term ‘validity’ is concerned with the question of whether the study reflects 
the claims that are supposed to be examined and measured, while reliability is associated 
with the question of whether the data processing is accurate and thus results are repeatable 
(Bryman, 2012).   
In qualitative research, there is a lack of consensus on standards for assessing quality of 
research (Creswell, 2007). However, various methods and strategies have been suggested 
by many scholars to ensure trustworthiness and quality of research. Neuman (2011) 
suggests that the researcher needs to gather “rich” data to prove that the study findings are 
valid and accurate.  Patton (1990) considers that the measurement instrument in qualitative 
research is the researcher himself/herself. Hence, validity in qualitative research depends 
on how skilful, careful and competent the researcher is in conducting research. Lincoln & 
Guba (1986) propose alternative criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research, including credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. In pursuit 
of a trustworthy study, these factors were used to assess the current work.  
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Credibility seeks to evaluate whether the research findings are believable and plausible 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1986). To achieve that, the study adopted a triangulation of data 
collection techniques to derive qualitative understanding. Many findings were supported 
by evidence obtained from both the interviews and the Facebook analysis to assure validity 
of claims and arguments. According to Denzin & Lincoln (2011) the combination of 
multiple methods can help to gain a broader, richer and holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon under study.  
To further ensure credibility of the research process, regular meetings with supervisors 
were maintained which worked as peer debriefing (Lincoln & Guba, 1986), in which the 
processes of data collection and analysis were discussed and reviewed in a way that helped 
to secure a balance of data interpretation. According to Bolak (1996), “while a foreign 
researcher runs the risk of being culture blind, an indigenous researcher runs the risk of 
being blinded by the familiar” (p. 109). However, although the researcher, as a Libyan, 
experienced the intense moments of the revolution and its aftermath that may have shaped 
her thinking in certain ways, she successfully created enough distance between herself and 
her own culture while conducting this research. According to literature on indigenous 
research, distancing oneself from a familiar environment, particularly in terms of location, 
helps to maintain native researchers’ objectivity (Bolak, 1996). Being outside Libya for 
four years away from her own culture and site helped to maintain the researcher’s 
reflexivity. Moreover, through conducting a thorough literature review, and attending 
different conferences and academic events, the researcher was exposed to different 
perspectives that allowed for conducting more insightful research and balanced 
representation of alternative viewpoints. Therefore, it can be said that the researcher 
balanced an insider/outsider position (Sherif, 2001). 
Transferability (generalisability) seeks to evaluate whether the research findings are 
applicable or transferable elsewhere to a similar context or setting. According to Tracy 
(2010), providing a thick description can achieve transferability. The researcher who aims 
to generalise qualitative findings has to make a clear description of the context, process and 
assumptions of a study (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). The richness of the descriptions offers the 
basis for others to judge the transferability of the findings to other settings (Bryman, 2012).  
In this study, the overall general characteristics of the study participants, illustrations of the 
settings, study challenges and the research process were given to enable others to judge the 
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transferability of findings. Based on the aforementioned, it can be said that the findings of 
this study, to some extent, are transferable to similar contexts. More specifically, the 
findings might well be mirrored within similar societies that have similar characteristics 
(e.g. tribal and regional division) and are going through a conflict (e.g. political struggle or 
social movement).     
Dependability seeks to evaluate whether the research findings are consistent and could be 
repeated if the same procedures were followed. To achieve this, Lincoln & Guba (1986) 
suggest that the researcher needs to reflect on the study through adopting an ‘auditing’ 
approach. This approach includes a step-by-step record of documents and evidence of each 
phase of the research process. During this study, the researcher kept complete records of 
different materials such as ethical approval, participant information sheet, information 
consent, interviews records and transcriptions, Facebook raw data, notes of intercoding 
reliability process, the study challenges and reflexive notes. 
Confirmability refers to the degree to which the credibility of study findings can be 
confirmed by others (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). According to Shenton (2004), it is important 
“as far as possible that the work’s findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of the 
informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher” (p. 72). To 
improve confirmability, the researcher documented the procedures and activities for each 
phase of study. The researcher also reflected on this throughout the process and describes 
this in the analysis. The arguments in this study were related to and contrasted with previous 
theories and concepts in this area. The audit strategy described above was also a crucial 
technique for establishing confirmability.  
4.9 Chapter summary 
This study adopts an interpretative qualitative methodology relying on a combination of in-
depth interviews and Facebook content analysis. The combination of both digital and non-
digital data offers a broader understanding of the phenomenon studied from different 
angles. Justification and rationale for adopting a multiple qualitative methods approach, 
and relevant decisions made as the study progressed, were fully explained. Data analysis 
procedures were also discussed and justified. Challenges faced this research in terms of 
data collection and ethical issues were explicitly described. To achieve research quality, 
empirical data was regularly reviewed and criteria of credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability were followed.  
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Chapter 5: Social media use before and during the uprising 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the interview data collected in 2016/2017. It is 
organised chronologically into two main sections: Section 5.2 presents young participants’ 
everyday online practices and experiences prior to the uprising, focusing mainly on to what 
extent social media was politically used, and to what extent the political environment was 
restricted. Section 5.3 demonstrates how social media was used and experienced during the 
2011 uprising, and how the regime responded to it. The aim is to gain insight into how 
young people revolted in a repressed environment and whether social media facilitated their 
action against the old regime.  
5.2 Understanding young people’s social media use before 2011  
In 2009, Libya was named as one of the “worst of the worst” of the most repressive regimes 
in the world by Freedom House, together with countries including, but not limited to, 
Burma, North Korea, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan (Freedom House, 2009). These 
countries received the lowest rating of 7 on the Freedom House survey in terms of both 
political rights and civil liberties. In the light of this intense repression, it was essential to 
gain in-depth understanding, based on real experience of young people, of what social 
media has been used for, and how they used it in such a repressed environment. Findings 
are presented in the following sections.  
5.2.1 Social media, politics and everyday life  
As discussed in Chapter 2, internet was first introduced in Libya in 1998 and became 
available to the public in 2000 (Freedom House, 2015). The majority of participants (n=21) 
started their use of internet and social media in different times after 2003; only a minority 
of them started earlier at some time between 2000 and 2002 (n=4). Initially, most 
participants accessed the internet from computers in their homes, workplaces and internet 
cafés. After the introduction of wireless network services (WiMax) in 2009 (Freedom 
House, 2015), most participants reported that they started to access the internet mainly from 
home. Between 2003-2009, internet forums and blogs were the most popular platforms 
among many participants, before the uptake of Facebook from 2009 onward. Throughout 
this time, young participants used the internet and social media mainly for sharing 
information and knowledge, socialising, entertainment and simply hanging out but very 
rarely for politics. Only a small number of participants engaged in some sort of political 
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activities. The nature of these activities and why the majority did not engage in any online 
political activities is discussed in the following sub-sections.  
5.2.1.1 Fear of government repression and self-censorship 
One of the most reported reasons for deterring many participants from discussing politics 
on social media was the fear of government repression. When asked whether they were 
involved in any sort of political discussion, e.g. government criticism, the majority of 
participants gave a decisive answer such as:  
“Of course not!” (B-F-11-ANTI) 
“Are you kidding? I never shared my political views on social media” (T-F-06-
UNC) 
“Who wants to face any troubles with the government! I only shared my personal 
opinion with my trusted circle of friends or family” (T-F-02-PRO) 
These extracts suggest how fear of government repression permeated deep into Libyan 
society. This fear barrier led many to widely practise self-censorship and refrain from 
voicing their views. The majority preferred to stay in their safe zone and avoided 
confrontation with authorities. All of this seemed to, over time, translate into participants 
largely maintaining a state of apathy and indifference in terms of confronting authorities or 
engaging in any sort of political activism. This feeling can be exemplified by the following 
comment: 
“I had never thought of action against the regime. Even if someone wanted to, there 
was no way of doing that. The country was tightly controlled by the regime and you 
would be simply put in jail. So what is the point? I wasn’t concerned to be honest. 
It didn’t even occur to my mind. I think it was something built up unconsciously 
over time. The regime was like an accepted fact or destiny that someone can’t 
change. I even didn’t expect that the 2011 protests would result in removing the 
regime” (B-F-10-PRO) 
This quote above clearly demonstrates a sense of disempowerment and how this participant 
became resigned to a lack of agency. 
While some participants (n=12) felt disempowered, others (n=4) reported that they were 
not really aware of democratic values. For example, one participant said that:   
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“Well, these buzzwords such as freedom of speech, social justice and citizens’ rights 
were new to me and I think for a lot of us. I was not sure of what these concepts 
really meant when I first heard them on media outlets during the uprising. Before 
that, I just hoped for a better standard of living. That is all” (T-F-1-PRO) 
This lack of understanding of such democratic values further emphasised how the regime 
controlled the flow of information. This restricted information environment led perhaps to 
limit some people’s political knowledge and their imagination of liberal democratic values. 
From another perspective, a number participants did not believe in the principles of 
Western democracy (these were mainly pro-Gaddafi participants). For them, the regime 
system was sufficient and democratic enough, unlike what is happening in Libya today as 
the country tries to apply Western democracy. They mainly believed in the regime’s unique 
system of “direct democracy”. This system was based on elected executive people’s 
committees responsible to legislative people’s congresses at the national, regional and local 
levels. Talking further about this issue, one participant commented:  
“Political process had to be subjected to rules and principles rather than opening 
the door for ordinary people to discuss politics on social media. The leader Gaddafi 
provided us with this unique system. Anybody was able to participate and discuss 
political issues through it. This is the right place for political deliberations, not on 
social media. Political process must be something monitored. Otherwise it would 
become a mess. You can compare between Gaddafi’s style of democracy and this 
new democracy imported from the West. Look at Libya today; you can see clearly 
the difference!” (S-F-20-ANTI) 
Despite these different opinions and experiences, there was a small group of participants 
(n=7), mainly pro-revolution, who used the internet and social media to seek information 
outside the realm of the regime. Their experiences and practices are presented below.  
5.2.1.2 Attempts to overcome the fear barrier  
As mentioned above, discussing politics and expressing personal opinions was uncommon 
among most of the study participants. However, there was a number of eager participants 
(n=7) who sought political information and news that was not available in the mainstream 
media. They mainly used opposition websites for accessing uncensored information. This 
does not mean that they did not fear the regime but their desire for knowing and exploring 
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alternatives seemed to be stronger. One participant commented on his experience in using 
these websites. He said: 
“Well, I can’t say I did not fear the government but as a young person I was curious 
to know about everything happening behind the scenes. So, I tried a few times to 
browse opposition websites looking for information and news. I was cautious in the 
beginning but when nothing happened, I continued using them normally. However, 
I didn’t add any comments. I was just browsing” (T-M-16-PRO) 
Despite the risks, it is interesting to see how this participant continued to browse opposition 
websites to look for different news. He was mainly driven by his curiosity and desire to 
know and explore new ideas and information. Although such a passive act might be 
considered easy or simple now, it could be seen in that time as significant because it might 
have created new opportunities for people, and helped them to dismantle the governmental 
barriers set up against flow of information. Thus, it could be considered as a first step 
towards enabling Libya’s closed public sphere to open up.  
The internet and social media are very important means to access uncensored information 
in a repressive environment. Take for example the following story:  
“Well, in 2007, I worked at a cybercafé in Tripoli as a manager. It was a popular 
one. One of my clients grabbed my attention because he tended to visit the place 
frequently to use the internet. As a manager, I was able to monitor and take control 
of my clients from the server. So, I monitored his activities and found that he was 
browsing websites I had never come across before. They were mainly opposition 
websites. He sometimes used a proxy to access but sometimes not. I asked around 
and I found out that he had been jailed many times by the regime because of his 
opposition. I tried to pretend that I didn’t know anything and dealt with him as a 
normal client. However, he opened my eyes to something new and since then I 
started to use these websites until the time of the revolution. The most discussed 
topics on these websites were about the government officials’ corruption, the poor 
development of Libya compared to its huge oil revenues, concerns related to the 
succession plan of Saif al-Islam, son of Gaddafi, comparing Libya under Gaddafi 
with Libya under the royal rule” (T-M-18-PRO) 
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This quote above further reflects on the importance of the internet in providing greater 
opportunity for publics to access different information and ideas outside the realm of the 
regime. It also shows that opposition websites were, to some degree, accessible and 
reachable for those who were eager and brave enough to find out uncensored news.  
Yet, while the above participants were passively browsing and reading through political 
information and news, others (n=4) used social media in a more active manner, such as 
posting personal expression and discussing public concerns. However, although they 
attempted to criticise particular government practices, they had never reached the level of 
direct criticism of the regime itself. They also posted anonymously rather than using their 
real identities. The following participant narrated her experience on how she used her blog 
for self-expression:   
“I mainly used my blog for personal expression. It was mainly blogging about 
general topics but I tried sometimes to provoke argument. I criticised certain 
government practices but it was kind of light criticism. For example, I wrote a blog 
post about the education system in Libya and how the system should teach 
innovation and creativity, rather than memorisation and conformity. In another 
blog post, I went beyond this to write about Al-Gaddafi’s trip to a certain city. I 
didn’t mention his name but I talked implicitly about how this city was cleaned up 
and prepared for welcoming him within only 24 hours. I was angry why this kind of 
service was only associated with his trip. I wanted better services and infrastructure 
in the country. My mom knew about this blog post. So, she cut the internet wire to 
prevent me from using the internet. She was afraid that I might get myself in trouble 
because of my online activities” (T-F-05-PRO) 
Caring families who did not want their children to get into trouble were something also 
mentioned by another participant who narrated:   
“I used to hear my family talking and criticising the regime. I also heard some 
stories of people who opposed him [Gaddafi], and how he reacted to that. The only 
thing I was told in that time when they were talking in my presence was not to repeat 
what I’ve heard to anyone. However, once I learned how to use the internet, I 
created a blog and starting blogging about different subjects. I used to log into some 
opposition websites and re-edit their news articles and re-post them. It was mainly 
copied from the Libya Today website. It was based in London and it was not really 
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against the regime. It had a kind of moderate position. So I did not really do 
something very risky. However, my family did not know about this blog. Otherwise 
they would have stopped me from blogging” (B-M-07-PRO)  
What is interesting about these two examples is the different generational tendency, and 
how younger generations seemed to be more willing to take a step forward in order to share 
their views and express personal opinions. This willingness may be the result of how the 
internet has become increasingly an integral part of young people’s lives that opens a 
window on the world. For example, this participant (B-M-07-PRO) further commented on 
how the internet broadened his horizons and kept him connected to the world through 
reading, writing, and interacting with others. This point here sheds light on the importance 
of the internet in creating an interconnected world through exposing people to diversity of 
ideas and thoughts even though their environment is closed and restricted. Internet and 
social media in the Libyan context seemed to contribute to some degree into opening up 
the public sphere, and thus, it might have given young people the vision to demand change. 
Unlike the above individual experiences, a couple of participants talked about their 
experiences in pushing the boundaries of acceptable discourse by establishing an internet 
forum for young people to use it as a platform for self-expression. Their story was as 
follows: 
“We were university students in that time when we decided to establish our forum. 
We wanted to create a space where we could exchange knowledge and information. 
The forum had many sections that could attract many people such as sports, 
literature, social, tech, health, and even politics. However, our discussion on 
politics was limited. I can say it was light criticism for some government practices 
such as officials’ corruption. It was a successful forum and it had thousands of 
followers. Some ideas emerged from this online forum, and translated into projects. 
It was mainly voluntary work and charity. A charity organisation emerged via this 
forum. As young people, we were very motivated to achieve something and feel that 
we are effective in our society. The aim was simply to do some useful activities and 
participate somehow in improving the country. However, once our forum became 
popular and gained more and more followers, the government paid attention to us. 
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We were invited by Tripoli University Revolutionary Headquarters 11, and they 
talked to us. After that, they allowed us to continue what we were doing, but we 
were warned against criticising the regime itself” (T-M-15-PRO)   
Although there was a limited opening due to the reformist scheme of the ‘Libya al-Ghad’ 
project which was introduced by Saif al-Islam Al-Gaddafi in the late 2000s, the culture of 
civil society work barely existed in Libya. Civil society organisations were only created 
under state supervision during the regime era (UNDP, 2015). Therefore, these young 
people’s activities seemed to be seen as threatening signs to the government. Thus, they 
had to be monitored and included under the government’s umbrella.    
However, despite these restrictions, what is interesting is how these networked young 
people reoriented themselves from passive participants to potential subjects in the absence 
of democratic governance and political freedoms. Although their attempts were not truly 
free, pushing towards breaking some taboos such as opening up a path towards the 
development of civil society was significant. It reflects a sense of collective agency to make 
changes within the constraints of the regime structure. These young people showed 
responsiveness, capacity and willingness to turn their thoughts into visible action, utilizing 
the limited room of freedom allowed by the government. 
5.2.1.3 Summary  
The above discussion reveals a tight control of the government over its citizens’ political 
and civic participation. Young people’s online practices tended to focus on general topics 
such as literature and entertainment but not politics. Although there were a few attempts to 
challenge the government control through using social media to seek alternatives, these 
attempts were limited and in some cases monitored. Self-censorship remained widely 
practised for fear of government repression.  
5.3 Understanding young people’s social media use during revolutionary 
times 
This section presents young participants’ experiences of using social media during the 
revolutionary times. It begins with reporting how participants heard about and participated 
in the protests. It is followed by an exploration of key motives and drivers that potentially 
                                                          
11 A unit that is a part of the Revolutionary Committee which operate within university to monitor staff 
and students’ ideas in case that they oppose the regime 
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led participants to break/maintain the fear of government repression. Finally, it discusses 
government surveillance and censorship, and how participants used different methods to 
circumvent the state control over old and new media.  
5.3.1 Finding out and communicating about the protests 
To obtain more understanding of participants’ experiences and stories, it was important to 
research the methods by which they heard and communicated about the uprising. Many 
(n=19) said that they first learned about it through appeals and calls posted on Facebook 
that asked people to protest against the regime on 17th of February. A number of them stated 
that they came across these calls for protests while they were navigating online news on 
the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. The ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page was the most 
commonly reported page where participants followed the calls for protests. As one 
participant said:  
“I was following the news on Tunisia and Egypt when I came across the ‘Day of 
Rage’ Facebook page. I read the calls for the uprising there” (T-M-03-ANTI) 
Finding information and news through social media demonstrates its importance as a vital 
channel of information distribution. These online platforms allowed information to travel 
easily across geographical boundaries. Although the ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page was 
created by Libyans living in exile, participants who were inside the country were able to 
navigate its content. Not only that, but its content also reached people who were not social 
media users. As one participant commented:  
“I heard from some friends that there were online appeals calling Libyans to take 
the street on 17 February. At that time, I didn’t even know what Facebook was. I 
had never had a Facebook account before. I was an internet user but I was only 
using it for pleasure. So, with some help from my friends, I created a Facebook 
account and started searching for news and updates” (T-M-14-PRO) 
This quote shows the significance of social media not only in crossing geographical 
boundaries but in crossing boundaries between online and offline worlds. Despite the 
government surveillance, Facebook interrupted the state’s control over the flow of 
information, and the news posted on it reached even those who were, at some point, non-
Facebook users.  
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However, once the protests were triggered, participants reported that they used a varied 
range of methods to gather information and news. In general, sources ranged from 
traditional (e.g. TV, mobile phones, and face-to-face communication) to new media (e.g. 
Facebook & YouTube). Participants used every method available to them to understand 
what was going on. For example, one participant commented: 
“Look, I used many sources such as Facebook, TV channels, mainly Al-Jazeera and 
Al-Arabia. I also got information from my friends and family or at work. Actually 
from everybody” (S-F-09-PRO) 
Exploring in more detail, Facebook was one of the most important source for a number of 
participants (n=19) to find out breaking news in the early days. They argued that Facebook 
provided them fast and timely materials on the events on the ground compared to other 
sources of information. As one participant commented: 
“On the first day of the protests, I received a message from my friend who lives in 
Benghazi. He sent me a photo of a small group of people protesting. It was not that 
clear because it was taken from behind and it was at night. I even didn’t believe 
him until I saw a YouTube video of the same protest on Al-Jazeera on the following 
day. You know, who dares to protest against the regime?” (T-M-6-UNC) 
It is interesting to see how this participant doubted the photo of these protests until it 
appeared on an official channel such as Al-Jazeera. In this way, Al-Jazeera TV did not only 
help the protestors to reach a wider audience, but also it gave them credibility. This 
understanding might underline the point that “the medium is the message” (McLuhan, 
1964) because in this case it seems that it was the medium that shaped and controlled the 
extent of this participant’s association and action. As different media wax and wane in 
importance over time, it seems that different publics might have been constituted via 
different media.  
Al-Jazeera’s news, for some participants, was even better than other online sources. One 
participant commented on Al-Jazeera coverage:  
“I don’t think that Al-Jazeera left room for other forms of social media. There was 
a live broadcast, reports and analysis regarding the situation in Libya. Al-Jazeera 
and Al-Arabia offered 24-hour coverage over the course of the revolution. They 
were extensively broadcasting” (T-F-06-UNC)  
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Al-Jazeera, in fact, served as one of the most popular channels for information and news 
among many participants, regardless of participants’ political stance. Both those pro- and 
against the regime followed Al-Jazeera to find out updates and news.  
Watching TV channels was an essential source of information for all interviewees because 
Facebook seemed to be blocked by the government in the early days of the uprising. 
Participants reported that they had difficulties in accessing Facebook. However, some of 
them managed to bypass the government’s censorship and were able to use Facebook. 
Interestingly, one participant reported that he copied information and learned how to 
unblock Facebook from his online network while he was following the Egyptian revolution. 
“Well, during the Egyptian revolution, I saw some posts on how to use certain 
software tools to unblock Facebook. So, I copied them just in case the same thing 
happened in Libya. So I could be ready” (T-M-16-PRO) 
Some other participants (n=4) found another way to communicate. They mainly used 
Yahoo messenger to connect with others. As one interviewee commented: 
“Yahoo messenger was my alternative option to communicate with friends and to 
know the latest updates. I also was told that Yahoo messenger was safer than 
Facebook and the government could not apply surveillance over it. I am not sure 
about that but this is what I have been told. I did not really get much information 
but it was mostly to make sure that my friends were fine and safe. You know in that 
time the telecommunication services got worse as the revolution progressed” (T-F-
02-PRO)  
In the early days of the uprising, several participants (19) stated that they contacted their 
friends or relatives over mobile phone to obtain updates on the events and make sure that 
they were safe. However, the government also interrupted mobile network services to 
control the flow of information. Nonetheless, participants moved to using landlines to make 
calls to check on others, particularly their relatives or friends who were near trouble spots. 
For instance, one interviewee commented:   
“I am from Sabha so I was contacting my friends in Benghazi and Tripoli over the 
phone almost every day to check on them and to find out what was going on. Then 
it became difficult to get through” (S-F-09-PRO) 
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Another participant used it differently. She said:  
“I used to call my relatives on the landline phone to exchange Al-Jazeera satellite 
frequencies. You know it was jammed many times so we had to update the frequency 
each time. When I called my relative or she called me, we tried to exchange the 
information in implicit ways, so that if the government was spying on phone calls, 
we would not grab its attention. For example, we did not mention the name of Al-
Jazeera. We just exchanged the satellite frequency. You know my relative lives in 
the same area but you know in that time we only went out in cases of emergency. 
So this was the easiest way to communicate with her” (T-F-01-PRO) 
Participants also exchanged information and updates through word of mouth and face-to-
face interactions. This form of communication was less risky, as described by one 
interviewee. She said:  
“I was meeting my friends at the university on a daily basis. We were discussing 
the situation and sharing views and information. This is safer than speaking on a 
mobile phone. So, no one from the government could spy on us” (T-F-01-PRO) 
Overall, participants tended to rely on different sources for information about the protests. 
These sources, as discussed above, varied between new and old media. Both types of media 
were equally important. The findings also show an interesting dynamic between the 
government and citizens. Each time the government tried to control the flow of information, 
the citizens responded and tried to keep the flow of information free.    
5.3.2 The fear barrier and social media access and use for protest purposes 
This section highlights participants’ stories and their motives in overcoming the fear of 
government repression in the early days of the uprising. On the whole, pro-revolution 
participants demonstrated that they were motivated and inspired by revolutions in the 
neighbouring countries Tunisia and Egypt. However, the degree to which the fear barrier 
was overcome varied, as discussed below.   
5.3.2.1 Breaking the fear barrier  
In the early days of the uprising, several pro-revolution participants (n=11) seemed to 
overcome the fear barrier created by the state. They reported that they were posting on 
social media to show their solidarity with and support for the revolution. For example, one 
participant recalled a statement she posted on her Facebook wall saying:    
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“Friday in Tunisia, Friday in Egypt and someone wants to cancel Friday in Libya!” 
(S-F-17-PRO)  
Friday is a special day of worship for Muslims, known as Jumu'ah, but during the Arab 
Spring it turned into a day of protest. In this post, it is clear how the participant was 
influenced by the revolutions in the neighbouring countries, and wanted Libya to follow 
suit and challenge the government repression.   
However, looking back at this juncture of time, some participants thought that they were 
hasty and emotionally driven. For example, one interviewee, in his accounts of the events, 
said that he posted heavily on Facebook because he did not expect serious consequences. 
Instead, he believed there would be a quick end to the regime, similar to what happened in 
Tunisia and Egypt.   
“I was so enthusiastic. I even posted under my real name. I thought it would take 
only a few days like the neighbouring countries. At most, I was expecting the firing 
of tear gas and water cannons, but not live bullets!” (T-M-16-PRO) 
This quote above reflected an interesting affective-cognitive dynamic. The enthusiasm and 
excitement seems to overcome a more balanced assessment.  
Similarly, this enthusiastic sentiment was also evident in another interview. One participant 
recalled her intense feelings at that point in time. She said:  
“I posted a lot in the first week on Facebook. For example, I remember I posted 
‘we are going to take to the street and participate in the protests’. In that moment, 
I was so enthusiastic because the moment I was waiting for eventually came. I didn’t 
even think of the consequences. It was our chance to get rid of the regime” (T-F-
05-PRO)    
Another participant was also keen to seek political change. Although this participant came 
from a wealthy family, he emphasised that the grievances of other people motivated him to 
support the revolution. This participant expressed his feelings at that time by saying:  
“I thought the wind of change was blowing and people finally could get their rights. 
I thought that the wealth of oil in Libya finally could be used for improving the 
country. When the Libyan revolution broke out, I was extremely enthusiastic. Yes, 
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we feared the regime of course but it was moments which are hard to describe. It 
was like a fear mixed with enthusiasm” (B-M-08-PRO)  
This quote further emphasised how the affective dynamic relates to the reasoning process 
to drive action. Although people feared the regime, at the same time they decided to 
challenge it and participated in the revolution in one way or another.  
In fact, the time leading up to the Libyan revolution was intense. During the events in 
neighbouring countries, a few participants (n=4) recalled how they had been provoked by 
sarcastic comments circulated on Facebook by Tunisians during the Egyptian revolution. 
To illustrate, some of these comments included insulting language against Libyan youth 
for not having the courage to protest against the regime. As one participant reported:  
“I remember one comment written by a Tunisian guy. It says ‘keep bending your 
body and burying your head in the sand, we want to see the men in Egypt’. So this 
made us angry and discontent. So if they were able to protest their regime, we also 
could do it. When the Libyan revolution started, we responded to them online saying 
‘mind your own business; we bent our body just because we were lacing up our 
running shoes’. We wanted to prove to them that we were brave enough and we 
were simply getting ready for our huge anti-regime protests” (T-M-15-PRO) 
This quote is interesting because it sheds light on how publics in the neighbouring countries 
were competing, and how social media helped in the diffusion of emotions that perhaps 
facilitated the revolutionary contagion process. The gendered aspect seemed to intensify 
young Libyans feeling and promoting their actions. They were put under pressure in a way 
that it would be a shame or stigma if they did not rise up against the regime similar to their 
peers in Tunisia and Egypt. This gives us insights on political masculinities as agents of 
change.  
Social media seemed to be powerful in intensifying people’s feelings and driving their 
actions particularly if it included highly stimulating content. In the early days of the 
uprisings, there was a common video shared on different types of media. This video showed 
people, believed to be regime forces and mercenaries, entering homes in Benghazi to arrest 
protestors, while the video was captured by a woman who was screaming in the 
background. Several participants recalled this video, and how it created different feelings 
of fear, solidarity and confusion. As one participant commented:  
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“When I saw this video and heard the woman screaming, I felt I had to do 
something. I felt we should support people in Benghazi. So every Friday after 
prayers, my friend and I tended to drive around Tripoli looking for any protests on 
the ground to join them. I joined two protests but they were small ones and people 
quickly left for fear of government” (T-M-19-PRO) 
This quote provides another example of how people could be mobilized through affective 
content. User-generated content seemed to foster people’s connection with one another and 
brought them together despite geographical distance.   
Besides this emotional aspect of content, participants reported another interesting factor 
that helped to mobilise people against the government. Libya’s history emerged as an 
important factor to drive the events, specifically in the east of Libya. To illustrate, King 
Idris, the monarch Gaddafi overthrew in 1969, belonged to Cyrenaica province, whereas 
Gaddafi belonged to Tripolitania province. Therefore, many people in the east of Libya 
wanted power to return back to their province. The following quote further explains this 
issue.  
“Well, as you know, many people in eastern Libya have a strong connection to the 
past. They are proud of that time of history when King Idris was ruling Libya. After 
Gaddafi came to power, they felt marginalized. So once the revolution sparked, they 
supported it strongly” (B-M-12-PRO) 
The history of Libya, before the unification of the three provinces Cyrenaica, Tripolitania 
and Fezzan to establish the Kingdom of Libya in 1951, came to the surface, provoking 
people’s emotions towards the 2011 events.  
To conclude, this section has identified a number of examples with different affective 
dynamics motivating people to overcome the fear barrier. These included, but were not 
restricted to, enthusiasm and excitement to remove the regime, emotional online content, 
emasculation in the eyes of other Arab nations, a sense of injustice, nostalgia to the 
monarchy’s era and geographical marginalisation. These reasons triggered strong and 
complex emotions that influenced their actions online and offline.  
5.3.2.2 Restoring the fear barrier  
While the fear barrier seemed to dissolve rapidly in the early days, it did not take long for 
people’s anxieties and wariness to return. The climate of self-censorship and fear of 
98 
 
government returned very quickly. One participant, for example, became increasingly 
alarmed and her fears returned shortly after the uprising took a violent direction. She 
stopped posting on Facebook. She only read and followed passively without interacting 
with others. This participant commented:  
“I stopped posting against the regime because I felt so scared. The situation started 
to evolve very quickly and turned to become very serious. It turned from peaceful 
protests to a real war between both sides, the regime and the rebels. I only 
monitored my Facebook news feed without even ‘liking’ anything” (S-F-17-PRO) 
Another participant reported that his family forced him to stop any online activities that 
showed his solidarity with the revolution. Therefore, he had to delete every message he 
posted on Facebook to support the revolution. Instead, he started to ‘like’ pro-regime 
Facebook pages as a camouflage for his real intention. He elaborated:  
“Some of my relatives contacted my father after he saw my Facebook posts. My 
father was angry with me and he told me to stop posting and be accountable to my 
family. So I had to be obedient and responsible to my family. To be honest, I myself 
felt scared later on because as I told you I posted under my real name” (T-M-16-
PRO) 
However, there was a tension between responsibility to family and responsibility to the 
uprising. This participant negotiated that tension and returned back to practise online 
activities once he got a secure internet connection. He reported that his friend, with 
sufficient equipment, was able to create an internet satellite connection that allowed them 
to post more safely and securely.   
As seen in this section, the fear of government repression dropped in the early days of the 
revolution. There was much enthusiasm and hope to remove the regime. Participants were 
inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and wanted to follow suit. However, the 
revolution in Libya took a different path from the neighbouring countries. It turned out to 
be a violent revolution. Therefore, once the events became more violent, fears returned and 
participants’ online activities were influenced. While some stopped posting messages of 
solidarity with the revolution, others moved to use more secure internet to avoid 
government censorship, demonstrating a sense of agency and determination to achieve their 
goal.  
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5.3.2.3 Maintaining the fear barrier 
While some participants were caught up by the moment, and tried to challenge the regime 
in some ways, others remained cautious (n=6). They feared the regime, while 
simultaneously were uncertain and confused about what was going on. Therefore, they 
continued practicing self-censorship. For example, one interviewee said: 
“It was a scary situation. It was confusing. I even didn’t know who I should support. 
It was not good idea to post or protest against the regime in that time. If I did, so 
what? Get arrested or maybe killed? What did you expect from a regime seeing 
itself collapsing?” (T-M-04-PRO)  
This shows how fear and confusion led this participant into inaction. This participant 
avoided engaging in any sort of action that might bring unwanted consequences.  
Another participant also shared a similar view of avoiding taking any risks. He said:   
“okay well, my friends suggested to join some secret online groups where there 
were some people trying to organise protests. However, I never joined because I 
didn’t trust them. What if it was a trap set by the regime? You never know” (T-M-
19-PRO)  
This participant believed that interacting with acquaintances or anonymous users online 
could risk his personal safety and his family’s safety if he was identified.  
In this serious evolving political situation, participants’ responses suggest that online 
spaces were seen as an unsafe environment. Therefore, some remained as watchers of the 
situation only and avoided any sort of confrontation with authorities online or offline.  
Regarding the pro-regime participants, they did not engage in much activity. Although all 
had Facebook accounts, the majority watched the news of the protests on TV. Only one of 
them used social media actively to show support and solidarity with the regime. For 
example, one pro-regime participant stated that she engaged in many online discussions on 
Facebook, trying to discourage people from protesting against the regime. The main 
message she tried to deliver to others was:  
“Yes, I wanted them to understand that it was simply a conspiracy by the West. It 
was clear from the first day but some people thought it was a real revolution. I had 
discussions and even fights with many people including my friends who supported 
100 
 
the revolution. They didn’t understand. They believed Al-Jazeera lies instead! I 
wished that the regime had shut down Facebook from the first day” (B-F-11-ANTI)  
Although the regime did not shut down Facebook from the first day, extensive surveillance 
and censorship was applied. The following section presents a number of stories and analysis 
regarding the regime’s surveillance.   
5.3.3 Government surveillance  
The findings revealed details of extensive surveillance undertaken by the regime to prevent 
the protests from growing and expanding. Since the government could not trace everybody 
with a revolutionary stance, activists were often targeted for repression and surveillance. 
For example, one interviewee narrated: 
“I knew someone who was arrested by the government. He was arrested because 
he was an administrator of a popular Facebook page. He did not even use his page 
to support the revolution. It was a precautionary step to stave off the expansion of 
the protests. He was also interviewed by the Libyan state TV channel to make him 
show his opposition to the revolution. So that he might have an impact on people 
who followed his page” (T-M-16-PRO)   
This example suggests that the government understood the importance role of social media 
and how it might facilitate anti-government protests. Therefore, it took proactive steps to 
prevent any potential activities that might have threatened the regime and destabilised the 
country.   
Another participant stated his own story about being arrested by the government. He was 
one of the moderators of the forum mentioned earlier in this study whose activities were 
monitored by the government. Reciting his own story, this participant said:   
“On the forum, we decided to raise the ceiling of liberties. In the very early days of 
the protests, we posted on the forum that ‘the Libyan blood is a red line’ to show 
our solidarity with protestors in the east of Libya. Some of the forum members were 
against us and posted messages of solidarity with the regime but we removed them. 
In the work place, I talked with my colleagues and showed my opposition to the 
regime. However, the majority feared talking publicly and avoided me. I tried with 
my friends to organise protests in Tripoli. We had a friend who was a student 
abroad. We gave him a list of our names so that in case we were arrested by the 
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government he could give it to Human Rights Watch. On 17th February, my friends 
and I met in my house and we planned some activities. However, the day after, I 
went to my work and I was arrested there. I was arrested on 18th February 2011. 
Of course they took my laptop and looked through my social media accounts. They 
tried to contact my friends but my friends were aware of my arrest. So, they started 
deleting everything they posted on the forum which might be used as evidence 
against me or them. They were also smart enough to change the domain of the 
forum. So they prevented the regime intelligence team from logging into it. 
However, later on the internet was cut off anyway. I was released on 24th August 
2011 after the rebels entered Tripoli” (T-M-18-PRO)  
The story above clearly illustrates how strongly the regime was trying to control the 
situation and cut off any opportunities to use internet and social media against the regime. 
The government was adept in targeting those young activists who were likely to be 
influential in expanding the protests’ reach. The government did not only arrest potential 
activists but went further to block the internet in order to control the flow of information. 
The following section discusses this point in more detail.   
5.3.4 Information blockage 
This section further discusses the old regime’s attempts to demobilise protestors by 
blocking information sources; for example, shutting down the internet, jamming satellite 
TV channels and interrupting telecommunication services. The regime tried to isolate 
people to prevent the protests expanding. Participants’ experiences and stories of how they 
responded and circumvented the government censorship to disseminate their message are 
presented below.  
5.3.4.1 Circumvention of internet censorship  
The internet was cut off by the government on March 3, two weeks after the outbreak of 
the uprising. After a month of effort, the internet services were restored in Benghazi, and 
later in Misurata in June 2011. Restoring the internet was a co-operative effort between 
many actors such as the U.A.E, Qatar and the Libyan-American telecommunications 
executive to provide services to some opposition-held areas (Scott-Railton, 2011). This 
suggests that numerous networks were outside the government’s control. As one 
interviewee described: 
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“When the internet was restored, we shared a lot of messages of solidarity on 
Facebook. I even posted first-hand information that came from the frontline. My 
relative was there and he used to call us via mobile phone and provide us with the 
latest news. When I got any news from him, I directly posted it on Facebook to share 
with others” (B-F-10-PRO) 
This quote shows how people were actively conveying critical information at a crucial place 
and moment, which was probably inaccessible for professional journalists in those early 
days. Young people became citizen journalists, recording and disseminating information. 
This example not only shows the importance of the internet in disseminating first-hand 
information but also shows an interesting mechanism of how information travelled between 
different types of media. The integration between old and new media facilitated information 
distribution by the revolutionaries. The information travelled from the frontline where the 
battles between the regime and rebels took place to reach a wider audience on the internet. 
This example also reflects on the importance of personal networks such as family and 
relatives in enabling the dissemination of information.  
In another instance, personal networks also appeared to be very important. A Benghazi-
based participant reported that his friend, who was living abroad, topped up Skype credits 
for them. This was to help interested people contact regional and international media 
outlets. Here he explained:  
“My relative who lives in the UK was topping up Skype credits for us. So that we 
could contact TV channels such as Al-Jazeera or other TV channels and tell them 
what was going on. He did this many times. They also helped in other activities such 
as delivering medical aid” (B-M-12-PRO) 
This example above shed light on the important role that the Libyan diaspora played during 
the uprising in helping people inside the country and providing them with aid and 
assistance.   
According to the interviewees, the Libyan diaspora also played an important role in 
providing people in Benghazi and other opposition-controlled areas with digital equipment 
to connect to the internet such as the two-way internet satellite and Thuraya satellite phone. 
They also facilitated connection between locals and foreign journalists, translating news 
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into different languages, thereby creating a global public sphere. As one participant 
commented:  
“Libyans who were living abroad returned to Benghazi during the events. They 
provided us with the necessary digital equipment and translated the news to 
international media outlets. They also collaborated with us to establish media 
centres. I was working in the media centre in Benghazi which was located next to 
the courtyard where people used to gather and protest against the regime. So this 
centre was then like a hub to collect information and news regarding the revolution 
and publish it, then distribute it either to TV channels or journalists or post it 
online” (B-M-08-PRO) 
In addition to these centres, cybercafés were another option opening up to people in 
Benghazi during the uprising. This was in late June according to this interviewee:  
“As I remember, cybercafés re-opened in Benghazi around June 2011. Some of my 
friends who did not have an internet connection at home used to go there to access 
the internet to look for information or just to show their solidarity to the revolution” 
(B-F-13-PRO)  
These examples above suggest that although the regime shut down the internet, some 
people were able to re-connect and support the revolutionary cause.  
However, unlike Benghazi, the internet remained shut down in the regime-controlled areas 
such as Tripoli and Sabha. Only a small number of participants reported that they were able 
to re-establish internet connectivity through the two-way internet satellite. For example, 
one participant commented:  
“I was working at a foreign company based in Tripoli. Because of the bad internet 
connection, the company was using two-way internet satellite even before the 
uprising. So when the events started and the regime cut off the internet, we were 
still able to log on to the internet. I used to log in through VPN12 for more security 
to protect myself. I captured some photos from the protests in the early days and 
later photos of the regime checkpoints, some things like that, and uploaded them 
                                                          
12 Virtual private networks (VPNs)—a technical means that can change where one’s device appears to be 
located. 
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online. This lasted until May I think when the regime came to the company to shut 
the internet down” (T-M-15-PRO)   
Another participant commented: 
“Well, I used to go to my neighbour. He was logging on via internet satellite. He 
was downloading videos about the events in hot spots such as Benghazi and 
Misurata. He then gave them to us on a hard disk to watch them at home” (S-F-17-
PRO) 
This example shows an interesting mechanism regarding how information flowed across 
the online and offline world through personal networks and strong ties. Even some of those 
who did not maintain an internet connection were able to watch online materials such as 
videos and photos. All they needed were adequate skills and enough equipment, e.g. a hard 
disk and computer, to watch original content and follow updates that might have been 
different from the edited mass media materials.   
Another participant, an employee of Libya’s internet provider Libya Telecom & 
Technology company (LTT), reported different dynamics and ways to seek and distribute 
information. Describing his own experience, he narrated:  
“I am an LTT employee. The internet was available in the company even though it 
was cut off around the country for a short period of time. What the government did 
in the beginning was to cut off Libya from the outside world. So, the internet slowed 
down and was cut off in some places. Anyway, we maintained the internet inside the 
company. However, I couldn’t do a lot because we were monitored. However, I 
downloaded some videos on CDs to give them to people I knew or I simply threw 
them away on the street so, people could pick them up and watch the videos” (T-
M-15-PRO) 
Similarly, the same approach was used by another interviewee. With his friends, he 
distributed materials on CDs and also flyers:   
“A friend of mine was able to build an internet satellite. I am not sure how he did 
that but he was skilful enough to do so. After that, we started downloading videos 
and pictures on CDs or USBs. Then we disseminated them by throwing them on the 
streets or gave them to other trusted friends. All CDs and other materials were 
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picked up because we passed by the same areas in the morning and we found 
nothing” (T-M-16-PRO) 
This quotation again shows how young people invented innovative ways to use 
technologies for their purposes, making efforts to keep people informed and connected.  
Besides distributing information this way, this participant stated that he and his friends 
were also creating content. They produced a number of videos in order to mobilize people 
and support their revolutionary cause. These videos included:  
“[…] photos from some areas in Tripoli that were in bad condition. So we collected 
these photos and added some sad music to them so we could influence public 
opinion. Then when they were ready we just uploaded them to YouTube” (T-M-16-
PRO) 
This example demonstrated that pro-revolution participants created propaganda to support 
their cause. This propaganda was the result of well-planned strategy with a clear aim to 
mobilise public opinion against the regime. Young people introduced innovative ways for 
creating information that might have attracted further attention to their revolutionary cause.  
In another instance, a young participant used the two-way internet satellite for coordinating 
activities. He mainly helped to provide humanitarian aid for Libyans who fled from their 
homes to the border between Libya and Tunisia because of the armed clashes. This 
participant commented:  
“This was around June in 2011, the number of people on the border increased. I 
was in Tripoli and I used internet satellite to communicate with my friends who had 
already left for Tunisia. They were assessing the situation over there and passed 
me information. I in turn tried to contact people who could offer them help such as 
food and money and so on. I myself left for Tunisia in July because the amount of 
work increased and more people were needed to help” (T-M-14-PRO)   
Unlike these relatively active participants, there was another participant who was less active 
due to some constraints. Because of the frequent electricity cut offs in Sabha during the 
uprising, this participant used what is called a Skygrabber, an offline satellite internet 
downloader, to follow the news and updates about places where action was taking place. 
Although this method was a ‘one-to-many’ way of communication (because it only allowed 
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for receiving rather than sending content), it was an effective means to keep this participant 
connected and informed of what was going on. He elaborated:   
“Okay what I did was to set up my laptop using Skygrabber software. So, my 
computer could catch data through the signal of the nearest internet satellite. This 
software only allows you to receive data. So you don’t know what the content of the 
files is until you open them. However, I found this method very useful and adequate 
at that time. I watched a lot of news and videos regarding the events. For example, 
I watched some video clips captured in Misurata city, where the major battles took 
place between the rebels and the regime forces” (S-M-21-UNC) 
Although this participant did not interact with others, this method helped him to be 
conversant to some extent with what was happening despite the geographical distance.    
While some pro-revolution participants tried to circumvent the internet censorship, pro-
regime participants did not report any attempts to do so. As narrated by some pro-
revolutionary participant, the regime established what was called the ‘Electronic Army 
team’ in order to fight back the revolutionary propaganda by portraying the revolution as a 
conspiracy against Libya, and warning about its consequences such as a tribal/civil war and 
the spread of Al-Qaeda. It was also reported that the regime set up Facebook pages to 
broadcast images and videos about rebels’ wrongdoings and misconducts during the 
clashes. 
To summarise, it would seem that the government's decision to block the internet was not 
entirely successful. Of course it prevented many people from using digital tools but some 
people were able to reconnect and circumvent the government censorship. This was through 
the help of some actors ranging from countries to individuals. The two-way internet satellite 
in particular provided a great opportunity for some people to bypass the internet blackout, 
allowing them to challenge the government’s control over the flow of information.  
5.3.4.2 Traditional communication tools 
Traditional communication methods were very important for a big segment of Libyan 
society. As discussed in the literature the internet penetration rate was low in Libya at the 
time of the uprising. In the following example, one participant shed light on the digital 
divide particularly in rural areas. He explained:   
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“In 2011, when I went back to my home town in the mountains, a group of young 
men came to visit us in the media center in Nalut city. They came only to find out 
what Facebook was. They had no idea about this online tool. The main medium for 
them was TV” (T-M-14-PRO) 
This quote highlights the problem of digital inequalities in terms of access, usage and skills 
in the country.  
As for the study participants themselves, traditional ways of interactions were important 
for both those who maintained internet connection and those who did not. The most 
important traditional way of interaction among participants was TV channels and face-to-
face interactions. Participants’ stories and experiences of connecting and conversing with 
one other through these traditional ways are discussed below.   
 TV channels as a source of information 
According to all participants, TV channels were reported to be the most dominant source 
of information during revolutionary times. The most reported channels that participants 
watched were Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Libya Al-Ahrar13 and the Libyan State Television. 
The first three channels supported the revolutionary cause while the latter was the voice of 
the regime. As mentioned earlier, the Al-Jazeera channel in particular was interrupted and 
jammed due to its heavy coverage during the uprising. However, despite the interruption 
of the channel, many participants (n=16) reported that they were able to retune the Al-
Jazeera broadcast frequency and continue watching it. Al-Jazeera was a source for different 
types of content ranging from reports, talk shows, and live broadcasting to user-generated 
content. Al-Jazeera picked up many user-generated videos and re-broadcast them on its TV 
channels. As one participant said:  
“Al-Jazeera broadcasted many videos. For example, the one I clearly remember 
was a video showing a group of young people raising a huge rebel flag in Tripoli. 
It was sometime around May. You know it was very motivating when you see a video 
like this taken from inside Tripoli where checkpoints were everywhere. You feel that 
there were some people who were brave and able to do something for the revolution. 
The video then showed the police removing the flag” (T-F-01-PRO) 
                                                          
13 Libya Al-Ahrar is a Libyan channel founded in late March 2011 by a Libyan expatriate and based in Doha, 
Qatar. 
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Although this participant had no internet access at that time, she was able to watch online 
content on TV. Al-Jazeera as such played a crucial role in bridging the online and offline 
world. Broadcasting such videos on Al-Jazeera brought the rebels’ actions to the public 
attention and gave them more visibility.   
However, despite the importance of Al-Jazeera as a key source of information, its reliability 
was questioned by many interviewees including those with a revolutionary stance. 
Surprisingly, some of them (n=4) admitted that they were aware that Al-Jazeera carried 
false information during the uprising. One pro-revolution participant narrated:  
“I remember that Al-Jazeera reported breaking news saying that there was an air 
strike by the regime forces on Hai Alandalus in Tripoli. I live nearby and I didn’t 
hear the sound of the attack. So, I went with my friends to the named place to check 
but there was nothing. However, I did not stop watching Al-Jazeera. You know TV 
channels were the only source left for us when the internet cut off, and of course I 
cannot say that all Al-Jazeera information was incorrect” (T-M-05-PRO) 
This story about the regime air strikes was also narrated by another interviewee but set in 
a different area in Tripoli. This, therefore, raises the question about the credibility of Al-
Jazeera, and whether this was deliberately done to sow confusion and mobilize more people 
against the regime.  
While some pro-revolution participants questioned the reliability of information circulated 
on Al-Jazeera, pro-regime participants were unanimous in the view that Al-Jazeera spread 
misleading and false information. They also blamed it for inciting strife among Libyans. 
Many of them recalled the following chant which was used heavily during the solidarity 
marches with the regime: 
 “Oh Al-Jazeera is dirty, our leader but no one else” (T-M-24-ANTI) 
This participant’s opinion of Al-Jazeera was as follows:   
“I was watching Al-Jazeera not because it was a trustworthy channel but to see 
how they were spreading lies and rumours to people. It was disgusting. It was clear 
from the beginning that their aim was to serve the Qatari agenda to remove the 
regime” (T-M-24-ANTI) 
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Pro-regime participants mainly watched the Libyan State Television. This channel was the 
voice for the regime against the revolutionary propaganda. Through daily talk shows, the 
regime tried to portray the revolution as a conspiracy against Libya, framing NATO 
interference as an imperialist attack. Participants also recalled how these talk shows were 
characterised by recurrent warnings about consequences of the revolution and how it could 
lead the country into a dark tunnel of tribal/civil war and religious extremism.  
 Face-to-face conversation  
Face-to-face conversation was another means by which participants communicated and 
exchanged information. This mainly was from the ‘street’. Street means having 
conversations with people in the neighbourhood, workplace, cafes, mosques (Masjid دجسم) 
and public spaces. As one interviewee commented: 
“I was meeting daily with my friends in the mosque. After the prayer, we discussed 
and shared what we knew with each other. Not only in the mosque but also in the 
workplace as well. Oh yes we also get our news from people we didn’t know before. 
For example, people we met at petrol stations. You know during the uprising, we 
queued in long lines to fill up our car tanks. So, people felt bored from waiting and 
started conversations with others” (T-M-04-PRO) 
This way of finding out information and communicating with people while doing other 
activities such as praying or queuing at petrol stations resembles what Fisher, Landry, & 
Naumer (2007) called ‘information grounds’. Information grounds are environments 
temporarily created when people go to a place for a certain reason but they start a 
conversation that might foster the unplanned and accidental sharing of information. 
However, some participants (n=6) went purposely to find out information in some public 
places. Similar to Tahrir square in Egypt, Court yard (also known as Almahkama Court as 
it is adjacent to the Court) and Maydan al Shajara were major gathering places for publics. 
In these places, the latest news and updates were exchanged. One participant narrated:  
“Well, in Almahkama Court, information from the ground was immediately 
broadcast on the platform. This platform was the site for all information and news 
regarding the revolution. It was a hub of different activities. Not only for knowing 
what was going on, but also it served as a platform for expressions of solidarity like 
songs, poems and speeches. It also served as a reliable network for directing 
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resources and providing the logistical support for rebels in hot spots” (B-M-08-
PRO) 
Similar to Benghazi, publics gathered also in Tripoli but mainly to support the regime. The 
two main public spaces, the Martyrs' Square (Arabic: اءادهشل  ناديم known as Green Square 
(ءارضخلا ةحاسلا), a landmark of downtown Tripoli, and Bab al-Azizia (Arabic: ةيزيزعلا باب), 
a military barracks and compound that served as the main base for Muammar Gaddafi, were 
also spaces for showing solidarity and support. There was also a live broadcast from these 
places on the Libyan State Television. One pro-Gaddafi participant reported:  
“Yes I went to the Green Square with my family during the uprising. It was a quick 
visit but I felt so good when I saw that many people supporting the regime” (T-F-
24-ANTI) 
While these public gatherings took place inside the country, Libyans also gathered outside 
Libya. A few participants reported that they left for Tunisia either to flee from the regime 
or to involve themselves in the humanitarian aid activities (aid which was given to people 
who ran away from the fight between NATO, pro- and anti-regime forces). According to 
these interviewees, cafés in Tunisia turned into meeting public spaces where Libyans 
(locals or those who had returned from exile) came together to discuss Libya’s affairs. Here 
one interviewee said:  
“Ok, in June, I decided to leave for Tunisia because my friends who were already there 
told me that the number of refugees had increased and they needed more help. When I 
arrived, I was very busy and did not even use social media. I found something different 
which I enjoyed very much, the political life in the cafés. There were some well-known 
cafés that we used to meet at. We met opposition figures, who took a political role after 
the fall of the regime. They were discussing many issues and giving a vision of the 
future. For example, we discussed the types of governance and the process of the 
political transition period and many other issues. These discussions advanced my 
understanding of politics very much. I had no idea before about these issues. The 
situation was very promising” (T-M-15-PRO) 
The above examples show that there were seemingly vibrant public spaces such as parks 
and cafes where many protests were held and people met. This situation resembled to some 
degree Habermas’ classical coffee houses where people come together to discuss public 
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issues and concerns, thereby forming and shaping new views and opinions. The different 
form of activism and the willingness to talk about politics suggests that a new form of 
civic/political culture might have been evolving at that time in Libyan society, especially 
among youth.  
 Radio  
Towards the end of the uprising (approximately between June and August), the participants, 
particularly those in the regime-controlled areas, reported that there was a real scarcity of 
information. The phone services (landlines and cell phones) and the electricity were further 
interrupted. This meant there was no TV channel to watch and no phone calls could be 
made. At this time, two participants reported that they had to use a battery-operated radio 
in order to find out the latest updates and news about the events. One interviewee described 
these moments:  
“From around June to August, we kind of returned back to the stone age. We were 
completely isolated. There were no mobile services and no electricity in Sabha. So 
there was no way to find out what was going on up there in Tripoli or Benghazi. 
However, I found a way to get the news. I used a battery-operated radio. You know, 
I heard about the liberation of Tripoli on 20th August through the radio. Otherwise, 
I wouldn’t have known straight away” (S-F-17-PRO)  
This quote reflects on how hard and difficult the situation was at that time. It shows the 
extent to which people were isolated and in need of information. However, people made 
use of the available methods to break this isolation and stay connected.   
To summarise, this section has presented how the government made strong efforts to 
disconnect people from one another and isolate them by shutting down different sources of 
information. However, despite the mass surveillance and censorship, counter-publics 
(Fraser, 1990) emerged to oppose and challenge the government’s control over the flow of 
information. Multiple types of communications both old and new were used, integrated and 
intertwined to stay connected and circumvent the government censorship. It seems that the 
mass surveillance indeed caused concern, but in a state of mass protests that were already 
gaining momentum, it seemed less effective. 
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5.4 Chapter overview  
This chapter has covered two phases, before and during the uprising. The findings on the 
pre-uprising period revealed that the political environment was tightly controlled and 
repressed. Young people feared voicing their opinion freely and openly due to government 
repression. Although there were a few attempts to challenge the government control over 
the public sphere, they were limited and in some cases monitored. Therefore, self-
censorship remained widely practised.  
During the revolutionary times, the government further intensified its surveillance over 
citizens. This included threats, arrest, internet censorship, and interruption of satellite TV 
channels and telecommunication services. While some participants feared taking any action 
and remained spectators, others were enthusiastic and emotionally driven. They were able 
to overcome these barriers. They managed to circumvent the government censorship and 
appropriate different technologies for their purposes. A number of participants adopted 
innovative communications solutions to stay connected and spread their message. 
Traditional media gave the rebels’ actions more visibility and presence.  
The pro-regime participants appeared to be less active. They remained mainly recipients of 
news and information through traditional media, mainly TV channels. However, the regime 
itself made efforts through its electronic army to stop the revolutionary networks from 
expanding, but that seemed to be difficult after protests that were already gaining 
momentum. 
Chapter 6: Social media use after the uprising  
This chapter presents young people’s social media use and the observed changes in their 
online practices and experiences in relation to the unfolding political events after the 
uprising (late 2011-2016). The aim is to explore the nature of the emerging networked 
public sphere at this period of time and to discuss to what extent social media has helped 
to foster a more democratic environment. The analysis revealed interesting post-
revolutionary dynamics organised topically and chronologically into two broad themes. 
First, social media, a newfound freedom of expression and a vibrant political environment. 
This theme described how the social media landscape opened up suddenly in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of the regime (late 2011-2014), revealing a vibrant political 
environment marked by different forms of political activities and practices. Second, social 
media, misinformation and political polarisation. This theme described how the vibrant 
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political environment has devolved into an environment of conflict, chaos and confusion. 
It also described a set of practices and dynamics that emerged in response to the country’s 
unsettling dynamics between 2014-2016. Findings are presented in the following sections. 
6.1 Social media, a newfound freedom of expression and a vibrant political 
environment 
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime, the social media scene opened up 
suddenly in Libya. A newfound freedom of expression altered the landscape of social media 
and fostered positive trends of political participation. Based on the interviews, a set of 
social media uses, activities and practices relating to the evolving political situation has 
been identified. These uses, activities and experiences are organised in the following 
themes: (1) Social media as a means of self-expression; (2) social media as a means to 
access and gather information; (3) convergence of new and old media; (4) social media as 
a tool for documenting and sharing events; (5) bridging online and offline worlds; (6) social 
media for organising and coordinating events. These themes are discussed below.  
6.1.1 Social media as a means of self-expression  
After the removal of the regime, a newfound freedom of expression altered the social media 
landscape. For the first time, many participants, mainly pro-revolution (n=15), reported that 
they could speak their opinion freely without fear of repression compared to the regime era. 
This stage was perceived as having high levels of freedom of expression. As one participant 
commented:  
“Well, it was an unprecedented freedom. The regime we feared was removed. So 
what we could not say during the revolution or even before, we were able to express 
it at this point of time. I myself participated in different online activities such as 
blogging and posting to express my thoughts and also my feelings” (T-F-01-PRO) 
The end of eight months of intense conflict gave rise to euphoric feelings in many pro-
revolution participants. This immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime was 
characterised not only by vibrant self-expression but also by a vibrant emotionality. For 
example:  
“I can say that this year was the happiest year in my life. We were talking about 
everything without fear. I discussed many topics and issues related to the election, 
collecting weapons from people and the constitution. I had discussions with many 
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Libyans from east, west and the south. We were looking forward to building the new 
Libya” (B-M-07-PRO) 
Another said: 
“You know it was a happy ending that not many of us expected. So Facebook was 
the platform where people expressed their happiness and victorious feelings. We 
shared messages of solidarity and we also shared pictures and videos of the 
revolutionary celebrations from almost every city across the country. 2012 was a 
very lively and unforgettable year!” (T-M-15-PRO) 
These extracts above show how people connected over affective expressions of solidarity 
and personal stories that might have constituted what Papacharissi (2015) called ‘affective 
publics’. Through social media, mainly Facebook, ‘affective publics’ were created around 
shared stories and personal expressions that combined facts with opinion and emotions. In 
this case, considering social media as a site of fact-based and rational discussion is less 
relevant because the emotional expressions are constituting an important aspect of political 
discussion on social media.   
Whilst nearly all pro-revolution participants reported that they had expressed themselves 
freely in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, one participant reported a different 
experience:  
            “I was interviewed by France 24 [TV channel]. I talked about cases of torture and 
secret prisons established by rebels in 2012. The video of my interview went viral 
on social media and was shared heavily by many Facebook pages. This caused me 
a lot of problems. I was heavily criticised because the image of the rebels in some 
people’s mind was perfect. For them, the rebels wouldn’t make mistakes or 
wrongdoings. I received many Facebook messages from people who I knew or 
didn’t know. It ranged from abusive and threatening messages to messages that 
doubted the credibility of what I had said in the interview. So, I was scared and put 
under deep pressure that led me to stop my online activities for a while. I only was 
observing reactions and comments from people without commenting or interacting 
with them. I returned after a while when people forgot about it” (T-F-05-PRO) 
This quote revealed that social media was not truly open and free when it came to discussing 
controversial or sensitive issues. Critical topics, which were not in harmony with the online 
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or offline mainstream version of events, seemed to generate conflictual reactions. In the 
immediate aftermath of the uprising, the interviews demonstrated that the image of the 
rebels tended to be idealised by those who supported the revolution. The rebels were seen 
as saviours and freedom fighters who brought victory and toppled the regime. Therefore, 
challenging this image seemed to be taboo and a difficult task. This point can be also linked 
to the concept of ‘affective publics’ and how the revolutionaries might have been connected 
emotionally to the rebels in a way that seemed to give them identity. Thus, it can be said 
that identity and emotion became important elements that defined publics at this point in 
time.  
The study also found more evidence that social media was restricted and limited. Fears of 
reprisals prevented many pro-regime participants from expressing themselves. Therefore, 
they avoided sharing their opinions or stances, although some posted responses. For 
example:  
“I was so angry and anxious after the events but I couldn’t speak up or express my 
feelings. I even preferred to spend most of my time at home. I didn’t want to see 
people. I felt I didn’t belong with them or their celebrations” (B-F-11-ANTI)  
However, while many pro-regime participants (n=5) refrained from voicing their opinion 
online, one did but under pseudonyms. The anonymity afforded by social media seem to 
give some people freedom to post their personal views.  For example: 
“I live in Tripoli but I belong to Gaddadfa tribe (Arabic: ةـفذاذقلا). I was using a fake 
name on Facebook so that no one could identify me. I expressed my view and my 
anger against this Nakbah (Arabic: ةبكنلا, literally "catastrophe"). (T-F-24-ANTI) 
The phrase ‘al-Nakbah’ is used in the Libyan context by the regime’s supporters to convey 
outrage at the ‘17 February revolution’. This phrase originally refers to a Palestinian exodus 
that occurred when Palestinian Arabs were expelled from their homes during the 1948 
Palestine-Israeli war. 
This participant stated that she had had a conflict with other users with different stances in 
which both sides verbally attacked and insulted each other. Describing this chaotic 
situation, another participant explained: 
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            “It was KG1 democracy. People suddenly experienced a big shift where they found 
themselves able to say or do whatever they wanted” (T-M-15-PRO) 
KG1, a kindergarten, is a metaphor used by this participant to indicate the lack of 
experience in practising democracy. However, this tendency of insulting and disagreeing 
with each other is not something related only to new democracies; the internet in general 
has a tendency to create a polarised and conflictual environment even in established 
democracies such as the U.S. (Fuchs, 2010;  Vaidhyanathan, 2018). 
6.1.2 Social media as a means to access and gather information  
Almost all participants (23 out of 25) reported that they relied on social media on a daily 
basis to find out the latest news and updates on the then-current situation in the country. 
They perceived social media platforms, particularly Facebook, as a new central hub of 
different types of information and news in addition to other traditional communication 
channels such as TV. For example, one interviewee acknowledged its importance in 
providing easy access to up-to-date information by commenting:    
“For me, social media became my main source of information after the revolution. 
Otherwise, how would I know what’s going on? Any social or political events or 
incidents happening in the country are reported there. Basically anything can be 
found there!” (B-M-07-PRO) 
Another participant reported that social media provided him with sufficient information on 
the voting process for the Libyan parliamentary election that was held in July 2012. Since 
this vote was the first in more than 40 years, this participant thought that reading posts on 
social media platforms was the quickest way to learn about and understand the voting 
process and its outcome. Based on his experience, he stated the following:   
“After the revolution, there was no better source than social media to keep up with 
up-to-the-minute information. There were many pages launched to report news or 
to support the political campaigns for parties or individual candidates. I used to 
follow them before the election. You know it was our first experience in voting and 
we were not really aware of how things would proceed. The content posted on social 
media to describe the election such as illustrative videos or online flyers helped me 
a lot in understanding many political matters. In addition, there was information 
about the candidates and parties and also women’s right to vote. Some parties 
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launched online campaigns to gain support. All of these matters were posted and 
discussed. Basically, they gave us detailed information from who can vote, how to 
register, the ways of voting to how the votes were counted and proceeded. All of 
this information was easy to access on social media” (B-M-08-PRO)  
This quote reflected a lively and vibrant level of political activity, marked by young people 
participating in different forms of online political activities. It shows how they moved from 
practising entertainment prior to the uprising to mainly practising and discussing politics 
in the immediate aftermath. This quote also draws our attention to how social media 
platforms were used as a means of publicity to support some political candidates and 
parties. Although it was the first election in more than 40 years in Libya, some political 
actors employed the new forms of digital political election campaigns along with traditional 
forms to gain wider public support and solidarity.   
In this immediate aftermath of the uprising, social media was an important channel for 
different groups, e.g. pro-and anti-regime. For example, whilst the majority of pro-uprising 
participants were concerned with revolutionary information such as the election and voting, 
pro-regime participants were seeking updates and news associated with the Green 
resistance14. An example of this is below: 
“The main news I was interested in during that time was about the Green resistance. 
On some Facebook pages that were affiliated with the Green movements, there was 
information related to resistance. At that time, there was a focused view that the 
regime would take over again, claiming that Al-Gaddafi was still alive. So, I mostly 
followed this kind of social media news” (S-M-21-UNC) 
It was clear from the interviews with both pro- and anti-regime participants that information 
and news was mainly sought through like-minded Facebook pages. Participants were 
mainly looking for information that matched their pre-existing views. This tendency of 
seeking like-minded content suggests that participants were likely to fall into the trap of 
confirmation bias. Therefore, their risk of isolation seemed to be much higher than if they 
were exposed to contrary points of view. In other words, participants were likely to be 
sitting in filter bubbles that might have potentially reinforced their own biases.  
                                                          
14 The Green Resistance (after the colour of Libya’s flag before the uprising) is a term sometimes used to 
refer to supposed pro-Gaddafi militant groups.  
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However, while some participants might have fallen into the confirmation bias trap, a 
number of participants appeared to be more open and able to break out of echo chambers. 
They reported that they even sought content that went against their political views. As one 
participant commented:  
“I had no problem in following Facebook pages with a different political stance. I 
wanted to know what and how each group thought, what their views were and how 
they perceived things. It was important to try to understand the whole picture. 
Someone needs to think before just supporting one side over another” (T-F-06-
UNC) 
The quote shows that this participant seemed to leave her comfort zone, and moved to look 
for different news. The participant did not seem to be overtly affective. Rather, she used 
critical reasoning and thinking to make her own conclusion about what was going on. This 
way of thinking is considered important for creating a well-functioning public sphere in the 
Habermasian sense. However, it is worth mentioning that this participant, who claimed to 
be tolerant and open to different views, had a moderate political stance in relation to the 
revolution. This could possibly explain her willingness to interact with a variety of views 
and ideas.   
Yet, while several participants were keen to look for information and news, a few argued 
that staying informed and connected did not require much effort. For example, one 
interviewee said:  
“I don’t really look for information but the information comes to me. Important 
things usually go viral and everybody starts sharing them. So, you will eventually 
know about anything new while you are chatting with someone or doing any other 
activities. It will just appear on your social media feed” (T-F-02-PRO) 
This excerpt shed light on the fluid nature of the new information environment created by 
social media. Although social media might confirm pre-existing biases, it simultaneously 
can expose people to a variety of views by allowing them to simply encounter them while 
carrying on a routine activity.  
6.1.3 Convergence of new and old media 
The new information environment created by social media was one of rich content and 
material. Many participants (21 out of 25) reported that they had seen news from traditional 
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media re-presented on social media platforms and vice versa. The traditional news they had 
seen on social media was mainly broadcast by Libyan satellite channels that emerged after 
the revolution (Quintanilla & Dajani, 2012). The following quote shows how both 
traditional and social media were integrated in order to transmit news and cover domestic 
events: 
“Look, anything important on TV such as a government press conference or a 
public speech was immediately reported on social media. So, in case I missed 
something broadcast on TV like the prime minister’s speech, I usually found it on 
social media soon after. It could be downloaded as a video or the main points of 
the speech could be summarised in text. On the flip side, TV channels are 
increasingly citing social media as a source of information. I saw many users’ 
stories directly quoted from Facebook and presented on traditional media as first-
hand experience or as an example of public opinion” (T-F-06-UNC) 
This example suggest that user-generated content might have created headlines in 
traditional newsrooms. Therefore, ordinary people, who used to be recipients of 
information, could produce their own news through posting content on Facebook or Twitter 
such as first-hand experiences or personal opinions. In this manner, internet and social 
media can be said to have enhanced democracy.  
6.1.4 Social media as a tool for documenting and sharing events 
As discussed in the literature, cell phone penetration was high in Libya. In 2011, the 
penetration rate was 161 percent, with more than 10 million mobile subscriptions (Freedom 
House, 2015). This prevalence of mobile phone usage suggests that people can easily use 
their camera phones to document and share videos and images. The interview data of this 
study shows that many participants (N=12), particularly those with a revolutionary stance, 
were involved in documenting different post-revolutionary events such as celebrations, 
civil society15 activities, and demonstrations. For example, one participant, with 9 years of 
experience in blogging, made the following comment about her involvement in civil society 
activities and how she blogged about them with enthusiasm: 
“As you know, before the revolution, it was almost impossible to create civil society 
organisations outside of state control. After the revolution, the door was opened 
                                                          
15 Civil society in Libya (e.g. NGOs) proliferated from the ground up after the revolution. 
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and many civil society organisations were established in 2012. I joined many of 
their activities and workshops. The topics ranged from prison detainees, human 
rights, charity, civic engagement, and democracy to rule of law. Every event I 
attended or workshop I was involved in, I tended to document it by taking photos 
and recording videos and then write blog posts about it. When I didn’t find time to 
write, I simply posted about them on my Twitter or Facebook account. I had beliefs 
that the civil society could play a significant role along with the government 
towards democracy. As a young person, I wanted to practice democracy in the right 
way and build Libya” (T-F-05-PRO) 
While this participant documented important moments of her own experiences, another 
participant explained that he documented events in his attempts to keep a record of what 
events occurred and when. By doing this, he believed that he could prevent historical 
information from being distorted. In his opinion, this allowed people, when looking back, 
to gain understanding of the situation regarding different events. The comment below 
illustrates in detail this participant’s point of view: 
“Documenting events is beneficial in many ways. First, it allows people to get the 
latest updates and news so that they can create a well-informed opinion on what is 
going on. Second, it contributes to keeping memories and records of important 
events. I myself documented and shared many events such as press conferences that 
were held by the successive governments on Twitter. To keep them organised, I 
shared them under clear hashtags. So they are easily researchable. My point is if 
someone in future wanted to look back in time, they can easily find the information 
they want. Such information can be used as evidence against or in favour of 
politicians or public figures. Those people sometimes denied that they said a 
particular thing or held a particular position. So when you keep a record of what 
they said, they cannot deny what their position was at a certain point in time” (B-
M-07-PRO) 
This act of keeping a record of historical moments is very important, and it resonates with 
Bennett & Segerberg’s argument that social media platforms can function as archives of 
memory records or action repertoires that might be transferred to other users (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012). What is also interesting about this quote is how social media affordances 
were utilised to curate and organise content under hashtags to facilitate the search process 
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and tracking discussion topics. This way of blogging and documenting could be considered 
a kind of “citizen journalism” practice that combines photo blogging and video blogging 
with text to build an archive of Libya’s battle for democracy. As such, massive amounts of 
information can be kept and stored for later access that may feed the public debate, and 
thus, enrich the public sphere.  
6.1.5 Bridging online and offline worlds 
Through everyday conversations with friends and family in workplace or social and public 
events, many participants (N=21) contributed to transmitting online information and news 
outside the boundaries of the digital space. It became apparent that social media was 
providing a new political communicative space, rich with information and news that did 
not occur elsewhere. Based on her experience engaging in a range of forms of political 
offline conversation, a young participant from Sabha explained: 
“I was so active on Twitter in the subsequent two years of the revolution. I educated 
myself first about the political transition in Libya. Things like types of governments, 
the parliamentary election, its tasks, the process of writing a constitution and so on. 
All the relevant information was there on social media. Then, when I met my friends 
and family, particularly those who were not on social media, I explained everything 
I knew to them. I did this many times at work or at even social gatherings. I liked to 
engage in such political conversations. I was full of hope in that time and 
enthusiastic about helping people understand what was going on” (S-F-17-PRO) 
It is interesting to think about how social media content makes its way into these 
information grounds, through this participant sharing her experience and what she learned 
online with people in her social circle. Creating this interconnection between the two worlds 
might have helped to reduce existing digital inequality, and facilitated the flow of 
information, particularly to those who lacked digital skills and internet access. 
Similar to the mechanism described above, this quote below also demonstrates how 
information and news were transmitted between the online and offline worlds:  
 “Well, my parents tended to watch TV because they did not have the required skills 
to use the internet. So for example when there was any conflict, fight or incident, I 
gave them more up-to-date information than TV, with all the videos and images that 
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people were sharing. Social media is faster and quicker to find out and get more 
detailed information than TV” (T-M-15-PRO)  
This quote highlights two important issues. First, it demonstrates how mainstream media 
was not the first platform for information on everyday news, particularly for young people. 
Second, this statement shows that this participant’s family was unable to use the internet 
because they lacked the required skills. This means that digital divide was not simply a 
matter of ease of internet access but also technical skills. Without the required skills, people 
cannot use the internet. However, this digital gap seems to be slightly narrowed in the recent 
years after the uprising. This participant interestingly added: 
“Well, today, my mom has her own Facebook account. I opened one for her and she 
learned how to use it” (B-M-15-PRO) 
This statement resonates with the internet statistics that show a continuing increase in the 
number of internet and social media users in Libya.  
6.1.6 Social media for organising and coordinating events   
In Libya’s post uprising, the majority of participants did not use social media themselves 
for mobilising or coordinating events. Only two participants reported that they engaged in 
events where social media platforms were used for organisation and coordination purposes. 
For example, one Tripoli-based participant had an experience using social media to 
coordinate and publicise some post-revolutionary events:  
“The first activity I joined after the revolution was an event organised in Tripoli in 
2012. It was a big event organised to show that the city was safe and able to host 
ambassadors and delegations from around the world. This event was organised at 
a national level. Many politicians and different actors attended. I was one of the 
organising committee members. Besides traditional ways of communication, we 
used social media for organising and coordinating things but most importantly for 
publicising the event. It was through a Facebook page we created to make people 
aware of the event and encourage them to turn up” (T-M-18-PRO) 
Some Benghazi-based participants also recalled how Facebook and Twitter were used to 
organise and support anti-militia demonstrations after the death of U.S. Ambassador to 
Libya, J. Christopher Stevens.  
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“Yes, I remember there was a demonstration in September 21, 2012, which followed 
the killing of the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi by members of the Ansar al-Sharia 
militia. It was called ‘the Friday to rescue Benghazi’. There was a circulated online 
invitation saying that everyone should change the image of their Facebook profile 
to a certain logo. On this logo, it says ‘I am really going to participate’. I changed 
my profile picture and also I joined the demonstration against the militia on the 
ground” (B-M-07-PRO) 
This example shows how social media is not only capable of organising events but also 
can mobilise people to offline forms of collective politics. 
Unlike using social media for organising large-scale events, another participant used it for 
coordinating a small demonstration. For example, this participant said: 
“I organised one demonstration when Jadhran closed the two major oil export 
terminals in the East of Libya. I felt I had to do something because this would affect 
all Libyans. So I contacted people through creating a Facebook group chat to plan 
time and place. We went after that to protest but we were a small group. Only seven 
people” (T-M-15-PRO) 
Rather than serving as a tool for mobilising large-scale collective action, social media, in 
this example, functioned more as a means of communication between friends with similar 
interests. However, what is important is that many groups with different scales adopted 
digital approaches of information circulation, recruitment and mobilisation through digital 
media tools.  
6.1.7 Summary  
The findings above demonstrate that social media facilitated the emergence of different 
networked forms of political participation. Participants’ practices and activities created a 
space in the public sphere where they discussed different topics that were previously off 
limits. However, despite this seemingly vibrant political environment, social media was 
still limited and not truly open for all topics to be discussed. While formerly taboo subjects 
such as political topics became open to discussion, new taboos emerged such as criticising 
the rebels or the 17 February Revolution. Discussing topics that did not fit in the 
revolutionary mainstream seemed to be difficult to some degree. This suggest that although 
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there was a promise of unrestrained participation, there were still areas that were difficult 
to discuss.  
6.2 Social media, misinformation and political polarisation 
While the social media landscape opened up suddenly in the immediate aftermath of the 
fall of the regime, the subsequent political struggle for power in the country and 
accompanying lawlessness brought about new trends, challenges and dynamics different 
from the immediate aftermath. These new trends and practices are organised in the 
following themes:  
6.2.1 Social media’s perceived credibility and reliability 
The credibility of online information emerged as an important factor influencing 
participants’ use of social media platforms in the later stage of Libya’s post-uprising period 
(2014-2016). At this later stage, all interviewees expressed less trust in social media 
compared to the earlier post-revolutionary stage. This is not to say that participants stopped 
relying on social media as a source of information, but their perceptions towards its 
credibility had changed. For example, one participant expressed the following while 
reflecting on her experience back in 2011 when she felt highly sympathetic to the 
revolution:  
“Well, I feel I was used. I thought everything posted on social media was correct 
but I found out that not all things I believed to be facts about the events were correct. 
I don’t remember specific examples now but I feel many things were made up and 
exaggerated. The events of the uprising were very fast and intense and there was a 
lot of confusion and pressure. We couldn’t get a chance to evaluate things. 
However, we have now learnt, but it is too late” (B-F-13-PRO) 
This participant thought that she lacked sufficient experience in assessing and judging the 
accuracy of online information during the revolution. She believed that her sympathy 
towards the revolution prevented her from making a reasonable judgment of the 
information she consumed. This indicates that social media might have lacked credibility 
and could even have been manipulated to spread false news and misinformation to achieve 
a particular agenda.  
Several participants reflected the sense of being exploited and manipulated by media during 
the uprising, specifically those with pro-revolutionary stances. They mainly linked this with 
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the abundance of rumours and amplified information they consumed during the 
revolutionary times as well as the intensity of the events. For example:  
“During the uprising, horrific information was circulated around the rape 
allegations by the regime forces, and also about hiring mercenaries from sub-
Saharan Africa to fight for the regime. We heard about this on social media and on 
TV channels alike. This news for example made my father’s political position shift 
from being neutral towards the uprising to supporting it and standing with the 
rebels. Unfortunately, there was no such thing. There might be a few cases but not 
as the media put it.” (B-F-10-PRO) 
Regardless of how accurate the information about the rape allegations or the mercenaries 
was, the example above shows how such shocking information can have a powerful impact 
on people’s minds and attention, particularly in a highly conservative society such as Libya. 
Focusing people’s attention on such a sensitive issue may have been one among many 
methods used to fuel the protests and mobilise people against the regime. 
Contrary to the pro-revolution participants, pro-regime participants did not doubt 
information that was circulated by the regime media in relation to the rebels’ misconduct 
during the uprising, even when they looked back at the past. This means that participants’ 
perceptions, beliefs and feelings seemed to affect how they viewed the credibility of 
information. Put differently, participants seem more likely to be inclined to information 
that confirmed pre-existing biases.  
However, despite this, participants in general showed progress towards understanding the 
nature of social media as a two-way channel of accurate as well as false information. This 
understanding impacted their practices and behaviour on social media regardless of their 
ideologies. In fact, they developed strategies and approaches to verify and deal with online 
information both as consumers and distributers. These approaches are discussed below. 
6.2.1.1 Verifying information with friends and family 
In order to validate social media information and news, one tactic commonly used by many 
participants (n=21) was to verify information and news with friends and family. As one 
interviewee reported: 
“Facts can be easily fabricated and distorted. Libya today is a fertile ground for 
fake news and misinformation. So what I often do is to check with my friends and 
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family. For example, a few days ago, there was news on Facebook about a fight 
between two militias in Tripoli but when I inboxed my friend who lives nearby he 
told me that the loud sound was a bonfire because of a wedding celebration” (T-
M-15-PRO) 
This quote indicates a major shift in the way people deal with online information over time. 
People seem to place more trust in information received from friends and family rather than 
acquaintances, distant friends or strangers on social media. Here we can observe that 
information received through ‘strong ties’ (close social relations or strong bonds) was likely 
to be perceived as more trustworthy than if received via ‘weak ties’ (weak bonds and social 
relations). This tendency shows how public attitudes started to shift towards embracing a 
cautious approach when consuming social media information.  
6.2.1.2 Verifying information using digital tools  
Another reported way to check information and news was through using digital tools. A 
few participants (n=9) stated that they often used reverse image search tools such as Google 
Images and TinEye to verify pictures they were not sure about. The quote below points out 
the importance of these tools in debunking faked images: 
“After the airstrike on Derna last year, there was an image of wounded kids that 
went viral on social media. I directly used Google Images to verify this image 
because I doubted it. I was right and the image was not of Libyan kids but related 
to kids from Gaza” (B-M-07-PRO) 
Although this example showed how social media seemed to become increasingly a space 
for fake stories and propaganda, there is the possibility of verifying, judging and evaluating 
the information using the affordances of digital technology. The statement below also 
shows how the technology features embedded in social media allowed for information 
validation:  
“When I read breaking news on social media, particularly those that include 
phrases such as ‘happening now’ or ‘urgent’, I straightaway use the Facebook 
search box to check if this is really happening now or a while ago. For example, a 
few days ago, I came across a post about some militias’ fight in Tripoli containing 
the phrase ‘happening now’. I searched using the filter feature of Facebook to sort 
the search results by date and time. What was interesting was that the fight was 
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already over but some people were still sharing the same post with the phrase 
‘happening now’” (T-M-15-PRO) 
This quote, on one hand, shows how misinformation spread easily on social media if people 
shared and posted information without checking. Although it might not be a deliberate 
attempt to spread misinformation, it makes the online environment more chaotic and 
problematic because it maintains false reports to spread. On the other hand, this quote 
shows improvement in people’s practices over time in terms of how they observe and 
consume social media information. Rather than taking information they read as fact, they 
start questioning and evaluating its credibility. As one interviewee commented: 
“Recently, I think people’s ability to assess any piece of information has improved. 
People who get easily fooled by particular information are fewer than before. 
People have a suspicion about everything now. They start to doubt and think 
carefully about whatever they read. Is it realistic or not? Why is this story posted 
at this time? Simply, they start questioning. They moved from only reading 
information to a more advanced level in which they analyse and compare the news. 
They start linking things together in order to understand what is going on. I myself 
read the news from different online platforms and sources before drawing my own 
conclusion” (T-M-18-PRO) 
This behaviour indicates the change in the way how people tackle information. Doubting 
and questioning reflect a critical attitude which means that people become more evaluative 
about information they read. Critical and rational thinking is an important element in the 
development of the public sphere. 
6.2.1.3 Switching between social media platforms  
Most participants reflected awareness of the potential bias of social media information. 
Therefore, they thought that checking the same fact in different platforms and sources could 
be helpful before drawing any conclusion. Twitter was the most reported platform that 
participants switched to (n=17). Twitter was perceived as a more reliable source of 
information than Facebook. It was also viewed as a more professional platform that is less 
chaotic and hostile. In the following example, one participant explained the reasons behind 
his preference of Twitter over Facebook.  
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             “Twitter is more professional than Facebook. It has only 140 characters which fits 
news. You can get the main point without the need to read long texts. If someone 
wants more details, he can simply click on the links or hashtags about any incident 
and find all the information in one place. For me, Twitter is a convenient platform 
and does not give me headaches” (T-M-04-PRO) 
However, this view was contested by a number of participants who thought that Twitter 
had started to become a noisy platform along the lines of Facebook. In their perspective, 
the increase in the number of Twitter users in Libya seemed to attract supporters and 
dissenters of different causes and ideologies to the platform, turning it into a conflictual 
space. Although this condition cannot create an ideal public sphere, it can certainly allow 
adversaries to come together in one space. In this manner, it can be said that social media 
creates publics and connects them together despite their differences.  
6.2.1.4 Developing the trust relationship  
Due to there often being a lot of confusion and doubt around which claims were true, 
participants (n=16) started to take their information from certain sources with which they 
had developed a trust relationship. This trust relationship, as they reported, developed over 
time with certain Facebook pages or Twitter accounts.  For example, one interviewee 
commented:  
“Over time, you can identify which Facebook page or Twitter account you can trust 
and which one is delivering more trustworthy information than another. Some 
pages are very reliable. They even edit their posts and apologise if they post 
something wrong. Anyway there is no ultimate trust” (T-M-03-ANTI)    
The phrase ‘there is no ultimate trust’ shows that the credibility of social media information 
is relative. Although this participant built a relationship of trust with certain social media 
networks, he was aware that social media might present inaccurate content. This therefore 
reflects that there seemed to be a deepening awareness over time among the study 
participants. 
Participants also reported that they started placing more trust in verified accounts and 
personal profiles rather than public or anonymous sources. The reason behind that was 
mainly because:  
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“…the thing is you don’t know who is sitting behind the keyboard managing this or 
that page. Is he or she a child, a politician, crazy person? While when you follow a 
personal profile or a well-known person such as a journalist, activist or a thinker, 
you know at least who they are and what their ideological bias might be. They are 
not anonymous to you. So, they also are much more accountable about what they 
publish compared to those hiding behind fake names” (S-F-9-PRO) 
Another participant discussed the need to strengthen the government and official bodies’ 
capacity for the use of the social media. This participant believed that people in authority 
should increase their adoption of social media as one way to interact with citizens and listen 
to their views in a transparent manner. Elaborating further on his point, he said: 
“Currently the government’s use of social media is not professional and also 
unofficial. For example, the Government of National Accord (Arabic:  قافولا ةموكح
ينطولا) does not have a verified social media account. So, those accounts available 
on social media that act on its behalf are not trustworthy” (B-M-07-PRO)    
Here we have another observation that information received through ‘strong ties’ 
(professional journalists, thinkers, activists, verified accounts) was likely to be perceived 
as more trustworthy than if received via ‘weak ties’ (anonymous Facebook pages). The 
anonymity afforded by social media, therefore, could limit its ability to mobilise people or 
influence their opinion because they may increasingly become distrustful of anonymous 
communications.  
6.2.1.5 Reading through users’ interactions 
Checking other users’ comments was another reported strategy to assess whether online 
content include truthful information or not. For example:  
“I often read through users’ comments after I read any post because people often 
confirm or disconfirm what has been posted. They also sometimes add to or correct 
it. For example, they might provide a link to the same information or refer to 
another page. So, you can check and compare” (B-F-11-ANTI) 
This strategy is important because it may help to prevent fake news from spreading online, 
as users may be less likely to re-post information if they are aware of its nature.    
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6.2.1.6 Ignoring and delaying interacting with social media information 
Although there is the potential to verify social media information, there is also a lot of 
difficulty in telling what is true and what is false. In a situation where participants’ attempts 
turned out to be futile, the common attitude was to ignore or delay interacting with such 
information. As one interviewee put it: 
“If I am distrustful of what I read, I simply put it on the shelf” (S-F-09-PRO)  
This participant further added that: 
“Stories could verify themselves. You just need to wait for some time, and then more 
information will appear to either contradict or support what has been posted. At 
the end, it depends on your ability to discern what was going on. However, most of 
the time you remain confused. So there is no way to understand sometimes” (S-F-
09-PRO) 
Although participants seemed to retain a healthy scepticism in the way they looked at 
information, there comes a point where everyone is distrustful of everything. This also 
becomes a problem and hence it is difficult for a democratic public sphere to function.  
6.2.2 The credibility of old vs. new media  
Although participants placed less trust in social media, it commanded more trust than TV. 
The study revealed that there was a dramatic decline in trusting old media, particularly 
satellite TV channels both nationally and regionally. Most participants held negative views 
toward the Libyan TV channels, specifically those not run by the state, including but not 
limited to Al-Nabba TV, Libya’s Channel, Libya One and Libya al Hadath TV. As one 
participant stated:  
“All TV channels are politicised. They originated the news depending on the 
agendas of their owners. That is why I distrust them. Although this is also possible 
on social media, at least there is still the possibility to find information posted by 
ordinary people but not from editors who want to feed you something for their own 
purposes” (T-F-05-PRO) 
However, losing trust in old media was not only limited to the national level but also 
regional. The Al-Jazeera channel in particular seemed to totally lose its credibility among 
the study participants. Many participants either pro- or against the uprising stated that they 
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did not rely any longer on Al-Jazeera as a reliable source of news. The quote below 
demonstrates the dramatic declining trust in Al-Jazeera as well as some other national 
channels: 
“I cancelled Al-Jazeera and some other Libyan channels from the list of channels 
on my own TV. I feel sick when I watch them because of bias and propaganda. So I 
simply got rid of them. I even don’t join my family in the living room if they are 
watching these channels. I feel much more comfortable like this. Less headache” 
(T-M-04-PRO) 
It is apparent that the Al-Jazeera channel seems to face a failure in maintaining a 
relationship with its audience. Its position in commanding participants’ attention compared 
to the past appeared to be lost because they believed that its news was ideologically-loaded. 
In fact, a recent study by Ethelb (2016) confirmed this point. Ethelb found that Al-Jazeera 
news headlines that were produced by Reuters in English and then adapted by Aljazeera 
have been ideologically mediated in a way that involved reformulating an Arabic version 
different from the original to conform to Al-Jazeera’s political and ideological agenda. 
These tactics and strategies to control and shape the public sphere are indeed a problem for 
the functioning of a democratic public sphere because such an information environment 
lacks transparency.  
6.2.3 Social media for informing citizens and saving lives  
Since 2014, Libya has been plagued by occasional fighting between militias in various 
areas, streets and alleys, erupting at different times and places. Within this chaotic situation, 
social media were used in a unique way in sending crucial and helpful information about 
the current situation. Participants (n=18) reported that many groups on Facebook have been 
created to exchange useful information to let people know where they can find petrol 
stations with fuel supply or banks with cash supply, and avoid areas of conflict. The quote 
below gives further explanation:  
“In Tripoli, there is a public Facebook group that has been established in order to 
let people know occurrences of danger and violence. It is called ‘Safe Path Tripoli’. 
The idea behind launching this group emerged when my friend was on his way back 
to Tripoli from Tunisia. He was stuck in Zawiya for three days because of the fight 
between militias that occurred in Tripoli in 2014. He was not able to find safe routes 
to reach his home in Tripoli. So, after the battle was over, he decided to set up a 
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Facebook group to help people if a similar situation happened, to stay safe and 
informed. The mechanism of sharing information in this group is that each member 
can provide information on the areas that are near or close to them. They might say 
something like, “red light,” to signal an area where militias are fighting or where 
fake checkpoints are taking people for ransom. They also can guide you on which 
safe paths can be used, which roads are open and which ones are blocked. I 
personally used this group to seek or share information with others. The 
information flows directly from people to people. The admin also tried to minimise 
misinformation by asking the users not to post without making sure their 
information is reliable. He also asked people to post under the hashtag #SafePath 
so that information can be found easily. He also thinks of building a mobile phone 
application based on this group for more flexible and faster services” (T-M-04-
PRO) 
This example shows how social media become successful and vital sources of emergency 
and crisis information. It helps to quickly spread helpful information about the then-current 
situation. In the absence of the government’s role in securing areas, or even providing 
citizens with sufficient information to protect their safety, people in the meantime took on 
this responsibility and utilised social media to face everyday life challenges. This finding 
supports a recent study by Reilly & Tantanasi (2018) in which social media was effective 
in reducing the number of casualties caused by air strikes in the Syrian civil war.  
While social media might help in crisis situations, it can also be used negatively. The quote 
below explains how social media was used to threaten people as well as for defamation:  
 “As I told you, I work as a Libya Telecom & Technology employee. There were 
several cases reported to the company about people using social media for 
defamation, hacking and espionage on individuals or activists for the purpose of 
threat, extortion and demanding ransom. However, we in the company cannot 
identify the exact location of these suspicious accounts. We only can give the 
location of the antenna that those criminals connect from, which usually covers 
almost five kilometres away. So, it is hard to follow them within this large space” 
(T-M-15-PRO) 
The example above suggests that although social media has the potential to be effective too 
during crisis and emergency situations, it may simultaneously put individuals and activists’ 
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safety at risk. The difficulties in preventing the act of cybercrime and cyberwar make online 
interactions a dangerous practice, particularly in a failed and lawless state such as Libya 
today. This of course can impact negatively on the development of the public sphere 
because it could lead people to avoid political practices to protect their safety.  
6.2.4 Social media for targeting specific audiences/ campaign of persuasion 
Although social media has the potential to provide people with a variety of content and 
information, it does not guarantee that people can form a more balanced view or informed 
decision just because of the availability of information. In fact, just as social media may 
provide people the information they need, it may also give them the information that 
someone else wants, in a way that may influence opinions and direct attention to certain 
issues, leading to people changing positions or rallying behind certain individuals or 
groups. The comment below reflects on this point:  
“My friends and I recently tried to purchase Facebook advertisements from a local 
company in order to publicise a particular political event that we wanted to 
organise: a campaign on a national level. We wanted to bring people together for 
reconciliation purposes. We wanted to reach and influence a larger number of 
people through Facebook. Social media is very important in stirring things up and 
directing people’s opinion. Unfortunately, the lack of funds stopped us from 
continuing this project. You know: no fund, no project” (T-M-18-PRO) 
This technique suggests that social media platforms might contribute to the improvement 
of the democratic process by tailoring more persuasive campaign messages on a range of 
issues such as reconciliation. However, there are concerns that such techniques might be 
used by political elites in order to manipulate public discourse perception, turning citizens 
to potential ‘consumers’ (Bates, 2016) and thus restricting the development of the 
democratic process.  
In this regard, an increased awareness of the potential use of social media in stirring things 
up and manipulating people’s views was frequently stated in the interviews: 
“Basically, it is an information war. Different groups are trying to feed us certain 
information and telling us how to think. Each group or party nowadays in Libya 
has their own electronic army to support them against their opponents. So, you can 
find the same story posted or described in many different ways. Let me give you an 
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example: if you read news about someone killed, he would be described as a martyr, 
victim or maybe an evil person who deserved it. It depends on how each group 
wants you to understand or look at certain news. So you need to be careful” (B-M-
08-PRO) 
Although it could be difficult to expand one’s worldview and consider all sides of an issue, 
two common approaches were reported by participants that helped them slightly to avoid 
their opinion being constructed and shaped by a certain or single point of view. These 
common approaches were:   
 Diversifying social media feeds  
A number of participants (n=12) claimed that they often sought alternatives by following 
new voices in order to look for opinions and views different from their own. For example, 
one participant stated that he tended to follow online content that he disagreed with 
because:  
“I know that most of what I see are opinions and voices like my own. So I wanted to 
explore new things. Someone should get out of his comfort zone to see what others think 
or believe. There is so much information out there” (B-M-8-PRO) 
Another reported that being tolerant to and interacting with diverse views and opinion on 
social media provided opportunities for open and informed democratic debate: 
“I deeply supported the Movement for Federal 16  Libya. However, after having a 
conversation on Twitter with someone who is against federalisation, he convinced me 
and I totally changed my opinion after that” (B-M-07-PRO) 
This example shows how the importance of interacting with a wide range of debates and 
views is vital to the functioning of a healthy democracy.  
 Deleting and unfollowing  
Several participants reported that they deleted certain political Facebook pages, particularly 
sponsored ones because:  
                                                          
16 A movement erupted many times after the uprising in which its supporters demand the establishment 
of a federal governing structure in Libya based on the country’s 1951 constitution—a time when Libya was 
divided into three federal states Cyrenaica (East), Fezzan (South), and Tripolitania (West). 
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“…they were simply working towards their own personal benefits and gains. No 
one thinks of building the country but they further fuelled the division and 
separation” (T-M-04-PRO) 
However, the mechanism of following or unfollowing certain Facebook pages or Twitter 
accounts is not straightforward. For example:  
“It is hard to say. For example, I deleted some Facebook pages and then re-
followed them. What you disliked today, you might re-like tomorrow. The positions 
of the pages also can change. The pages themselves change. They sometimes 
become less active, or less trustworthy and so on. We also change. Our ideologies 
and views, and thus the pages we follow. You never know” (T-M-15-PRO) 
This quote demonstrates that publics are fluid and changing over time. Their feelings, 
ideologies and position are also shifting. Therefore, it could be difficult to draw a certain 
conclusion regarding the democratic potential of social media at this point in time.   
6.2.5 Social media for everyday political conversation and freedom of speech  
Several participants (n=21) stated that they feel less comfortable expressing their political 
views and discussing them with others online since 2014 (when the wave of assassinations 
and the struggle for power between militias began to take their toll). One view that emerged 
in all interviews was that Libyan society appeared to be deeply divided, in a way that led 
to labelling individuals, or entire cities and tribes according to certain ideologies and 
beliefs. In this later stage of the uprising’s aftermath, the division and tension is not only 
between anti- and pro-regime but also between supporters and dissenters of newly emerged 
ideologies and groups. These new groups include mainly the Dignity coalition (known as 
the army), led by Khalifa Hafter, a former army officer, based in the east of Libya; Shura 
Council of Benghazi; Islamist revolutionary forces (anti-Dignity); and Dawn coalition, pro-
Islamist militias based in the West (anti-Dignity). As each group dominated certain 
geographical locations, participants stated that they felt less confident in expressing their 
opinion if they were against these militias and armed groups. Therefore, some returned to 
practise self-censorship. For example: 
“We are back to square zero. If you are based in the east, it is difficult to criticise 
Hafter and if you are based in the west, it is difficult to criticise the Dawn group. 
Of course there are exceptions but you have to measure the risk by yourself and be 
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accountable for what you write because no one can help you. There is no law. I 
myself have preferred not to discuss politics recently” (T-M-16-PRO) 
Some other participants thought that the best way to express critiques and opinions about 
critical issues was through the use of pseudonyms. As one participant commented: 
             “Look, the best way to express your personal feelings and opinion is through using 
a fake name. Otherwise, you might expose yourself to danger” (B-F-11-ANTI) 
On one hand, the statement above shows how freedom of expression is in decline. On the 
other hand, it exemplifies the importance of the affordances of social media in allowing 
and enabling this participant to voice his opinion without necessarily worrying about his 
personal safety.  
Another example of self-censorship was:  
“Well, I post under my real identity. However, if I want to post about something 
sensitive, I often edit the privacy setting of my Facebook profile so I can choose 
who can see my post” (T-M-15-PRO) 
These quotes above suggest that fears of reprisal and the growing uncertainty in the 
country’s situation enhanced participants’ self-censorship and led them to post 
anonymously. 
Yet, posting anonymously did not always guarantee safety. The story below shows how 
users could be vulnerable and exposed to harm even though they communicated 
anonymously:  
            “I know someone who was an admin of a popular Facebook page. He used to 
criticise certain Tripoli-based militia heavily on his page. However, this militia was 
able to identify him. He then was threatened and forced to stop posting against 
them” (T-M-19-PRO) 
This example further confirmed the point discussed previously that the militias would act 
if threatened.  
Despite all this complexity, one interviewee was against the use of pseudonyms, 
particularly when expressing personal viewpoints. He argued that using pseudonyms could 
137 
 
make powerful actors feel stronger (e.g. militias), and therefore, this could eventually result 
in further restrictions on the freedom of speech. He explained this as follows:  
            “Using pseudonyms is a good choice but one should confront this phenomenon. 
Otherwise, it will be aggravated and no one will be able to enjoy freedom of speech 
either online or offline. Personally, I often post my political opinion under my real 
name and I will never use a fake one” (T-M-18-PRO) 
Through this statement, the participant reflected a strong human agency and also 
willingness to take potentially significant risks for principles. 
From another perspective, some other participants believed that although there was 
instability in the country, people were still able to post criticism and discuss their personal 
views. As one participant stated:  
            “I think it is fine to post whatever you want. Look at Facebook, it is simply a virtual 
battleground between different groups or individuals. Militias wouldn’t take action 
unless their presence on the ground was threatened. Otherwise they wouldn’t 
bother. I personally think I’m more confident online in expressing my views” (T-F-
06-UNC) 
However, despite all of these different views, there was an agreement between participants 
that the government(s) and state officials could be criticised without fear or even hiding 
behind fake names. All of these tendencies reflected a complex situation in this late stage 
of Libya’s post-uprising period. The ongoing developments on the ground and the dynamic 
loyalty of militias further complicated the situation. This complexity suggests that the role 
of social media in the development of the democratic process is still far from certain. 
6.2.6 Social media and the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion  
While many participants (n=19) increasingly used self-censorship approach to 
communicate around politics, it was observed that several participants (n=5) with a pro-
regime stance began to communicate their anti-revolutionary views more confidently at 
this later stage: 
“I felt so tense after the fall of the regime but I feared talking in public. I couldn’t 
even join their Facebook pages. Nowadays I have calmed down and I have had 
some discussion with those who support the revolution online. Of course none of 
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them can deny that this revolution led us to a dark tunnel. I know that expressing 
my opinion online or even offline will not lead us to find the light but at least 
someone can vent own feelings” (T-F-24-ANTI)  
This quote shows that despite her disagreement with others, this participant began at least 
to interact and communicate with voices opposite to her. This attitude is important to the 
development of the public sphere. Although reaching consensus in this case is hard to 
achieve, bringing adversaries together in a single inclusive space may influence the other 
party’s beliefs and thus facilitate the constitution of the public sphere.  
Besides this opportunity for the inclusion of diverse participants, a sense of tolerance was 
also expressed among the study participants. For example, one pro-revolution participant 
claimed to be more tolerant now compared to in the immediate aftermath of the uprising:  
“Okay my attitude has changed fundamentally. I became more tolerant to other 
views, not because the revolution didn’t pay off but because respecting others is 
important. I insulted many people after the revolution just because they supported 
the regime. Unfortunately, I posted many comments just for the purpose of 
discomforting and annoying some people who are pro-regime. I understand now it 
was the wrong behaviour” (S-F-17-PRO)   
Another pro-revolution participant said that he was collaborating with his pro-regime friend 
in order to administrate a Facebook page for bringing people together, stressing the need 
for what he called ‘the national reconciliation’. He elaborated:  
“Okay, during the uprising and after, we have been labelled as ‘thuwar’   راوث
(rebels) and ‘azlam’ ملازأ (regime loyalists). Let me admit that we swallowed the 
bait. Now we should change this. Through this page, we are trying to call for peace. 
We are trying to bring people together, reconcile between them and avoid 
promoting hate speech. This important for the national reconciliation” (T-M-15-
PRO) 
The example above suggests that the language of polarisation online in some cases seems 
to be decreasing. By trying to provide a balanced discourse on this page, there may be an 
opportunity for promoting dialogue and acceptance among different camps and groups. In 
this way, social media could play a positive role in contributing to building public 
consensus and facilitating a healthy democratic debate and practice.  
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On the other hand, there were also some participants who reflected a sense of intolerance 
and unwillingness to others opposite to them. For example:  
“Currently, I am only following Facebook pages or accounts that I am comfortable 
with, specifically the ones that support the army (Dignity operation). I don’t feel 
that I want to hear anything or interact with anybody against the army” (B-F-10-
PRO) 
Another participant commented:   
“I had online discussion with a Facebook friend about the situation in Libya. I was 
comparing between stability during the rule of Al-Gaddafi and the situation now. 
He did not accept that and he insulted me and also said that I was living in the past. 
I simply blocked him to avoid the headache. Blocking is the magic solution for these 
people” (T-M-03-ANTI) 
This act of excluding others through blocking suggests that social media could reduce the 
opportunity to create inclusive space where everybody can join a discussion and access 
diverse information and ideas. Thus, it could restrict opportunities for the development of 
the democratic public sphere.  
Overall, it can be said that social media can contribute to the post-revolutionary events in 
both positive and negative ways. While it could promote a participatory environment and 
enhance democratic process, it might simultaneously limit opportunities for participation 
and create a polarised environment.  
6.2.7 Social media and opinion polarisation 
There was a common view among participants that social media was a reflection of what 
was happening offline. An obvious case in point was the regional and tribal conflicts in the 
country. All participants commented on how this issue became critical in Libya today, 
affecting people’s use of social media and producing further division and fragmentation 
within the society. The quote below explains how polarisation of public opinion reached a 
high level in 2014 and continued to rise throughout the next years:  
“I think social media is simply reflecting our life and problems that already exist in 
our society. Yes, it adds to it by exaggerating and amplifying things but the 
problems are already there. Take for example, the east-west divide. This is 
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something historical but it has been recently revived and become worse since 2014, 
particularly after the emergence of the two governments, one in the east and the 
other in the west. Of course, social media does not create this problem but probably 
makes it prominent. Simple as that” (B-M-12-PRO)  
This shows how social media may feed and maintain the offline division through online 
conversations and debates, generating more tensions and struggles.   
However, talking further about the role of social media in this tribal-regional environment, 
a number of interviewees reflected that the situation is better in reality than its portrayal on 
social media. For example, one interviewee said: 
“To be fair, despite divisions and the problems, there is less tension in reality. From 
my experience, I feel people are fine when they meet even though they have different 
backgrounds and belong to different tribes and cities. In my opinion, social media 
does not really reflect reality in many respects. I am not saying that there are no 
problems but I think social media is amplifying things. The job of some Facebook 
pages is just to spread sedition and create instability in the country for certain 
agendas” (T-M-04-PRO) 
A similar view shared by another participant: 
“Well, I believe that some Facebook pages were set up merely for exaggerating 
statements and forcing certain agendas. In this way, they just promote hate speech 
and create further division in the country” (T-M-14-PRO) 
This could suggest that social media does not only create polarisation but also seems to 
produce more fragmented and extremely unconnected groups compared to the offline 
environment. In this way, social media can thus isolate publics and prevent them from 
seeing beyond their own worlds.  
However, although people may run the risk of isolation inherent in social media, they could 
still be exposed to richer and more diverse content and sources in different ways. For 
example, one participant acknowledged the affordance of Facebook in enabling her to 
encounter a variety of information and ideas:  
“When my Facebook friends share someone’s status or ‘like’ a post or a page, it 
appears on my Facebook news feed. I followed many people this way.  Their 
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activities often catch my interest and attract me to explore certain issues further. In 
my opinion, ideas or information on social media cannot be hidden or manipulated 
for a long time. Personally, social media helped me to open up to different ideas 
and thoughts I was not aware of” (T-F-06-UNC)  
Accordingly, although social media might limit people’s ability to explore new 
perspectives, this example above shows that there is still a possibility of being exposed to 
different information and news, particularly that which is of interest to people’s personal 
social network such as family, acquaintances, friends and friends of friends. In this way, 
social media can introduce people to a diversity of voices and views, countering the flow 
of one-sided information, challenging different agendas, and giving people the opportunity 
to connect with a variety of ideas and access masses of information.  
A similar case in point is discussed by another participant. She believed that social media 
enabled her to understand different issues regarding the revolutionary cause:  
“Well, although some of these issues I am going to talk about were presented on 
Libyan official television during the uprising, I didn’t watch them. You know at that 
time, Al-Jazeera caught my attention. So after the revolution, these topics re-
circulated on social media. For example, I watched a video explaining the link 
between NATO interference and Gaddafi’s calls to the African nations to use the 
golden dinar instead of the U.S. dollar and the euro. Also, I read some articles on 
the claims about a fund given by Gaddafi to Nicolas Sarkozy for his election 
campaign, and why Sarkozy was very keen to attack Libya. Also, why the keeper of 
Gaddafi`s secrets, Nuri Al-Mismari, fled specifically to France before the outbreak 
of Arab uprisings. A lot of issues like this made me step back and rethink the 
revolution and whether I missed certain information related to it or not” (S-F-17-
PRO) 
However, although social media seemed to introduce this participant to new information 
she was not aware of, it does not guarantee that people sharing this information are correct 
or credible. Just as social media may provide people the information they need, it may also 
give them the information that someone else wants, in a way that may influence opinions 
and direct attention to certain issues. This leads to the following theme.  
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6.2.8 Social media and manipulating public opinion  
There was a common sense among several pro-revolution participants (n=13) that they 
were emotionally driven and exploited by the different types of media during the uprising. 
For example, one pro-revolution participant commented:   
“The media in its coverage focused mainly on portraying the regime and its 
opponents as an evil vs. good. However, I am not saying that the regime was good 
or that there was no violence committed by its forces. Of course, there was. 
However, the thing that I believe now is that the complete truth was not given to us, 
and there was too much exaggeration. The regime had good and bad things but it 
was portrayed in a very bad way that made us blind to some issues” (B-M-08-PRO)  
He further added: 
“Looking back, I always ask myself this question. Was it better to have a revolution 
or to have an evolution?” (B-M-08-PRO) 
This quote shows a reversal in this participant’s views and reflects a sense of regret over 
the old regime's demise.  
Another participant felt naive about the posts he shared in the past during the revolution 
and its immediate aftermath when he checked them from ‘On This Day’, the ‘time travel’ 
feature: 
“I deleted several posts because their content was clearly false and silly. I feel 
ashamed of myself when I read what I wrote or posted. I was hasty and naïve 
sharing everything without thinking” (T-M-16-PRO)    
This quote shows how it might be difficult to distinguish between news value and 
misinformation during a conflict and in intense moments. It shows also how news 
propaganda might influence and manipulate people’s opinion, particularly those who lack 
media literacy skills.  
This participant further added that he became distrustful in the political process and lost 
faith in the revolution. He reflected on his current position through describing himself as 
‘penitent’, referring to a part of Gaddafi’s speech in the early days of the uprising when he 
warned the protestors, saying that ‘You'll regret it later, but you will not be able to go back’ 
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فوس( )مدنلا عفني لا موي ،نومدنت . However, this interviewee emphasised that his regret was not 
because the regime was perfect but because of “safety and security” provided by it.  
However, not all pro-revolution participants doubted or lost faith in the revolution. In fact, 
a number of them still believe in it and its principles. In fact, they believed that their 
decisions to participate stemmed from a real desire and passion for change rather than being 
influenced by media. Despite the revolution’s outcomes, they thought that change was 
necessary and required. As one participant commented: 
“Well, if we did not try, we would never know. I still believe in the revolution and I 
planned to participate before the protests even started, before the propaganda of 
Al-Jazeera and before videos and photos circulated on social media. I know the 
situation is hard now and this is not the thing we hoped for but you never know. 
This suffering could be a part of the change” (T-M-15-PRO) 
Another participant also thought:  
“Change is not easy. The failure of the revolution doesn’t mean that it was the 
wrong decision or a conspiracy. In my opinion, this is normal. The revolution was 
the first step only, and there are many steps that need to be done. I am currently 
working on a project called (8 + 8). It means eight solutions to solve eight problems. 
I am trying to reach agreement between different factions in Libya without firing 
any single bullet. Social media will be used for the publicity of this event when it is 
ready” (T-M-18-PRO) 
This example reflects a strong human agency of how people might negotiate their role in 
society by opposing different forms of constraints in this complex transition period. This 
participant also believed in the role of social media in helping him achieve his goal. He 
thought that social media was an important space where he could create an arena to bring 
people together in an inclusive environment. Social media as such might act as an 
alternative public sphere in which people discuss and deliberate on different issues.    
6.2.9 Social media and changing attitudes towards emotional content  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2011 events triggered different complex emotions 
in a way that shaped participants’ views and led to action as well as non-action. The quote 
below further exhibits a clear example of how emotional content regarding the protests, 
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which also had a strong presence in traditional media, might have influenced this pro-
revolution participant’s response to the uprising: 
“To be honest, my political information was poor. For me, Gaddafi was a symbol 
of Libya but when I saw the videos of protests and heard news about clashes and 
victims, I felt so sympathetic and angry. It was a complex feeling. I straightway 
supported the uprising although I didn’t participate physically” (T-F-02-PRO) 
This shows how emotional content might have helped to focus this participant’s attention 
on one part of the world around her. Being immersed in such content seemed to make her 
miss out on counter-information in a way that may have led to pushing her further towards 
a certain direction.  
This is something also clearly reflected in the following pro-regime participants’ answer:  
“…no one talked about the rebels’ crimes. Media only focused on things against 
the regime. Do you remember the YouTube video that was broadcast on the state 
channel? The one that showed members of the army arrested by the rebels who 
were then killed. This is of course something that was not important for Al-Jazeera 
or other media outlets because their aim was clear. It was simply media 
‘presstitution’ (T-F-24-ANTI)   
These examples above demonstrate that everyone had different emotions, and thus, 
different behaviours and different understanding of the revolution.  
However, although sensational information may have shaped people’s actions and opinions 
during the uprising, it would seem to work in a different way in the recent times of Libya’s 
post-uprising. Participants seemed to become less overtly affective. For example, one 
participant explained that he became ‘desensitised’ to the violent scenes shared on social 
media. He thought that:  
“We are getting used to bloody scenes. Images and videos of death and violence 
have become a part of our everyday life. Of course we feel sorry and sad but our 
reaction is not as before. It is sometimes difficult to know if it is real or not. So you 
don’t even know what you should do. Should I feel sad or not? What if the thing I 
felt sad about is not true? You know, it is a very complex situation” (T-M-16-PRO) 
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While some felt desensitised, others commented on how social media content still triggers 
online reactions, but these reactions often last for a shorter time or are less likely to be 
translated into an offline action:  
“Well, videos that contain abuse and violence often go viral and trigger a lot of 
discussions, shares, and comments. However, this tends to last for two or three days 
at most and then people forget about it and probably move on to discuss another 
issue. You know this makes me feel frustrated and apathetic because there is no 
value or real action coming out of these online discussions” (T-M-04-PRO) 
This suggests that although social media may feed the momentum of certain events, it may 
not sustain its impetus once the event is over. This condition resonates with the concept of 
“slacktivism” (Morozov, 2011), where people limit their actions to no more than taking a 
minimal effort of joining online discussion or expressing emotions about particular posts. 
In this manner, the internet could lead into non-action and prevent people from productive 
activism.  
6.2.10 Returning back to everyday social media activities 
Responding to the chaos and complexity surrounding the Libyan context, it was observed 
that many interviewees (n=22) returned back to use social media for non-political activities, 
similar to what was reported before the uprising. These practices included socialising, 
learning, entertainment and simply hanging out. This is not to say they withdrew 
completely from politics but they reflected less interest in political participation. In the 
following sections, two points are presented. First, reasons that may induce participants’ 
partial political withdrawal. Second, types of non-political social media activities that 
participants returned to after 2014.     
6.2.10.1 Reasons behind withdrawal from online political practice 
In general, the negativity surrounding the Libyan atmosphere and the chaotic situation 
seemed to feed into growing disinterest in politics, discouraging participants to some extent 
from engaging politically online. Looking more specifically, certain reasons were 
identified. For example, family friction, polarisation, fear of speech and distrust in the 
political process. All of these factors led many participants to become less politically 
interested and thus alter their social media practices.   
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 Family friction  
One participant reported that one reason behind avoiding posting personal views was 
to avoid backlash with users in his social network who did not share the same beliefs:  
“My friends and family used to interfere in my opinion on Facebook. We sometimes 
argue. So to not risk or damage my relationship with my relative or friend, I do not 
post about politics on Facebook too much. Rather, I use Twitter for political 
discussion because not all of them are there on Twitter. So Facebook for family and 
Twitter for politics” (B-M-08-PRO) 
It is interesting to see how social relations might limit people’s freedom of speech, 
particularly in the complex tribal system of Libya, thereby restricting the development of 
healthy democratic discussion.  
 Polarisation 
Chaos and deep polarisation in the social media environment led to political 
disengagement. For example, one participant commented:   
“I am a friendly person. I don’t like to be a part of a discussion where users are 
engaging in hostile discussions and arguments. Unfortunately, some Facebook 
pages have turned to be a space of conflict” (T-M-04-PRO) 
He further stated: 
“You know, there is too much noise online. It is just a lot of conflicting opinions 
and debates. You don’t know what to take or who to believe. It is something really 
annoying” (T-M-04-PRO) 
This demonstrates how increased polarisation in the online environment might turn off 
people from politics. In this way, social media did not serve as a democratic space bringing 
people together but served as a space of conflict that might lead to further division and 
polarisation, while leading some to political withdrawal.  
Another participant shared a similar view. She refrained from contributing in any political 
activities either online or offline because:   
“Practising politics in Libya is still immature. We have become jaded from the civil 
war and its implication on our life. We already had enough in reality; no one 
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wanted more noise on Facebook. I deleted most of the Facebook pages that spread 
hate and negativity. I don’t want to be involved in endless trivial and hostile 
discussions” (T-F-05-PRO) 
This is another piece of evidence showing how participants increasingly withdrew from 
political participation because of the growing polarisation and chaos in the online 
environment.  
 Fear of speech  
Some participants preferred not to take part in online discussion if there was threat to their 
safety. For example, one interviewee said:  
“Everybody is worrying about their safety and security. The security situation has 
deteriorated in Libya. The government is no longer in control. No one can help you 
if you get into trouble. So, it is better to not get involved in discussions that you 
know may lead to harm” (T-M-16-PRO) 
 Distrust in political process  
While some participants expressed concerns regarding the worsening security situation, 
and how this might have limited their ability to participate in politics freely and openly, 
others reflected a feeling of political inefficacy and distrust of the political process. As one 
participant commented:  
“[…] what social media can do if you are fighting countries such UAE, Qatar. They 
are fuelling the armed groups on the ground with weapons and money […] and of 
course all of this is with the blessing of America. Basically, you are fighting the 
USA and other Western countries. The current government just are tools in their 
hands” (B-F-10-PRO) 
This statement cast doubt on the capacity of political practice and the efficiency of the 
ultimate outcome of political participation.  
Overall, the examples above suggest that there is a common trend of withdrawing from 
politics among the study participants due to the country’s chaotic situation.  
6.2.10.2 Types of non-political social media activities 
While participants seemed to reduce their political activities, they simultaneously returned 
to using social media for non-political practices such as social communication, sharing 
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information and knowledge, entertainment, commercialisation and documenting events. 
These activities are discussed below:   
 Entertainment, social communication and sharing knowledge 
One of the most common reported activities was the use of social media for entertainment, 
social communication and knowledge sharing. For example:    
“Currently Instagram is my favourite online space. I like photography and I can 
share my photos there away from the headache caused by Facebook” (T-M-04-
PRO) 
Another participant turned from being politically active to engage in sharing knowledge 
and information related to her expertise as a medical student:  
“I have joined an Arab translation team on social media since 2014, and also a 
Libyan team since 2016. I did some voluntary work at the beginning but then it has 
become a paid job to translate knowledge from other languages into Arabic. I think 
this is how social media should be used rather than spreading hate and discontent” 
(T-F-05-PRO) 
Another example of moving away from politics was:  
“I am an admin of one of the popular Facebook pages. The page’s orientation was 
political in the past. However, we have started posting things about sport, 
technology or any other interesting things that young people like. We are trying to 
ease people’s feelings of distress, and avoid politics as much as we can, although 
we post news from time to time. You know one cannot detach himself completely 
from reality” (T-M-16-PRO) 
The above quotation suggests an important transformation in the online content on social 
media. This change draws our attention to how Facebook page administrators and 
influential Twitter users could act as ‘gatekeepers’ and might control in some way the 
nature of the content, and consequently the nature of discussion.  
 Commercialisation  
One noteworthy trend all participants noticed was the use of Facebook for online marketing 
business. Participants stated that social media platforms largely shifted to become 
commercial spaces and an effective marketing tool for start-ups. It was reported that many 
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Facebook pages and groups had been established mainly for commercial profit purposes. 
As one participant, an administrator of a popular Facebook page, commented:    
“Recently, our Facebook page changed to be primarily commercial. We provide 
mainly advertising services such as creating adverts for new restaurants, cafés or 
whatever for a certain amount of money” (T-M-16-PRO) 
Another interviewee also reported that he established a Facebook page specifically to boost 
his own business and make a profit:   
“Look, there were some studies that said that people who use social media were 
able to increase their income by 10%. So, I have created a Facebook page for 
marketing related to my work. It helped me a lot to boost my business” (B-M-22-
ANTI) 
The use of social media for marketing/start-ups and civic projects was not only common 
among men but also between women. A number of participants highlighted the importance 
of social media in empowering women and giving them space to negotiate their role in 
society practising different types of activities. As one participant commented:    
“After the uprising, both male and female users used social media to discuss 
different issues about society or related to Libya’s current situation. Women also 
established many start-up projects online ranging from selling food to freelance 
work” (T-F-24-ANTI)   
This quote suggests that social media helped to empower women and promote their civic 
and economic participation. This finding is important in terms of Fraser’s argument of 
subordinate groups (Fraser, 1990). Unlike the Habermasian concept of a single public 
sphere which was formulated around the interests of the male-dominant bourgeois, social 
media also gave a space to LW to express their interests and act more independently in 
society. By including these alternative groups, the egalitarian principle in society may be 
represented, and the subordinate groups therefore can communicate particular needs and 
interests (Fraser, 1990).  
Overall, this noteworthy trend of the use of Facebook for online marketing of businesses 
suggests that the significance of social media as a space for political discussion might 
witness a decline. The reason for this is that the increase in commercial content could limit 
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the capacity of social media as a source of political information which might stimulate 
public debate. This point resonates with Habermas’s point regarding the decline of the 
bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1989). The argument of Habermas lies mainly in the 
idea that the bourgeois public sphere witnessed a decline because of the increasing power 
of commercial corporations that turned people to consumers rather than critical citizens 
(Habermas, 1989). In the same manner, therefore, the promises of social media to create 
public sphere might also be threatened by this growing phenomenon of commercialisation.  
 Documentation  
Despite the increase in different social and commercial activities online, social media still 
served as a common source of different types of information and documentation. There 
were many examples reported by different participants suggesting that social media was 
increasingly used to observe individuals and spot government officials’ wrongdoings. For 
example: 
“Last week, there was a widespread image on social media showing a security 
guard organising crowds in front of a bank in a violent way. Someone took a photo 
of him and uploaded it on social media. This photo aroused feelings of anger in the 
Libyan street and on social media. The army reacted to this by arresting this person 
straightaway” (B-F-10-PRO) 
This example suggests that people did not only use social media to find information, but 
they were themselves creating content by pulling out their phones to document and spot 
wrongdoings and misconducts. This phenomenon of acting as watchdogs was termed 
“sousveillance” by Steve Mann, meaning that citizens can employ their camera devices to 
observe, monitor and document different events and incidents (Mann et al., 2003). In this 
manner, information can be conveyed to a wider public, which in turn might lead to them 
putting pressure on government or official bodies, requiring them to react. Therefore, this 
could have future implications on establishing a more transparent environment and holding 
people accountable for their actions.  
However, the lack of information technology infrastructure could be a real barrier to people 
acting as watchdogs or transmitting information. Although there was some improvement 
in the internet service in Libya in 2009 (Freedom House, 2015), it would seem that technical 
factors still impacted on the use of social media in the country. For example, one participant 
from Sabha commented: 
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“In Libya, the speed of the internet is poor and the cost is high compared to the 
services provided. In my city, Sabha, we still face problems with weak internet 
connection. Not only in Sabha; even in Tripoli and other main cities they also have 
similar issues. Personally, I think if the services improved, social media could play 
a better role. For example, everybody could have their say and share their views 
across the country. Also, I think by improving the telecommunication infrastructure, 
less fact would be manipulated. What I mean is we are now mostly relying on 
recorded videos and photos which can easily be edited and fabricated. So, if we 
have good internet, people can go live instead of recording. I think the future is for 
live video streaming. If this happened, I think less rumour and more credible 
information could be shared” (S-M-21-UNC)      
In this way, ordinary people can potentially become ‘citizen journalists’, and consumers of 
the content can themselves become producers. This might increase their chances of 
producing political participation in a way that contributes to facilitating a dialogue about 
different issues of public interest.  
6.2.11 Summary 
The findings above demonstrate various social media uses, activities and experiences in the 
second stage of Libya’s post-revolutionary dynamics (2014-2016). Compared to the early 
stage of the post-uprising, participants recently placed less trust in social media content. In 
general, participants retained a healthy scepticism in the way they looked at online content. 
They developed various approaches to check the accuracy of information and news using 
different verification strategies (e.g. Google Images, family and friends, verified accounts, 
etc.). Participants also appeared to be less overtly affective because of the increase of 
misinformation and disinformation. In fact, some of them reflected a sort of desensitised 
attitude towards violent or emotional content they saw online. 
The study also revealed that Libyan society, which recently became more ideologically 
fragmented, produced a more complex dynamic that is simultaneously more inclusive of 
Gaddafi loyalists online or offline. Participants, to some extent, claimed or reflected a sense 
of tolerance and acceptance to others who held different views from them, although a few 
were not willing to listen to their opponents. This sense of inclusion was not only in relation 
to ideological beliefs. The study identified another type of inclusion in relation to gender. 
It was observed that social media had the potential to include more women’s voices. In the 
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post-uprising period, for example, it was observed that more female participants (regardless 
of their stance) engaged in online political discussions at some point in time (e.g. sharing 
information or personal views, expressing solidarity, commenting on political events). 
However, regardless of gender, it was found that the majority of participants became 
increasingly less interested in politics in recent times due to many reasons, such as 
polarisation, fear of speech and distrust in the political process while losing faith in the 
revolution. Therefore, they withdrew partly from politics and turned back to practise non-
political activities (e.g. entertainment, socialising, sharing knowledge and 
commercialisation, etc.). 
6.3 Chapter overview  
This chapter has presented young people’s social media uses and the observed changes in 
their online practices and experiences in relation to the unfolding political events and 
everyday life of the post-uprising period (late 2011-2016). It has illuminated how the 2011 
revolution began with hope and optimism, but it ended with apprehension, confusion and 
polarisation. While the immediate aftermath of the uprising witnessed a vibrant political 
environment, in which young participants engaged with different political activities and 
practices, the subsequent struggle for power and accompanying instability fostered 
negative trends such as self-censorship, contention and polarisation. Social networks 
changed from being vibrant political spaces to ones of verbal harassment and 
argumentation that led many to abandon political participation. Instead of practising 
politics, participants moved largely to use social media for entertainment, social interaction, 
documenting events and online marketing business. Overall, the findings suggest that the 
use of social media by young Libyans continued to expand and shift over time and 
circumstances. 
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Chapter 7: Facebook analysis  
The findings presented in this chapter report on the qualitative content analysis of 17327 
messages (posts and comments) posted on two selected Facebook pages, the LW 
revolutionary page, and LI anti-revolutionary page, over a 3-day period during the first five 
anniversaries of the revolution. The purpose of this analysis was to contribute to achieving 
the main aim of the thesis, which seeks to explore the nature of the emergent networked 
public sphere and its evolution over time. To do so, the Facebook data were examined with 
the following questions in mind: 
1. How do users articulate their political views on Facebook in the post-revolutionary 
period? i.e. how rational are their discussions? Are their messages informational or 
emotional in nature? What are the dominant types of these messages? 
2. Does posting behaviour differ between the two pages or change over time in terms 
of diversity and inclusivity, and how different actors (admin vs. users) are using 
the platform? 
The chapter presents each page individually by first providing an overview of the page, 
followed by general patterns and trends that are noted regarding the nature of users’ 
discussions. Then it reports on a number of findings which emerged from the analysis of 
posts and comments. Where applicable, the concepts of the public sphere and networked 
public(s) and their related critiques were applied to reflect on the emergent findings. 
7.1 The LW revolutionary Facebook page 
7.1.1 Overview of the page 
The LW Facebook page was set up around a social topic in November 2010, nearly three 
months before the uprising occurred. However, as described in its ‘About’ section, the page 
dedicated its online space to supporting the 2011 protests, disseminating revolutionary 
information and defending the right to revolution. After the fall of the regime, the page 
continued to take this revolutionary stance, gaining widespread popularity among users. At 
the time of data collection (February 2016), the page had reached 1389914 followers. 
The total number of Facebook messages collected from this page was 11660, comprised of 
posts and comments (those posted by the page administrator(s) and those posted by users). 
Table 7.1 shows the breakdown of this extracted content by the type of message (post or 
comment) at each anniversary.  
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Table 7.1. The breakdown of messages on the LW Facebook page for a 3-day period 
         Types of messages 
Year Posts Comments Total 
2012 21 468 489 
2013 36 563 599 
2014 59 2917 2976 
2015 57 3816 3873 
2016 41 3682 3723 
Total  214 11446 11660 
 
As can be seen from the table, the number of Facebook messages varied greatly between 
anniversaries. Unlike the small amount of content extracted in the first two anniversaries, 
a general trend of growth in the amount of messages was remarkable on the last three 
anniversaries of the uprising. This growth in content, which reveals the growing level of 
interaction on this page, may have been associated with the continuous increase in the 
number of Facebook users in the country (Freedom House, 2015). In addition, these 
numbers, which suggest increasing then stabilising participation, could perhaps mean that 
people were starting to lose interest in politics.   
However, at the time of writing (2018), it was found that the entire LW Facebook page had 
surprisingly disappeared from Facebook. The disappearance of this page means losing its 
entire collection of digital content, including thousands of posts, photos, and videos that 
narrate and document many critical events that took place in the post-revolution period. In 
losing such a massive amount of information, there might be no possibility of recovery, 
and we are missing out on a contemporary archive of memory records that relate to a critical 
time in Libya’s post-uprising period. The risk of losing the past reflects the fragility of 
social media. It shows how this technology might have a negative impact on the 
development of the public sphere because it might create temporary spaces for discussion 
and documentation rather than allowing for preservation. Thus, a part of a rich and feverish 
period of digital history might slip away, and the next generation might not be able to learn 
about it.  
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7.1.2 General patterns and trends  
Following the coding scheme described previously in the methodology chapter to 
understand how Facebook was used in Libya’s post-uprising period, four major categories 
of content were identified: Information-related, Opinion-related, Action-related and 
Emotion-related. Each of these major categories is comprised of sub-categories. Before 
exploring them in detail, the study first presents these major themes to provide an overall 
understanding of the nature of the discussion taking place on the ‘LW’ Facebook page (see 
figure 7.1 below).     
Figure 7.1 Distribution of the main categories of the LW Facebook messages17. 
 
By aggregating the number of messages (both posts and comments) within each main theme 
the Emotion-related and Opinion-related messages were found to be the most predominant 
on each anniversary. Information-related and Action-related messages were rare or less 
common.  
This suggests that the online political discussion occurring on this Facebook page was more 
emotional in nature than cognitive, which by no means constitutes a perfect picture of a 
critical-rational public sphere as conceived by Habermas (1989). Rather, this finding is 
consistent with that of Papacharissi (2015) who views social media as a channel for 
affective expression and stories that connect people together in historical moments. This 
prevalence of emotional over cognitive components does not necessarily mean that the page 
                                                          
17 Since the categories are not mutually exclusive (the same message can fall into multiple categories), the 
percentages do not add up to 100%.   
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lacked any democratic value. In fact, such expressions constitute an important aspect of the 
online political discussion, and help us to understand the practices of the networked publics.   
7.1.3 Post analysis  
After providing an overall analysis, the study took a closer look at the messages in more 
detail in order to capture the different uses of Facebook: more specifically, of admin(s) and 
users. Therefore, the study distinguished between posts and comments instead of lumping 
them together in a single phase of analysis, while integrating them when necessary when 
presenting the findings to provide a context. According to Kim, Kim, & Yoo (2014), “posts 
and comments are designed to function differently in SNSs [social networking services]. 
That is, a post is designed to express an independent opinion or to convey first-hand 
information, while a comment is designed to express one’s opinions related to a previous 
piece of information, or to make an observation or statement” (p. 146).  
As shown previously in table 7.1, there were 214 total admin posts for the LW revolutionary 
Facebook page. These posts were classified according to the coding scheme of this study. 
As a result, it was found that these admin posts mainly fell into four categories: Giving 
information, Requesting information, Posting criticism and Solidarity (see Table 7.218).  
Table 7.2. Category classification of LW Facebook page posts 
Year 2012 
(N. of posts = 21) 
2013 
(N. of posts =36) 
2014 
(N. of posts = 59) 
2015 
(N. of posts =57) 
2016 
(N. of posts =41) 
Category Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % 
Giving information 1 (4.7%) 9 (25%) 37 (62.7) 46 (80.7%) 37 (90.2%) 
Requesting 
information 
0 (0%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (3.3%) 3 (5.2%) 5 (12.1%) 
Posting criticism 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (6.7%) 4(7%) 0 (0%) 
Solidarity 20 (95.2%) 30 (83.3%) 28 (47.5%) 18 (31.5%)  11 (26.8%) 
 
As can be seen from the table, the posts on the first two anniversaries of the uprising were 
largely used to express solidarity with the revolution rather than to give information related 
to it, or associated with its post-events. These posts included, but were not limited to, 
nationalistic slogans and victorious expressions. For example:  
                                                          
18 To provide an easy-read table, only categories that these posts fell into are displayed rather than 
providing the entire coding scheme.    
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“No East No West. Libya is one country!” (LW60/12) 
“We stand together; we bond together until we build the new Libya. Libya free” 
(LW101/12) 
“Allahu Akbar19. Viva 17 February revolution!” (LW15/13) 
These different forms of expressions of solidarity were sometimes attached to images of 
the revolutionary festivals that took place across the country to commemorate the 
anniversary of the revolution, reflecting the euphoria that prevailed in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution.  
In the following anniversaries, the data demonstrated a major change in the posting trend. 
The analysis identified a general trend of decline in posts of solidarity, while showing a 
dramatic increase in the frequency of informational posts, coupled with a rise in the posts 
that contained criticism. The reason behind this changing trend of admin posts was perhaps 
due to the violent events that erupted in the country in 201420 (Freedom House, 2015). 
Many of these posts, for example, conveyed information about the fast-changing events as 
they happened, such as political announcements, political speeches, incidents of killings 
and explosion, deterioration of the security situation, terrorism, and governmental 
information. Illustrative examples of these posts follow:   
“This is a copy of the statement of the Military Council of #Nalut regarding the 
parliament extension” (LW558/14) 
“Happening now! Dr. Mustafa Abushagur 21on #LibyaAl-alhrar TV channel” 
(LW717/14) 
“Libya's oil militia leader Ibrahim Jadhran met U.S. & British military attachés 
outside of Libya” (LW321/15) 
“Breaking: Human Rights Watch confirms the death of 3 children and their 
mother in the Egyptian airstrikes on the city of #Darna #Libya” (LW424/15) 
                                                          
19 Allahu Akbar (God is greater) is a term used by Muslims in their daily lives to remind themselves of 
God’s vastness and power. It was used as a cheer in the Arab Spring. 
20 Libya has remained trapped by a standoff between different militants and armed groups since 2014.  
21 Mustafa Abushagur is a Libyan politician who served as interim Deputy Prime Minister of Libya from 22 
November 2011 to 14 November 2012 in Abdurrahim El-Keib’s cabinet. 
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Interestingly, although these informational posts reflect Libya’s dynamic political and 
security situation, there were no posts that were found to call for any type of action. The 
page admin(s) did not seem to emerge as an active agent for mobilisation. Rather, their 
posts demonstrated a high level of information-providing activities. These activities were 
not only in relation to political and security information, but also to different aspects of the 
post-revolutionary events such as information related to the commemoration of the 
revolution. These posts in particular often generated a conflict between users, who were 
either in agreement or disagreement with the idea of celebrating the anniversary of the 
revolution, as many appeared to lose faith in the revolution, particularly after 2014. (This 
is explained in more detail in the comment analysis section). Examples of these posts are:  
“Despite the pain, we are #celebrating the fourth anniversary of the revolution! and we 
will do so until establishing a state of law, a state of welfare. The photo is from today’s 
celebration event at the martyrs’ square #Tripoli #Libya” (LW44/15) 
“Because of #freedom #democracy #martyrs, we are commemorating the fifth 
anniversary of the revolution. Allahu Akbar!  #Misurata’s public celebration 
#Libya. Pictured by M***” (LW1335/16) 
As can be seen, the above posts did not only document the celebratory events, but also 
expressed determination and continuous support to the revolutionary cause. Through 
referencing martyrs who rose up against the regime or emphasising the revolution 
principles, the admin(s) may have been trying to maintain the revolutionary spirit and re-
connect public(s) to the revolutionary cause which seemed to have been shaken in recent 
years, as the comment analysis will show in the next section. It is also important to mention 
that these posts were coded as being both Giving information and Solidarity, following the 
non-mutually exclusive code approach adopted in this study, because they were not purely 
informational, but carried both information and emotional elements. These findings, 
therefore, further support the idea of ‘affective publics’ introduced by Papacharissi (2015) 
in which news, emotion and opinion are blended into one narrative.  
What is also notable about the above examples, along with the other posts on this page, is 
that the majority of posts came in a visual format such as images and videos. This 
prevalence of visual materials can be seen as a strong indicator of the rise of the citizen 
journalism phenomenon, in which digitally equipped citizens can become an important 
source of information and news. Technology can help not only to post opinions and views, 
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but also to document particular moments and provide information about certain actions. 
The following table shows precisely the frequency distribution of different forms of posts 
on the LW Facebook page.  
 
Table 7.3. The frequency distribution of the forms of posts 
Post type Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Status 17 0 10 9 0 
Photo 2 34 48 45 39 
Video 2 1 1 3 2 
Link 0 1 0 0 0 
Total  21 36 59 57 41 
    
7.1.4 Comment analysis  
In this section, users’ comments posted on the LW Facebook page, which were large in 
quantity (11446), were analysed and classified according to the coding scheme of the study 
(see the table below).   
Table 7.4. The classification of the LW Facebook comments 
Year 2012  
(N. of comments = 
468) 
2013  
(N. of comments = 
563) 
2014 
(N. of comments 
= 2917) 
2015 
(N. of comments 
= 3816) 
2016 
(N. of comments 
=3682) 
Cognitive comments (No of comments and %) 
Information-related   
Giving information  5 (0.01%) 11 (3.3%) 217 (7.4%) 284 (7.4 %) 263 (7.1%) 
Requesting 
information 
0 (0%) 4 (0.8%) 46 (1.5%) 54 (1.4 %) 67 (1.8%) 
Opinion-related 
Posting criticism  5 (0.01%) 30 (5.3%) 610 (20.7 %) 611 (16%) 445 (12%) 
Distrust social media 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 103 (3.5%) 145 (3.7 %) 7 (0.1%) 
Stating opinion  2 (0.4%) 13 (2.3%) 193 (6.6%) 276 (7.2%) 137 (3.7%) 
Action-related  
Calling for action  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (0.2%) 17 (0.4%) 13 (0.3%) 
Emotional comments (No. of comments and %) 
Emotion-related  
Concerns  0 (0%) 2 (0.3%) 276 (9.4%) 210 (5.5%) 111 (3.0%) 
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Sarcasm 0 (0%) 3 (0.5%) 69 (2.3% 310 (8.1%) 303 (8.2 %) 
Solidarity  301 (64.3%) 288 (50.1%) 1102 (37.7%) 734 (19.2 %) 1056 (28.6 %) 
Optimism 125 (26.7%) 200 (35.5%) 76 (2.6%) 24 (0.6%) 21 (0.5%) 
Sympathy 31 (6.6 %) 3 (0.5%) 495 (16.9%) 132 (3.4%) 183 (4.9%) 
Sadness  0 (0%) 1 (0.1%) 301 (10.3%) 631 (16.5%) 431 (11.7%) 
Anger 1 (0.2%) 8 (1.4 %) 379 (12.9%) 939 (24.6%) 704 (19.1%) 
Words of comfort  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 176 (6%) 167 (4.3%) 5 (0.1%) 
Other  16 (3.4%) 62 (11%) 108 (3.7%) 59 (1.5 %) 47 (1.2%)  
 
As can be seen in the table, comments that were emotional and/or characterised by 
emotional elements were the most dominant type on every anniversary. On the first two 
anniversaries, for example, the page was used greatly to express positive feeling towards 
the revolution rather than sharing information or debating politics. The most prevalent 
category was the one expressing Solidarity (64.3%) (50.1%), followed by Optimism 
(26.7%) (35.5%), on the first and second anniversaries respectively. Comments that 
contained negative feelings such as Anger, Sadness or Concerns were very rare and mostly 
muted. 
Bearing in mind that the page was revolutionary-oriented, the prevalence of positive 
emotions in this early stage of Libya’s post-uprising period was not surprising. Yet, what 
is important is that the dominance of this positive content indicates how homogeneous and 
coherent the narrative on this page was, suggesting that the page was mostly populated by 
like-minded users rather than diverse users. For example, in 2012, there was only one 
comment that interrupted the coherence of discussion on this page. In this comment, anger 
and discontent with the first revolution anniversary celebration was expressed:  
“A bunch of idiots celebrating the new colonisation22!” (LW78/12) 
Interestingly, no comments were found in response to this comment. Instead, the following 
comments continued to express feelings of revolutionary pride and solidarity, and formed 
more coherent discussion.  
On one hand, this lack of the representation of the other opposing viewpoints demonstrates 
how Facebook can encourage polarisation in which users just mix with others who agree 
with them or are like themselves. On the other hand, it could suggest that others who may 
                                                          
22 This term is often used to refer to the West’s interference through NATO in Libya dating back to 2011.  
161 
 
have different views (e.g. pro-regime) may have feared voicing their own opinion on this 
page, while additionally the page might not have been a welcoming space for its opponents. 
In 2013, for example, the flow of some conversations suggests that there were some 
comments that had been deleted. The remaining comments around these conversations 
show that there seems to be an argument between pro- and anti-revolution users. Although 
it is impossible to know who removed these comments (this could have been done by 
admin(s) or by users themselves who perhaps feared unwanted consequences or changed 
their minds), the important point here is that the LW Facebook page did not seem to serve 
as an entirely open environment because some users were being excluded or they excluded 
themselves. The latter, however, suggests that just as people have the right to express and 
debate their opinion freely, they also have the ‘right to be forgotten’ (Sarikakis & Winter, 
2017). In this light, people have a right to change their mind – if someone perhaps posted 
something they later regretted and/or disagreed with, should they have a right to remove 
that post from a democratic public space? This is a problematic question, but it suggests 
that post deletion has a complex relationship to ideas of democracy and the public sphere.  
For the recent anniversaries of the uprising, the analysis shows no sign of missing content, 
though it is important to acknowledge that it could be difficult, if not impossible, sometimes 
to spot such an issue, particularly within a large data set and within non-homogeneous 
discussion, which is something increasingly noted on the later anniversaries of the uprising. 
At this late stage, the focus of the content was found to have shifted from certain 
revolutionary narratives towards more diverse issues. The analysis shows that there was 
more information being shared, and more opinions and emotions being expressed. For 
example, users increasingly used the page for Giving Information, with 217 comments in 
2014 (7.4%), 284 comments in 2015 (7.4 %), and 263 comments in 2016 (7.1%). Most of 
these comments were posted in order to convey first-hand observations and experiences. 
The following comments, for example, are users’ responses to the page admin who was 
gathering updates regarding the security situation of some areas across the country: 
“Janzour is 100%” (LW3/14) 
“Just heard a big boom!! in Benghazi a few minutes ago” (LW12/14) 
“2 really big bangs in #Tripoli as well but it could be just a bonfire. Not sure” 
(LW15/14) 
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The page was also used to Request Information, through which users sought information 
and clarifications about different matters such as: 
“Anyone know what time the prime minister's speech is today and where to watch it?” 
(LW200/15) 
“I heard the sound of a spy plane a few hours ago over Tripoli. Did anyone else hear it?” 
(LW102/15) 
These informational messages show the importance of Facebook as a source of information, 
and how this platform facilitated individuals’ connections within and across different 
geographical areas, allowing them to exchange relevant information and experiences.  
Besides the use of Facebook to disseminate information and news, users also used this page 
to voice their criticism. The analysis revealed an extraordinary amount of Criticism, 
presented in 610 comments in 2014 (20.7 %), 611 comments in 2015 (16%), and 438 
comments in 2016 (11.8%). Users under this category vividly expressed criticism and 
dissatisfaction of a variety of topics including, political parties and groups, militias and 
public figures, tribal and regional issues, oil production, government(s) and authorities. 
Examples of these comments were as follows:   
“Callers for federalisation play dirty. They are feeding people's needs to gain more 
support #Libya #federalisation” (LW100/14) 
“Italy is an authoritarian country over Libya. It interferes in the Tripoli region. 
Cyrenaica will be better off seceding from Libya and rebuilding. Defend Cyrenaica. Why 
fight over the rest?” (LW591/15) 
 “I couldn’t get it. How Ibrahim Jadhran, who blockaded oil to stop it being sold without 
proper flow meters, today himself sold oil without meters. We should separate Tripoli 
from Cyrenaica!” (LW98/15) 
“We ended up having so many Presidents that it's hard to keep count. President of House 
of Representatives #Saleh, President of High State Council #Mishri and President of 
Government of National Accord #Sarraj. But nothing gets done. They say, when everyone 
is leader, no one is leader” (LW529/16) 
These various topics related to many aspects of Libya’s troubled transition were often 
controversial and tended to generate a lot of conflict and clashes among users. One of many 
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hot topics that surfaced in the post-2011 online discussion was regional and tribal tension, 
which was always a contentious and recurrent theme throughout the dataset. The terms such 
as Tripoli region and Cyrenaica region presented in the above comments reflect a deep 
fragmentation and division within Libyan society.  
At this late stage (2014/15/16), the comments in general were mostly written in a negative 
tone. Negative emotions such as Anger, Sadness, Sarcasm, Concerns, etc. were found to be 
frequently expressed. Among these negative emotions, for example, Anger was by far the 
most common category. Comments under this category, which contained flaming and 
personal attacks, were presented in 418 comments (14.3%) in 2014, 936 comments (24.5%) 
in 2015, and 767 comments (20.8%) in 2016. The nature of these conflictual comments 
became sharper and bolder, particularly in 2015 due to a video released by ISIS showing 
what they claimed to be the executions of 21 Egyptian Copts in Libya in Sirte, a city lying 
on the Libyan coast halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi. The release of this video 
coincided with the fourth anniversary of the revolution, inviting a lot of anger and conflict 
among users, particularly between those who wanted to celebrate the anniversary and others 
who disagreed with this. The following conversation illustrates this issue:     
“What p***ed me off is how can some people still celebrate the anniversary while the 
country is blowing up and controlled by ISIS? #idiots” (LW55/15) 
“Let them celebrate because #Rats can’t simply admit that Gaddafi was right and their 
fake revolution invented by #NATO brought us ISIS!! Death!! Poverty!! Division!! and so 
on. If they can’t see this, they are so blind to the truth!” (LW56/15) 
“Celebrating the anniversary is something narrow-minded people can’t understand. It is 
beyond their thinking and it is not our job to convince them!!!” (LW57/15) 
Despite the aggressive and hostile nature of these comments, they reflect that the online 
discussion was not only composed of like-minded users but also non-like-minded. The 
second comment in the above conversation, for example, appeared to be posted by a pro-
regime user, which was something increasingly noted throughout the last three 
anniversaries under study. This increase in the presence of the pro-regime stance, along 
with other ideological perspectives, suggests that the page opened up for diverse publics to 
participate in the debate. This openness was not only on a local level but also on a regional 
level. To illustrate, this terrorist incident linked to ISIS stimulated several Egyptians to 
participate in the online discussion on this page, but they featured more use of inflammatory 
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language. Although there was no definitive evidence to prove that these comments 
originated from Egypt, it suggests that the LW Facebook page was an open and accessible 
space for individuals with diverse views, allowing Libyans and non-Libyans to interact in 
a highly decentralised manner.  
However, while some users were interacting and conflicting regarding different ideological 
perspective, others were questioning the credibility of social media content. These 
comments that expressed suspicion of social media information, which was coded under 
the Distrust Social Media category, were more frequent in 2014, with 103 comments 
(3.5%), and in 2015, with 145 comments (3.7 %). This is perhaps because of the critical 
events happening in Libya in that time. In 2014, for example, the majority of comments 
classified under this category were responses to a photo post showing protests in Benghazi, 
supporting the extension of the Tripoli-based General National Congress23, despite the fact 
that the city was commonly known for standing against its extension. In 2015, the release 
of the ISIS video discussed above was the post at which the majority of Distrust Social 
Media comments were directed. Illustrative examples of such comments include: 
“This #ISIS video looks fake... Hollywood type editing. I feel the decapitations of the 
Copts never happened!” (LW112/15) 
“I don’t trust this video but this is obviously the coast of Sirte but it could also be 
photoshopped! Confusing!” (LW115/15) 
“Here's a good analysis of the debunked "fake ISIS video": https://www.me...” 
(LW116/15) 
Yet, questioning the credibility of these posts does not necessarily mean that the 
information they carried was fake, but it may give insights and reflect a level of awareness 
about how users consumed social media content, and how they applied a critical lens to 
topics they read. 
While some users were doubting and questioning the credibility of some social media 
information, others appeared to lose their revolutionary spirit. In fact, there was mounting 
disillusion and despair characterising the content on the later anniversaries, which could be 
                                                          
23 The GNC was the legislative authority of Libya for two years following the end of the uprising. It was 
elected by popular vote on 7 July 2012, and took power from the National Transitional Council on 8 August 
2012.  
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a result of and a response to Libya’s escalating uncertainty and instability. The content 
largely reflected people’s struggle for safety and security and their limited access to medical 
care, electricity, and food. All of these problems and more were translated into feelings of 
Sadness, Concerns, Sympathy, and Sarcasm, which characterised a large amount of 
comments. Examples of these negative emotions are illustrated below.  
“It is just sad how things ended up! The sacrifices that people made and the ultimate 
price they paid to bring about freedom and democracy. So far they have produced 
neither. Did the Revolution devour its children? Wondering whether it was all worth it.” 
(LW50/16) 
“People waiting in endless lines in front of banks for long hours or days, just to hear the 
phrase ‘No money today, Sir’. I don’t even want to think of how the future will be. R.I.P. 
Libya 😭” (LW140/16) 
“How sad to be displaced in your country. I wish that the tragedy that some people are 
experiencing ends soon” (LW503/16) 
“We should build a Lego airport! So the next time militias decide to fight near an airport 
it is easy to take it apart 😂 😂” (LW44/15) 
Besides the prevalence of negative emotions, Solidarity feelings were also common on the 
last three anniversaries under study (see table 7.4 above). However, the expressions of 
solidarity that users were sharing were not only in relation to the revolutionary stance or to 
the old regime. In fact, many comments were showing tribal affiliation, or voicing support 
to either of the rival regional militias that had emerged since 2014. Examples are illustrated 
below:   
“Cyrenaica is on the verge of victory to build a real military. Keep going! Operation 
Dawn must be dismantled!” (LW66/15) 
“Definitely and without any doubt I support Operation Dawn, the group who sacrifices 
themselves to fight ISIS in Sirte” (LW87/15) 
“I am encouraged to see Libya getting serious military support. Finally feels like there is 
a plan! I am from the West of Libya and support #theLibyanmilitary” (LW71/15) 
These comments demonstrated how political discussions on this Facebook page were 
polarised. Users seemed to be deep and extreme in their stances, which often led to the 
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creation of an area of tension and conflict. As highlighted previously, however, the 
presence of the oppositional views suggested that the discussion was, to a certain degree, 
diverse, and thus brought different groups together despite their different affiliations.  
Yet, while some users appeared to take a more extreme stance on an issue, others showed 
a level of rationality and tolerance to the opposite view. Their comments were likely to 
contain balanced views and were devoid of personal attacks or harsh criticism (regardless 
of users’ stance on an issue). This type of comment was classified under the Stating Opinion 
category, with 193 comments in 2014 (6.6%), 276 comments in 2015 (7.2%), and 137 
comments in 2016 (3.7%). The following is an example of a conversation characterised by 
a civil discussion on federalisation, a topic that tended to produce a lot of heat in Libya: 
“There are no benefits to federalisation in Libya, none. Too long for me to list. But I am 
willing to talk” (LW301/14) 
“Look, federalisation does not mean division of #Libya – it's only ‘division of power’ 
under the federal government of Libya & constitution” (LW302/14) 
“I understand federalisation as a political system though federalisation is not an 
answer... I think it would lead to an eventual split if you understand what I mean #Libya 
united, not split” (LW303/14) 
It can be seen that these comments reflected users’ willingness to interact with one another 
in a rational and respectful manner despite their disagreement. Although this way of user 
interaction could be considered important because it allowed users to critically debate and 
deliberate over what may constitute the common good, they were low in frequency 
compared to the other categories.  
Overall, the analysis of this page has showed that users’ discussion was more likely to be 
emotional and intense rather than rational. The content changed from being positive in the 
early anniversaries into more hostile discussion in the later anniversaries. The political 
discussion on the LW Facebook page appeared to be highly polarised, while simultaneously 
diverse, suggesting the fragmented, polarised and chaotic nature of the emergent Libyan 
networked sphere.  
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7.2 The LI anti-revolutionary Facebook page 
7.2.1 Overview of the page 
The LI Facebook page introduced itself as “The largest page for Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi’s loyalists on Facebook”. The page clearly stated its aim as follows: “Our mission 
is to cleanse Libya inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alleyway by alleyway, 
person by person, until the country is cleansed of dirt and scum”. These words were taken 
literally from Muammar Gaddafi’s speech delivered in the early days of the uprising, in 
which he vowed to hunt down his opponents, who he branded as “drug addicts, jihadist 
and rats”. This page also achieved broad popularity and its number of followers reached 
around 183805 at the time of data collection (February 2016). The total Facebook messages 
collected from this page was 5667, comprised of posts and comments. Table 7.5 shows the 
breakdown of the extracted content by the type of message (posts and comments) on each 
anniversary under the study.   
 
Table 7.5. The breakdown of messages on the LI Facebook page for a 3-day period  
         Types of messages 
Year Posts Comments Total 
2012 60 458 518 
2013 56 1716 1772 
2014 94 2531 2625 
2015 17 417 434 
2016 30 288 318 
Total  257 5410 5667 
 
As can be seen from the table, the number of Facebook messages varied greatly between 
the anniversaries. While the number of messages extracted in the first anniversary of the 
uprising was small, there was an overall increase of the number of retrieved messages in 
the second and third anniversaries, before the frequency of messages significantly dropped 
off in 2015 and 2016. The reason behind this fluctuation of the page content is difficult to 
predict because it could potentially have a number of interpretations. It could be because 
people may have become less or more interested in discussing politics on this page, thus 
reducing or increasing their activities, or because users may have been fearful or gained 
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more confidence to speak their opinion at some points in time, or because other pages 
became more popular.  
At the time of writing (2018), the page was re-visited and it was found that there had been 
a sharp decline in its online activities. In fact, the most recent activity on the page was 
posted on 31 August 2017. This means that the page had moved from being an active to an 
inactive space of discussion and expression. This changing trend demonstrates the fragility 
and fluid nature of social media, where connected groups may get disconnected at any point 
of time. 
7.2.2 General patterns and trends  
On this page, there were a total of 5667 messages (posts and comments) collected for 
analysis. Following the coding scheme described in the methodology section, these 
messages fell into four major categories: Information-related, Opinion-related, Action-
related, and Emotion-related. To provide an overall understanding of the nature of the 
discussion on the LI Facebook page, the study first provides sum totals/percentages for 
each of the main categories (see figure 7.2). Similar to the LW Facebook page, Emotion-
related messages were found to be the most prevalent on each anniversary, followed by 
Opinion-related messages. Information-related and Action-related were less common or 
very scarce. This suggests that the LI Facebook page was used mostly as a space to vent 
emotions rather than sharing information or discussing opinions and views.  
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Figure 7.2. Distribution of the main categories of the LI Facebook messages24. 
 
 
7.2.3 Post analysis 
Out of the 5667 messages extracted from the LI Facebook page, a total of 257 admin posts 
were organised according to the coding scheme described in the methodology section. 
Findings revealed that the majority of posts mainly fell into five categories: Giving 
information, Criticism, Calls for action, Solidarity and Anger (see table 7.625).  
 
Table 7.6. Category classification of LI Facebook page posts 
Year 2012 
(N. of posts = 60) 
2013 
(N. of posts =56) 
2014 
(N. of posts =94) 
2015 
(N. of posts =17) 
2016 
(N. of posts =30) 
Category Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % Frequency and % 
Giving information 50 (83.3%) 49 (87.5%) 68 (71.3) 12 (70.5%) 20 (66.6%) 
Posting criticism  9 (15%) 19 (33.9) 17 (18%) 3 (17.6%) 10 (33.3%) 
Calls for action 1 (1.6%) 3 (5.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Solidarity 15 (25%) 7 (12.5%) 9 (9.5%) 2 (11.7%) 4 (13.3%) 
Anger 11 (18.3%) 12 (21.4%) 11 (11.7%) 5 (29.4%)  4 (13.3%) 
                                                          
24 Since the categories are not mutually exclusive and the same message can fall into multiple categories, 
the percentages do not add up to 100%.   
 
25 To provide an easy-read table, only categories that LI posts fell into are displayed rather than providing 
the entire coding scheme.    
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As can be seen from the table, informational posts were by far the most common posts on 
each anniversary of the uprising. These posts mainly conveyed the latest breaking news 
and information, covering a range of topics such as updates on the Green Resistance26, 
violent incidents or clashes (e.g. reports of attacking, killing, kidnapping, injuries), 
reference to external interference in Libya (e.g.  the West, Qatar), or views of intellectuals 
or journalists drawn from newspapers. For example: 
“Gaddafi's supporters rise up in civil disobedience against the government, leaving 
thousands of seats empty in schools and workplaces” (LI48/12) 
“The Guardian: Britain’s ‘Floating Shop Window’ signals massive undeclared arms race 
in Libya. http://www.facebook.com/ ...” (LI230/13) 
 “An explosion (probably car bomb) has occurred in Omar Almokhtar street. #Tripoli 
#Libya” (LI286/13) 
“Breaking: Nicolas Sarkozy under investigation over 2012 campaign funds. 
http://www.facebook.com/ ...” (LI279/16) 
As can be seen from the examples above, some of the posts included links to external 
sources to provide users with the original or actual information regarding certain news or 
events. This included links to social media websites (e.g. blogs) or links to local or even 
international news articles (e.g. The Independent, The Guardian).  
However, not all posts were purely informational in nature. In fact, some of them were 
found to be tinged with emotions such as Solidarity and Anger while also carrying 
information. Thus, they fit into multiple categories. An example of a non-mutually 
exclusive post is a photo post published in the fifth anniversary of the uprising. It showed 
a small group of people marching and raising Libya’s previous green flag in a city known 
for its alliance with the old regime. This post was coded as being both Giving Information 
and Solidarity because it did not only transmit information on the march, but also contained 
an expression of solidarity supporting this act, as illustrated below:  
                                                          
26 A term often used to refer to supposed pro-Gaddafi forces. 
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“Signs of Al-Jamahiria return today in **** city! We all stand with you guys! Keep 
going!” (LI76/16) 
This post, which communicated moments of enthusiasm and hope about the return of Al-
Jamahiria, received a high level of user engagement. Al-Jamahiria is a term coined by 
Muammar al-Gaddafi in The Green Book to refer to Libya. The official name of Libya 
during the regime era was Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which was changed to be State of Libya 
after the revolution. The majority of comments posted in response to this post demonstrated 
a great sense of solidarity with the act.  
Interestingly, despite the page’s anti-revolutionary orientation, it was found that there were 
almost no posts containing calls for any type of action, even on the first two anniversaries 
where people’s feelings were likely to be much more intense. Only a very small number of 
Action-related posts were found (1 post in 2012, and 3 posts in 2013). The content of these 
posts mainly included calls for online action. Examples follow:   
“Dear friends please participate in the vote on CNN website: Do you support the NATO 
intervention in Syria? Answer with NO plz!” (LI455/12) 
“Please unfollow the Green Resistance Facebook page. It has been hacked!” (LI1001/13) 
These examples above may exemplify how weak tie networks afforded by social media 
could facilitate individuals’ connections to encourage them to support a certain cause or 
take a specific action. However, the scarcity of this type of post suggests that the most 
important benefit of the LI Facebook page was to provide information and news rather than 
mobilising people to action.  
Similar to the LW Facebook page, these informational posts came mostly in the form of 
visual materials, along with other communication modalities of text and links. This 
prevalence of visual material highlights the role of citizen journalists in documenting 
different events, and how they can become producers of information rather than passive 
recipients. The following table shows precisely the frequency distribution of the different 
forms of posts published on the LI Facebook page. 
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Table 7.7 The frequency distribution of the forms of posts 
Post type Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Status 3 0 66 9 9 
Photo 0 36 28 7 17 
Video 16 6 0 0 4 
Link 41 14 0 1 0 
Total  60 56 94 17 30 
 
7.2.4 Comment analysis  
In this section, users’ comments posted on the LI Facebook page were placed into 
categories that emerged through the coding process. The number of comments was 
analysed was 5410 (see the table below).   
Table 7.8. The classification of the LI Facebook comments 
Year 2012  
(N. of comments = 
458) 
2013  
(N. of comments = 
1716) 
2014 
(N. of comments 
= 2531) 
2015 
(N. of comments 
= 417) 
2016 
(N. of comments 
=288) 
Cognitive comments (No of comments and %) 
Information-related   
Giving information  40 (8.7%) 104 (6%) 137 (5.4%) 24 (5.7 %) 13 (4.5%) 
Requesting 
information 
39 (8.5) 40 (2.3%) 56 (2.2%) 5 (1.1 %) 5 (1.7%) 
Opinion-related 
Posting criticism  133 (29%) 782 (45.5%) 904 (35.7 %) 166 (39.8%) 132 (45.8) 
Distrust social media 11 (2.4) 32 (1.8) 26 (1%) 1 (0.2%) 3 (1%) 
Stating opinion  5 (1%) 30 (1.7%) 22 (0.8%) 25 (5.9%) 8 (2.7%) 
Action-related  
Calling for action  13 (2.8%) 24 (1.3%) 15 (0.5%) 6 (1.4%) 4 (1.3%) 
Emotional comments (No of comments and %) 
Emotion-related  
Concerns  45 (9.8%) 59 (3.4%) 148 (5.8%) 41 (9.8%) 15 (5.2%) 
Sarcasm 9 (1.9%) 184 (10.7%) 184 (7.2%) 34 (8.1%) 30 (10.4 %) 
Solidarity  131 (28.6%) 301 (17.5%) 499 (19.7%) 95 (22.7%) 80 (27.7 %) 
Optimism 10 (2.1%) 51 (2.9%) 50 (1.9%) 4 (0.9%) 11 (3.8%) 
Sympathy 32 (6.9 %) 157 (9.1%) 162 (6.4%) 20 (4.7%) 4 (1.3%) 
Sadness  80 (17.4%) 243 (14.1%) 218 (8.6%) 85 (20.3%) 50 (17.3%) 
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Anger 119 (25.9%) 405 (23.6 %) 595 (23.5%) 127 (30.4%) 90 (31.2%) 
Words of comfort  1 (0.2%) 17 (0.9) 124 (4.8%) 6 (1.4%) 12 (4.1%) 
Other  16 (3.4%) 13 (0.7%) 32 (1.2%) 7 (1.6 %) 3 (1 %)  
 
As can be seen from the table, the most prevalent category on each anniversary was the one 
expressing Criticism. Users mainly indulged in a sustained denunciation of the revolution 
and its destructive aspects. The comments in general were littered with insults and 
inflammatory language, resulting in much overlap between the Criticism and Anger 
categories. Therefore, when criticism was made in a very aggressive tone and filled with 
extreme anger, the comment was coded as being both Criticism and Anger. Illustrations of 
these comments are provided below: 
“After the U.S. sold WAR, its media stopped covering events on Libya, WHY? To hide the 
continued killing by their weapon supply! The thing is some people still believe that there 
is no purpose behind its military interference! Sometimes you just have to AAAHHH to 
feel better!!” (LI246/12) 
“What do we expect from idiots who took the Zionist, Bernard Levy as a friend? The wolf 
in sheep’s clothing” (LI735/13) 
Bernard Levy27 was one of the external actors who made an appearance in Libya during the 
uprising to support the rebels. His role, as he stated in the media, was mainly that of linking 
members of the National Transitional Council 28  with NATO political leaders in Paris 
during the G-8 summit in March 2011 (before NATO launched Operation Odyssey 
Dawn29). Levy was criticised frequently in the comments on each anniversary, particularly 
in relation to his Jewish roots and his Israeli connections, taking this as a basis to emphasise 
what users appeared to believe: that there was a Zionist Conspiracy regarding Libya, and a 
plan to help Israel and the West to assert complete hegemony over the region.  
Such highly charged claims that mixed religion with politics often provoked excessive 
amounts of discontent and anger among users. In these discussions, users tended to 
reinforce each other’s views and ideas rather than countering them. The counter-argument, 
                                                          
27 A French controversial philosopher and political activist.  He is also one of the biggest defenders of 
Israel.  
28 NTC was the de facto government of Libya for a period during and after the Libyan uprising, in which 
rebel forces overthrew the Gaddafi regime. 
29 US-EU Military Operation against Libya (19 March - 31 October, 2011). 
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in fact, was rarely shared and often less likely to disrupt the coherence of the discussion on 
this page. The following comments, for example, in which users were calling on the 
admin(s) to take action to remove the revolution’s supporters from the page, suggest that 
the LI Facebook page did not seem to serve as a welcoming environment for the opposite 
side of the argument, but rather, reflected a deep polarisation: 
“Please admin wipe these traitors from the page!” (LI232/12) 
“Take them out admin. This is not their place!!” (LI1094/13) 
These examples suggest that the LI Facebook page was mainly occupied by like-minded 
users. In this way, it can be argued that the page had the potential to create an echo-chamber 
effect, making users more likely to interact with people they agreed with, and thus, it may 
have resulted in more polarisation and division.  
This sense of political polarisation and intolerance, presented in the above Action-related 
examples, was also reflected by the minimal number of comments under the Stating 
Opinion category. This category, which mainly included balanced arguments between users 
no matter what their political orientations were, provided further evidence that the LI 
Facebook page had a tendency to mainly bring like-minded people together rather than 
enabling interaction between a diverse set of individuals.  
In general, most of the content on the LI Facebook page was likely to be attuned to its 
stance. Unlike the diverse voices that characterised the LW Facebook page discussion on 
the later anniversaries, users on this page were more attached to their original cause. No 
matter the incident or the issue reported in the post, users mainly attributed or linked it to 
the fall of the regime. For example, in 2015, after Egypt launched raids in Libya as a 
response to the ISIS attack on the Coptic Egyptians, users were very likely to make direct 
reflective comments on the political vacuum that resulted from the fall of the regime. These 
reflections took different emotional forms (e.g. Solidarity, Sarcasm, Anger, etc.). For 
example, some comments of emotional solidarity, which was one of the most common 
categories in all anniversaries, referenced parts of Al-Gaddafi’s speech that he delivered in 
the early days of the uprising, as illustrated below: 
“Col. Gaddafi was a great leader with enormous vision. He warned of Al-Qaeda from the 
beginning when he said about the revolutionaries: ‘This is Al-Qaeda. It's not my people.’ 
We will continue his fight for the Green cause till the end” (LI52/2015) 
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Making reference to Muammar Al-Gaddafi himself or his speeches tended to evoke 
comments of solidarity and support for other like-minded users, in a way that demonstrated 
the importance of affect in creating links and connections among publics toward certain 
issues. The emotions expressed through such stories connected users to each other. This 
finding further supports the idea of ‘affective publics’ by Papacharissi (2015), which 
highlights the power of emotional expression to create emotional bonds and connections. 
The issue of the Egyptian attack did not only generate comments of solidarity but also 
produced comments that were sarcastic and humorous. For instance, some users made 
comments on how history tends to repeat itself when it comes to a revolution or a social 
movement:  
 “Can someone remind me in which section are we now in the book of the French 
revolution? I think it is the Reign of Terror, isn’t it? 😂” (LI41/15) 
The French revolution and also the Iraq invasion were the most common examples pointed 
to by users. This could show how the narrative of the past continued to define and shape 
present narratives, although it described a different conflict.  
While some users engaged with the Egyptian attack in a sarcastic or humorous way, others 
expressed more anger and discontent. For example: 
“After Gaddafi, this is not a country anymore!! What the hell is this?” (LI366/15) 
“All are attacking Libya’s sovereignty! I am so p***ed off!” (LI375/15) 
These different forms of emotional responses could demonstrate how politics was debated 
on this platform. The LI Facebook page seemed to serve as a space for emotional ventilation 
more than a space for analytical and critical comments. Even when users appeared to be 
unsure about certain issues, their responses often came in the form of prayers, particularly 
if encountered with conflicting ideas and news: 
“Hasbunallahu wa-ni’mal wakeel30” (LI53/14) 
“Laa Hawla Wa Laa Quwwata Il-la Bil-laah31. Everything is confusing in this country” 
(LI80/15) 
                                                          
30 Allah (Alone) is Sufficient for us, and He is the Best Disposer of affairs (for us) 
31 There is no power and no strength except with Allah 
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The analysis also shows how users increasingly became more cautious about the 
information they consumed, questioning and doubting its credibility. For example:  
“Are you sure it was the sound of a bang? I live close by and it is more likely a bonfire. I 
could see the light of it. Stop spreading rumours if you are not sure” (LI694/14) 
The above comment could reflect two points. On one hand, it shows how misinformation 
and rumours had the potential to spread easily on Facebook. On the other hand, it reveals 
how Facebook as a social media platform has made it possible for publics to counter false 
information, allowing users to question, correct and even provide their own version of truth 
about the given incidents or events.  
However, although questioning and doubting the credibility of information is a healthy 
practice, users’ judgment in some cases appeared to be irrational and biased. For example, 
in 2012, one user commented on the credibility of the images and videos of protests back 
to the early days of the uprising in Benghazi:    
“Look, many photos posted online during the 2011 uprising were fake. They related back 
to the 2006 protests32. They were simply re-used in 2011 to deceive people! It was just a 
conspiracy” (LI428/12) 
What seemed to be irrational about this comment is that technology was not as advanced 
in 2006 as it has become today. The first iPhone, for example, was introduced in June 2007, 
suggesting that using smartphones to document and record events occurring in 2006 in 
Libya is unlikely to have happened. Putting forward such an argument, therefore, could be 
a result of the user’s intensity of feeling because the time in which this comment was posted 
coincided with the first anniversary of the uprising, thus perhaps leading them to risk 
misjudging the surrounding events. Alternatively the user may have just intended to portray 
it this way to influence readers’ thoughts and thus gain more support for his/her cause.        
7.3 Chapter overview 
This chapter comprised an empirical study undertaken in order to examine posts and 
comments that users made on two selected public Facebook pages: the LW Facebook page, 
a pro-revolutionary page; and the LI Facebook page, anti-revolutionary, with the aim of 
                                                          
32 Protests took place in Benghazi outside the Italian consulate on 17 Feb 2006, after a Danish newspaper 
depicted the Prophet Mohammed in a controversial caricature. The government struck back at these 
protests and at least ten people were reported to be killed.  
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better understanding the nature of the emergent networked public sphere and its evolution 
over time. The analysis revealed key interesting findings that are presented below: 
The first important finding in the data was the change in the number of extracted Facebook 
messages over several years, before both pages witnessed unforeseen developments. While 
the LW Facebook page entirely disappeared, the LI Facebook page faced a dramatic decline 
in its activities and became an inactive page. On one hand, this finding shed light on the 
dynamic and fluid nature of Facebook, which allows for easy creation and deletion of 
groups and pages. On the other hand, these unforeseen developments, particularly on the 
LI Facebook page, help us to understand the practices of networked publics, demonstrating 
the shifting nature of public focus over time.  
The second important finding in the data was the nature of discussions carried out on the 
two selected Facebook pages. On both pages, the discussion appeared to be more emotional 
and assertive than cognitive and analytical. For example, the LW Facebook page was 
widely used to rejoice over the fall of the regime rather than sharing information or debating 
politics on the first two anniversaries. The most prevalent categories at this time were those 
expressing Solidarity and Optimism. Over time, this changed. The discussion became more 
negative on the later anniversaries, demonstrating an overarching sense of disillusion and 
despair at the apparent major defeat of the revolution. Criticism, Anger, and Sadness were 
the most dominant categories at this later stage. Conversely, the analysis of the LI Facebook 
page content reveals a different pattern. The page maintained the same style of discussion 
on each anniversary, which was characterised mainly by a heavy amount of criticism of the 
revolution, written in an aggressive tone and filled with extreme anger. 
The third important finding in the data was in relation to the polarised atmosphere reflected 
in both pages. The study also revealed different patterns in terms of the representation of 
viewpoints within each Facebook page. For example, while the discussion on the LI 
Facebook page remained highly on-topic throughout the 3-day period over each 
anniversary, constituting a continuous line of thinking against the revolution, the discussion 
on the LW Facebook page witnessed a dramatic change on the later anniversaries. Despite 
its hostile environment, its content skewed towards a greater diversity of ideological 
perspectives, even bringing in opposing camps. Although the revolutionaries appeared to 
be divided among themselves, their discussion represented different stances and opinions. 
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In addition, the viewpoint of the old regime supporters was increasingly presented within 
the discussion at this later stage. 
Overall, these findings highlight the shifting and changing nature of publics over time and 
circumstances. Rather than being static, their ideas, discussions and emotions dramatically 
changed.     
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction  
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was 
the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it 
was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it 
was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, 
we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way—in 
short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest 
authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative 
degree of comparison only”   
                                                                                                         Charles Dickens  
These words, from the introductory paragraph of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, 
were written in 1859, to reflect on the contradictions that emerged during the turmoil of the 
French Revolution and its aftermath. Although the novel was written over 150 years ago, 
in a predigital age, these dichotomies resonate perfectly within the Libyan context, 
encapsulating what is going on right now rather well. It provides a basic summary of 
Libya’s public sphere today, reflecting on how the revolution began in a sheer sense of 
hope, but devolved into desolation, division and chaos.  
By exploring the tale of Libya over three complex phases, before, during and after the 
uprising, this study sought to find whether these dichotomies and various paradoxical 
themes are inevitable, or whether the networked public sphere creates an alternative space 
that to some extent can better support debate and deliberation. The aim was to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of how digital technologies and society interacted over these 
three phases, and how these technologies were experienced and used during this time. This 
study goes beyond the false two positions of understanding the democratic potential of 
internet and social media: ‘optimism’ versus ‘pessimism’; or a tool of ‘liberation’ versus a 
tool of ‘repression’. Rather, it attempts to understand social media technologies’ complex 
impact, and even sometimes its contradictory effects on social change and democratic 
transformation.   
This chapter is organised into two main sections: the first section focuses on the two phases, 
before and during the uprising, to explore and discuss how a small number of digitally 
savvy young people revolted in a repressed environment, and how they scaled up from 
Facebook online calls/posts to a bloody revolution. The second section focuses on the post-
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revolutionary period, to explore the opportunities of internet and social media for 
democracy and promoting a nascent public sphere in the country. Before presenting these 
sections, a summary of the key findings and insights is provided.  
8.2 Key findings and insights 
This section summarises the key findings and insights related to technology usage and 
young people’s lived experiences before, during and after the uprising. The findings that 
relate to the (pre-and during the uprising time) only emerged from thematic analysis of the 
interviews due to the fact that it was not possible to collect actual Facebook data associated 
with the events of 2011, while the findings relate to the post-uprising period emerged from 
both the thematic analysis of interview data and the Facebook content analysis. It is also 
important to mentioned that the study distinguishes between two phases of the post-uprising 
period: the first phase covers the period between the subsequent fall of the regime and the 
beginning of 2014, mainly characterized by excitement and hope towards the democratic 
transition; the second phase covers the period between 2014 and 2016, mainly marked by 
disillusionment and instability due to the country’s deepening power struggle. Findings as 
follows: 
Pre-uprising   
 The Libyan public sphere was found to be largely strangulated due to the 
government’s tight control and extensive surveillance. While the study identified a 
few attempts of self-expression and political blogging, these attempts were not truly 
open and democratic, but often kept private or indirect, in the name of personal 
security and safety. The government’s political climate encouraged self-censorship 
in online as well as offline environment.  
During the uprising  
 Although social media activities came from a tiny fraction of digitally equipped 
young people, they were able to create innovative ways to bypass the government’s 
internet censorship and keep the information flow free. Through establishing media 
centres and installing internet satellites, they were able to circumvent restrictions 
and disseminate revolutionary information. Locals and those who came back from 
exile collaborated with each other to publicise the revolutionary cause.  
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 Despite the government’s pervasive surveillance, new media in the form of 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, along with traditional media played critical roles 
in disseminating information, and conveying compelling sentiments, within and 
across national boundaries.  
 
 While various media tools were used to bring the ground experience of the 
revolutionaries to global attention, the regime itself also made intense efforts to 
counter the revolutionary narrative using a mix of old and new media approaches. 
The study revealed how TV talk shows were dedicated to portraying the revolution 
as a conspiracy against Libya, framing NATO interference as an imperialist attack, 
while warning about consequences of the revolution such as turning the country 
into a base for Al-Qaeda and religious extremism. 
 
 Both sides of the conflict contributed to the news stream by distributing highly 
charged content for their political ends. This resulted in producing intense 
informational environment that infused with diverse and pluralistic expression, in a 
way that created an emotional pressure on people, that lead them to rise up either 
against or for the regime.  
Post-uprising (the immediate phase) 
 Young participants, particularly those with a revolutionary stance, demonstrated 
active use of social media platforms; some of which were politically engaged or 
self-expressed for the first time in their lives, after decades of political apathy and 
oppression under the previous regime.  
 
 Yet, despite seemingly active political participation, freedom of expression was not 
totally enjoyed. The study revealed that the ability to discuss public issues which 
countered the revolutionary stream seemed to be problematic, even among the 
victorious revolutionaries, resulting in serious threats online and offline.  
 
 While fear of speech deterred many of pro-regime interviewees from voicing their 
views online, the Facebook analysis revealed extraordinary amount of criticism 
posted against the revolution. This suggests that there were groups of pro-regime 
users who were able to voice their opinion and views, although it is important to 
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acknowledge that there was no absolute confirmation of the users’ locations and 
identities (e.g. whether they were inside or outside Libya, and whether they were 
posting under pseudonyms or real identities). 
 
Post-uprising (the later phase) 
 Growing distrust in media sources. While young Libyans are facing a fundamental 
challenge: assessing the credibility of information disseminated online, they are 
simultaneously developing strategies and approaches to verify and fact-check news 
both as consumers and distributers.  
 
 Young Libyans face new forms of control exerted by militias, armed factions, tribes 
and family in a way have pushed many to censor themselves, (e.g. edit privacy 
setting, switch between platforms and withdraw from politics).  
 
 With media sector (old and new) linked to political, regional and ideological 
agendas, engagement in support of democratic values is not a priority for many 
Libyans. Stability was prioritised over democracy, in the sense that most 
participants wanted to turn the clock back to 2010 before the revolution. 
 
 The political, ideological and regional polarisation that is raging in Libya is 
reflected in the online media landscape. Although it widens diversity of views, 
invigorating plurality in the public space, this polarisation is fuelling trends towards 
political resignation and disengagement.   
 
 Paralleling the decrease in political involvement, there is an increased tendency 
towards transforming social media networks, chiefly Facebook, to commercial 
spaces, particularly as a field for advertising and entertainment.  
 
 Although social media platforms can serve as archives of memory records or action 
repertoires that might be passed on to other users, a part of a rich and feverish period 
of digital history of Libya has slipped away due to the fluidity structure and 
unforeseen developments of Facebook (e.g. the disappearance of the LW Facebook 
page).  
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8.3 Digital media and new publics: revolting in a repressed environment 
Since the breakout of the Arab uprisings, much has been written about the role of social 
media as a force for change and reform in Tunisia and Egypt (e.g. Howard & Hussain, 
2011; Lynch, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Fuchs, 2012; Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 
2014). Yet, far too little attention has been paid to the Libyan uprising. Therefore, this study 
is devoted to discussing the Libyan context, focusing on young people’s uses and 
experiences of social media, mainly during the uprising and the post-uprising period (2011-
2016). However, it was also important to briefly shed light on the political use of the 
internet and social media during the time leading up to the Libyan uprising, in order to 
better understand the nature of the emergent networked public sphere and whether it 
contributed in some way to facilitating political change.    
Before the eruption of the Arab Spring, Libya stood in a much worse position in terms of 
using the internet for free expression and political activism, compared to the situation in 
the neighbouring countries Tunisia and Egypt. While Tunisian and Egyptian bloggers and 
activists made use of the internet to challenge the state-regulated boundaries of the public 
sphere, debating politics, criticising their regimes and in some cases organising political 
actions (although it did not result in massive scale activism that put a real pressure on the 
then current governments) (Howard, 2010; Randeree, 2011), the use of internet and social 
media in political activism was far different and much more restricted in Libya. The study 
clarifies how the culture of fear, which found to be either cultivated by family or imposed 
by the government, was ingrained in young people’s everyday routine. Because of this, 
self-censorship emerged as commonplace among the study participants, resulting in narrow 
self-expression and perhaps leading to apathetic political attitude. In fact, the association 
between political apathy and the fear of government retaliation, according to Iskandar 
(2006), are expected consequences within repressive regimes. Thus, the question is: How 
could Libyan young people break the fear barrier and trigger the revolution in 2011? And 
how they did scale up from Facebook online calls/posts to a bloody revolution?  
From an optimistic perspective, the internet and social media enable publics to 
communicate faster and easier, gain greater access to information, get more opportunities 
to engage in the public sphere, and enhance their ability to undertake collective action 
(Shirky, 2011; Lynch, 2011). Internet and social media also have the potential to expand 
people’s political knowledge and thus increase the likelihood of their political interest 
which may in turn lead to an increase in political activism (Debatim, 2008; Howard, 2010). 
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In this study, although online expression in the Libyan public sphere was found to be 
largely strangulated due to the government’s tight control, there have been tiny attempts of 
blogging before the revolution, some of which emerged under the government’s 
recognition and surveillance. There have also been attempts to seek political information 
outside the regime’s realm, mainly from opposition websites, of which a number were 
freely accessible during the time leading up to the uprising.  
Despite the fact that political blogging remained a very small phenomenon among those 
who reflected a strong sense of human agency and will, their attempts at blogging as a 
means of self-expression may indicate a beginning of change in youth participation in 
political life in Libya, and may have in some way contributed to pave the way towards 
political change. In the absence of democratic governance, internet technology seemed to 
allow young people, who desired to have a voice, to reorient themselves from passive 
participants to potential subjects. It enabled and empowered their efforts to cross the 
boundary in the offline world, and moved forward to counter in some way the hegemonic 
political culture, challenging different governmental and social restrictions (Lotan et al., 
2011).  
In a restricted environment, engaging in online activities to express personal opinion or 
even to observe passively political information can be considered as a brave act. Such acts 
could be a possible basis for influencing a new generation to embrace a set of new political 
norms and values, which over time could be a part of making social change possible. As 
described in earlier chapters, all participants in this study who were exposed to political 
information provided by the opposition websites or engaged in blogging were more likely 
to participate at some point during the 2011 uprising, either online (e.g. posting, sharing) 
or offline (joining protests). This could suggest that political discussion occurring in these 
online spaces may have educated those participants, raised their awareness and promoted 
their political knowledge towards certain issues, enabling them to obtain different types of 
political information that fell outside the regime realm, and thus perhaps forming a counter-
public sphere (Fraser, 1990). According to Lynch (2007, p.5), “[if] blogs cannot constitute 
a genuine public sphere without reaching a mass audience, they still might form a counter-
public, an incubator of new ideas and new identities which evolves alongside and slowly 
reshapes the mainstream public from below”. Yet, without being over-optimistic, one 
cannot ignore the fact that the statistics reflect a very low internet penetration rate in Libya 
(only 5.5% in 2010) (Salem & Mourtada, 2011), and in general young people’s engagement 
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was rarely and narrowly political. Thus, it would be very difficult to argue that the internet 
played a crucial role in enhancing or creating a public sphere at this point in the pre-uprising 
period, but it may perhaps have contributed to planting possible seeds that were vital for 
the formation of consciousness and opinion, making small groups of young people ready 
to take up possible action.  
8.3.1 Breaking the fear barrier, motivations and drivers  
This study does not aim to claim that social media on its own created the revolution, but to 
explore to what degree and in what ways these technologies aided the Libyan protests, and 
understand its significance in how events played out. Following the path of the 
neighbouring countries Tunisia and Egypt, some young Libyans were inspired and 
motivated to break the fear barrier and topple the regime. Castells (2012), in ‘Networks of 
Outrage and Hope’ highlights the connections between social media networks as a means 
of protest and the overcoming of fear. He shows how enthusiasm is linked to hope and fear, 
and goal-seeking action is linked to anxiety and anger, leading to the creation of emotional 
movements. The current study emphasises this point. The hope for change and the feeling 
of anger led some participants to overcome their fears to act against the regime, either 
online or offline, while simultaneously leading others to engage in a state of sustained 
passivity owing to their fear of government. Even before the Libyan protests sparked, the 
enthusiasm about the possibility of revolting against the regime started to shade the picture. 
Although the interviewees did not see to engage or network actively with the calls for 
protests on social media, some identified acts in this study could be seen as important 
indicators of the underlying motivation leading up to protesting against the regime. 
Just before the Libyan uprising occurred, social media seemed to invite pluralized political 
expression and narrative, in which a variety of actors had a say and contributed to the stream 
(Papacharissi, 2015). Some of these actors were able to create content in a decentralized 
manner, crossing national borders and potentially contributing to the mobilization process. 
Participants reported that social media seemed to become a space of interactions between 
Libyans and non-Libyans from the neighbouring countries, Tunisia and Egypt. It was 
reported that some Tunisian citizens made provocative comments on Facebook, 
emasculating and humiliating young Libyans, accusing them of lacking capability to protest 
against the regime, in a way that may have led to fuelling some young people’s anger and 
actions, and the way they challenged their fears. Questioning Libyan ‘masculinity’ in the 
eyes of other Arab nations suggests how the effects of emotionally- charged content may 
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have added to the intensity of the atmosphere at that point in time, and perhaps paving the 
way for protests to spark.  
As such, it can be argued that social media networks may have provided the conditions for 
connective environment, offering an online arena for interaction and discussion, where the 
logic of action seemed to be altered from traditional collective to connective (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015). In this type of horizontal networking logic, which is 
characterised by personalized content, diverse and pluralistic expression, individuals can 
join protests without having to be a part of a hierarchical political organization or to buy 
into an ideological perspective. The horizontal networks of communication could facilitate 
the spread of mobilising content in the new media spaces, in a way that may lend voice and 
visibility to underrepresented points of view (Papacharissi, 2015). Thus, it is more likely to 
broaden the scale of protests, gaining the attention and sympathy of a large portion of 
people.   
When the Libyan protests sparked, sharing highly emotional content was one of the most 
powerful ways to connect people together, and create emotional bonds (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015). Online content of protesters and the regime brutality 
against them, which later were picked up by traditional media, helped to spread the 
revolutionary cause. Due to the violent nature of the events, information and news shared 
from the ground was characterized mainly by bloody scenes, deadly clashes and rumours, 
leading to an increase in drama and interest. Especially in the early days of conflict, there 
was widespread propaganda about the regime, such as the allegation of rape, and the 
widespread notion that the regime employed black Africans to serve as mercenaries. Such 
content was found to have an impact on triggering people’s anger, intensifying their 
feelings and becoming an emotional rallying point during the protests. This draws our 
attention to the ability of social media platforms to pluralize expression that present a 
‘polyphonic yet coherent narrative’ (Papacharissi, 2015) against the Al-Gadaafi regime and 
for revolution and democracy.  
However, the regime, on the other hand, made strong efforts to counter the revolutionary 
coherent narrative and put the revolution down using different media channels. Intimidation 
of the spectre of Islamic extremism, tribal civil war and framing NATO interference as an 
imperialist attack, was a major part of the regime propaganda effort. Videos and images of 
war crimes claimed to be committed by the rebels were also broadcast.  
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This content shared on different types of media, which served different political ends, 
seemed to create an emotional pressure on people which might have been difficult to 
withstand; thus, they rose up either against or for the regime. This, therefore, suggests that 
the political information environment in the Libyan uprising by no means constituted an 
ideal public sphere in the Habermasian sense, but at the same time it cannot be considered 
irrelevant to it. The emotional dimension of political expression is a viable aspect of 
political participation and a crucial element for opinion formation and mobilization.    
8.3.2 Surveillance and censorship  
Social media tools have the potential to become tools of counter power instead of only tools 
of social connection and entertainment. However, the effects of government surveillance 
and censorship are likely to make the process of counter power and social change harder 
not easier, increasing the risks of political participation. Morozov (2011) argued that social 
media can have negative implications on social movements because social media can be 
used by authoritarian regimes as tools of oppression and propaganda to counter popular 
uprisings. From his perspective, the internet can empower the strong and disempower the 
weak. These arguments are important to this research because the old regime sought to 
control the flow of information in the public sphere throughout its rule.  
As the study shows, despite the efforts of reforms and openness within the regime system 
in the pre-uprising period, young people never reached the level of direct criticism of the 
regime. Further, although many opposition websites were left unblocked, the regime 
simultaneously used internet-monitoring services to observe users’ online activities and 
keep them under the government’s eye. This suggests that freedom of speech was defined 
within vague parameters of the regime’s interest prior to the uprising. During the 2011 
events, the internet and social media were also targeted for censorship by the regime 
because of their use in disseminating revolutionary information. In fact, the internet was 
shut down most of the time during the uprising. In addition, the findings show that 
government internet surveillance went beyond merely blocking the internet, to crack down 
on bloggers and activists who could potentially have had an influence on driving the 
movement forward.  
Although public sphere activities came from a tiny fraction of digitally equipped young 
people, governmental actions to control the flow of the information could be seen as 
significant predictors of how important the internet and social media were to the 
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revolutionaries to threaten the regime’s status quo. Their importance as a means for 
transmitting information and self-expression could also be inferred through the words of 
the BBC World News editor, Jon Williams, when he commented on the internet being cut 
off by the regime (Williams, 2011). He said that reporters and journalists had additional 
responsibility due to the decrease of the flow of video and images produced by networked 
local citizens in the early days due to the internet cut-off.  
However, despite the internet interruption, the flow of information did not completely stop. 
While there were no special services such as “speak to tweet” which was introduced during 
the Egyptian revolution by big companies such as Google and Twitter (Kassem, 2013), this 
study demonstrates how young Libyans constantly created innovative ways to bypass the 
government’s internet censorship in order to keep the information flow free. Through 
establishing media centres, installing internet satellites or using existing ones that were 
already available in some workplaces (e.g. companies), small groups of young people 
teamed up with their peers to seek, record and disseminate revolutionary information. This 
was despite the government’s rigorous efforts to track the location of internet satellite users, 
particularly in Tripoli (through the regime’s Electronic Army team). In the opposition-
controlled areas (e.g. Benghazi), the regime lost all its capability to monitor citizens’ online 
activities due to the separation of the internet network from the main national 
telecommunication services, leaving many networks outside of its surveillance.  
This could explain why images and videos of the events continued to flow. These findings 
may help us to understand the power of social media in facilitating the fast exchange of 
information, thereby contributing to the momentum of the events, and keeping alive a spirit 
of resistance, particularly when connected to traditional media, allowing for wider 
dissemination. Therefore, it could be argued that it would be always very difficult for 
repressive regimes to entirely apply precise censorship over their citizens. Circumvention 
technologies can certainly help to break through information blockades and counter barriers 
that may be built by governments to block the flow of information. Consequently, the 
state’s ability to dominate the public sphere might be fundamentally challenged and 
weakened. This does not ignore, however, the fact that digital activism will always involve 
putting individuals at risk. 
Although the tide of advanced technology can make tech-savvy groups of young people 
hard to detect, at the same time it does not entirely guarantee their safety. As the study 
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shows, the possibility of being identified by the government led some participants to refrain 
from expressing their views and to engage in self-silencing, particularly when the uprising 
took a serious and violent direction. Conversely, it led others to challenge their fears and 
continue to oppose the regime. This can suggest that government surveillance and 
censorship may be seen as drivers as well as barriers. While it may lead some to confront 
their regime and possibly help to take the movement forward, it could also lead others to 
avoid engaging in risky online behaviour, and thus, might limit low-cost online platforms’ 
revolutionary potential.  
8.3.3 The relationship between mainstream and new social media 
The thesis that the Arab Spring revolutions were simply “Facebook revolutions” or 
“Twitter revolutions”, referring to the role of social media in ousting the long-standing 
Arab regimes, was largely rejected by many scholars (e.g. Morozov, 2011; Lynch, 2011; 
Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013). However, this does not mean that 
social media had no role in the Arab Spring. According to Tufekci & Wilson, (2012) social 
media was one part of the emergence of a new system of political communication that 
shaped the events of the Arab Spring. They argued that this system, which is a combination 
of three elements, satellite TV channels, Internet and social media platforms and the 
Internet-enabled cellphones, created a fundamental transformation in the Arab public 
sphere during the MENA uprisings. This was because it expanded citizens’ capability to 
document events and increased the odds of their political participation.  
However, as the focus of Tufekci and Wilson’s empirical study was upon Egypt, this raises 
the question of whether this new system of political communication is operated differently 
and has similar implications on the events as they unfolded in the Libyan context. Unlike 
Egypt, internet-enabled cellphones were not prevalent in Libya, although mobile phone 
penetration reached 161 percent in 2011 (Freedom House, 2015). In addition, the Libyan 
uprising was characterized by long periods of interruption of different sources of 
information, both traditional and digital (e.g. blocking internet, disrupting mobile phone 
services and jamming satellite TV channels). In theory, this means that the relationship 
between the three main components that constitute the new system of political 
communication is likely to be missing in the Libyan case. In practice, evidence emerged 
from the study that challenged this preconception and confirmed that such connections are 
likely to exist, albeit taking on slightly different dynamics.  
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Because of the lack of internet-enabled cellphones, the ability of citizens to document 
events and then share them online was not straightforward. The study shows how getting 
information out to the world was a difficult task, costing participants much time and effort. 
It also increased the risks to their personal safety. Despite that, the study reveals how some 
participants were likely to engage in collaborative acts with their peers to produce and 
disseminate information. One interesting finding is that some participants with internet 
access became connecting points, enabling video, photos and news to be collected through 
their non-internet networks of trusted family and friends. This meant that even individuals 
with no internet access were able to contribute to the process of disseminating revolutionary 
information. Mobile phone devices, therefore, do not necessarily have to be internet-
enabled to be a part of the new system of political communication. Only a few points of 
internet connection might be needed to enable political information and voices to spread 
effectively.  
However, spreading information and solidarity messages on a large scale might have 
remained limited if not connected with traditional media. Consistent with the literature (e.g. 
Castells, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013), this research stressed 
the importance of traditional media and its relationship with social media. The emerging 
‘citizen journalism’ phenomenon is important in light of critical moments, where the 
environment might be dangerous and not easily accessible for professional journalists. One 
example among many citizen journalists’ videos picked up by traditional media, 
specifically the Al-Jazeera TV channel, was a video showing a group of young people 
raising a huge rebel flag in Tripoli during the uprising. The video also showed police 
removing it. The study participants who recalled this video had no internet access at that 
time and watched it on the Al-Jazeera TV channel. Being able to record such a video in a 
highly restricted environment, from inside Tripoli, illustrates the biggest impact of social 
media, when it links to traditional media in covering domestic actions at critical moments, 
and thus, bringing these moments to public attention when they would have been otherwise 
kept in the dark. 
The importance of traditional media such as Al-Jazeera lay in its ability to increase 
visibility and presence of the messages of those opposed to the regime, expanding their 
publicity to reach regional and global publics. This, therefore, may have contributed to the 
momentum of the events and helped to mobilise sympathisers. Enhanced visibility inside 
and outside of Libya involved much more effort than only relying on images and videos 
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produced by citizen journalists. The Al-Jazeera channel as well as many other traditional 
media outlets maintained presence on the ground through their correspondents, particularly 
in the areas that quickly came under opposition forces, such as the eastern city of Benghazi 
and the mountainous region in the very west of Libya. The study shows how the ‘media 
centres’ established in these areas, in which cameras were sent to front lines to capture 
videos and images of the clashes, also became very important sources of information for 
Al-Jazeera as well as other different media outlets. In fact, these centres seemed to become 
hubs for collaboration between different actors such as locals, journalists, correspondents 
and the Libyan diaspora (those who were living in the exile and returned back during the 
uprising) in order to gather more publicity and attention for their cause. Although the 
regime tried to publicise its cause as well, it seemed to gain less visibility on some media 
outlets, particularly Al-Jazeera, where pro-regime news, according to study interviewees, 
was often omitted. Thus, this suggests that the visibility of the revolutionary cause was 
more likely to outweigh the voice of the regime, leading to a shift in the balance of power 
from regime to the citizens, and perhaps generating global public sphere.   
8.4 Digital media and new publics: new forms of engagement 
As discussed previously, the public sphere under the old regime was tightly closed and 
controlled, resulting in a restricted flow of information and a vast practise of self-censorship 
both online and offline (Bell, Anthony & Witter, 2011). Following the fall of the regime, 
however, there has been more ease and availability in accessing the internet and various 
forms of social media networks. Libya’s internet was switched back on after months of a 
government-mandated shutdown (Zhang, 2011). Since then, the proportion of Libyans, 
particularly young people, connected through social media, particularly Facebook, has 
undergone a continuous increase (Salem & Mourtada, 2011; Freedom House, 2015; 
Internet World Stats, 2017).  
However, although this growth in public access to, and intense use of, social media holds 
the promise of freeing the flow of information and reviving the public sphere, several 
aspects of these technologies simultaneously may limit that democratic potential. 
According to many scholars (e.g. Sunstein, 2002; Papacharissi, 2009; Fuchs, 2010; 
Iosifidis, 2011; Tufekci, 2017; Vaidhyanathan, 2018), although digital media has the 
potential to provide greater access to information and enhance democratic deliberation, it 
may also undermine democracy, segment and polarise populations. Thus, these 
technologies should not be considered ‘neutral tools’. 
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One of the major characteristics of this study that must be understood before discussing the 
potential contribution and limitations of social media to Libya’s emergent digital public 
sphere is that Libya is undergoing a political transition period, wherein Libyan citizens are 
being shaped as we speak, and the role of social media seems to be developing constantly. 
Accordingly, the idea of this study does not evolve only around that absolute or rigid 
argument that internet and social media networks, on their own, are able to ‘make or break’ 
a public sphere (Papacharissi, 2009), but it is also about young people and their surrounding 
uncertain environment. The following sections discuss young Libyans’ interaction with 
digital media, considering their uses, lived experiences, and attitudes to provide a concrete 
understanding of the networked public sphere and how has it evolved over the last couple 
of years after the uprising.  
8.4.1 Social media, new opportunities and different challenges    
As discussed in the findings, the first two years subsequent to the uprising were marked by 
a vibrant political environment full of hope and enthusiasm to establish a new Libya. Young 
participants were found to take a more active role than was possible before the fall of the 
regime. Many of them, particularly those with a revolutionary stance, were involved in 
online political communication, sharing information and discussing politics. This shows 
that the new information environment, facilitated by social media, created a more vibrant 
and participatory space of information that flowed differently from the previously state-
controlled media. The traditional centre of one-way communication (government to 
citizens) was no longer restricting the flow of information, but new gates of freedom of 
expression and power were opened up. 
From a positive perspective, this unprecedented change in social media environment 
seemed to be promising, suggesting that new democratic possibilities were on the horizon 
in Libya. However, by digging deep into the participants’ experiences in this early stage, a 
number of limitations and restrictions were identified. The findings show that this 
environment was not truly democratic and inclusive, and not all public topics were open to 
discussion and debate, particularly those against the mainstream revolutionary discourse. 
The interview analysis, for example, shows that the voices of the pro-regime participants 
were likely to be muted. This was because the majority of pro-regime participants feared 
the possibility of being harassed or abused if they challenged the revolutionary dominant 
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debate, particularly at this critical time, just after the uprising. Therefore, they chose mostly 
to remain silent online as well as offline.  
This could be better explained through the ‘spiral of silence’ theory (Noelle-Neumann, 
1974) in which minority viewpoints are intimidated into silence because they are 
inconsistent with the view of the majority or the mainstream discourse. According to this 
theory, the spiral of silence occurs when individuals perceive their opinion as unpopular. 
Therefore, they remain quiet for fear of exclusion and criticism. This also could explain 
why the anti-revolutionary viewpoint was rarely represented on the LW Facebook page, 
particularly in the first two years following the uprising. It could be that the pro-regime 
users might have perceived this page, which introduced itself as a pro-revolutionary page 
and was populated by a majority of revolution enthusiasts, as an unsafe and unfriendly 
environment for showing their opposition to the revolution. For this reason, therefore, it 
might have been avoided. 
However, this does not mean that all online platforms were totally avoided. The LI 
Facebook page could be a good example to show that there was a group of anti-
revolutionary individuals who might have been inclined to form or join online groups of 
like-minded individuals to express themselves. Forming such a page perhaps gave them a 
feeling that they were in a majority so that they could interact in a safe and friendly 
environment. On this page, the criticism of the revolution and its chaotic aspects was 
explicit and stark. Although it is impossible to verify the users’ locations and their identities 
(whether they were anonymised or real), the extraordinary amount of criticism against the 
revolution suggests that social media sites may have enabled certain groups to break their 
silence and challenge the dominant revolutionary debate even from behind a keyboard. 
Hence, it could be argued that social media contributed to widening the margin of freedom 
of expression, and perhaps helped to create alternative publics or “subaltern 
counterpublics” that compete to articulate their voice within the public sphere (Fraser, 
1990). Although it is important to acknowledge that the arguments produced might not 
have been equally powerful, as the pro-regime groups were in a weaker position and were 
not supported by the mainstream media, the fact of an argument being less privileged does 
not necessarily mean it has less impact on the development of the public discourse. 
According to many scholars (Lynch, 2007; Papacharissi, 2009), the multiple public 
spheres, which vary in power and extent, exist to give a voice to collective identities and 
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allow different ideas to develop, leading eventually to reshaping public opinion and views, 
particularly in the long run.   
8.5 Digital dilemma, new dynamics and disposition  
Since 2014, the divisive trend has become clear and sharp in Libya due to a violent power 
struggle. As a result, the emergent vibrant political environment has fallen apart and the 
conflictual atmosphere is reflected by Libya’s transitional path that evolved after the ‘Feb 
17 revolution’. Although digital networks helped to foster a space of relative freedom in 
which information and ideas could travel with relative ease and speed, Libya’s fast-
changing events brought about new challenges that altered the online environment and 
introduced new dynamics. These challenges evolved around the complexity of the 
networked public sphere, including lack of objectivity in the information flow, widespread 
polarisation and tension, the fragility and the fluidity of social media content, and how 
people come to understand this medium and evaluate their experience. The following 
sections discuss how this complex digital world affected young people’s use of social 
media, including their experiences and attitudes, especially at this phase of the escalated 
uncertainty in Libya’s situation.  
8.5.1 Changing levels of trust in social media information 
Looking backward into past years, participants, particularly those with a revolutionary 
stance, felt that they were emotionally exploited and misled by information circulated on 
both old and new media. Al-Jazeera TV in particular, whose coverage was mostly informed 
by user-generated content, was accused of spreading misinformation/disinformation and 
obliterating facts to promote the revolutionary viewpoint. Although this may be very much 
true, it does not mean that the pro-regime media provided unbiased coverage, or that the 
anti-revolutionary participants were not emotionally influenced.  
In media convention, the old mantra ‘If it bleeds, it leads’ is often followed by media outlets 
to grab people’s attention and minds. Add to that the Libyan uprising itself was of a violent 
nature. As discussed earlier in section 8.3.1, the propaganda machine for both sides of the 
conflict, pro- and anti-revolution, was on, competing for attention to seek public support 
for their cause. TV presenters, bloggers and activists seemed to become new opinion 
leaders for publics, trying to direct and manipulate their opinion. This suggests that 
members of the public can be vulnerable targets for opinion manipulation and propaganda 
campaigns, particularly in this digital age where information is everywhere.    
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A more recent example showing how digital media can be used as a tool of manipulation 
and persuasion by targeting political content at specific audiences is the Facebook-
Cambridge Analytica scandal, where data was harvested from up to 87 million Facebook 
users to be used for the U.S. presidential campaign of Donald Trump. In a series of 
undercover videos by Channel 4 News  (2018), a Cambridge Analytica Executive was 
caught discussing election tricks and  techniques on how the company gives facts emotional 
coloration and deliberately preys on people's fears:  
“The two fundamental human drivers when it comes to taking information on board 
effectively are hopes and fears, and many of those are unspoken and even 
unconscious -- you didn't know that was a fear until you saw something that just 
evoked that reaction from you”. He continued, “and our job is to get, is to drop the 
bucket further down the well than anybody else to understand what are those really 
deep-seated underlying fears, concerns. There is no good fighting an election 
campaign on the facts because actually it's all about emotion"  
This quote above shows how the way information is shared can be manipulated by 
gathering data on users, so that they can be targeted with certain posts and ads that may 
impact their potential voting behaviour as well as their feelings. This confirms Gramsci’s 
argument that the pure spontaneity of an action or event does not exist (Gramsci, 1971), 
but there are often certain players and organisers, with varying degrees of power, involved 
in setting a scene, and paving the way for certain events to unfold. Therefore, people must 
learn how to be attentive, and must develop new approaches to weigh up the claims 
themselves because “it can be hard to see beyond their own worlds if they are not looking” 
(boyd, 2010, p. 34).  
In this study, the emerging findings from both the interviews and the Facebook data show 
that young people are increasingly developing a cautious and critical approach in dealing 
with social media information. To a great extent, this is a very healthy practice because it 
indicates that people started eradicating their media illiteracy and engaging critically with 
public discourse and discussion. However, things cannot be reduced to the simple 
improvement of people’s critical thinking, since the networked public sphere itself is 
problematic. We are now living in an environment where information and documentation 
is everywhere. People are more susceptible to fake news and echo chambers online than 
ever before. Therefore, being attentive or critical does not necessarily offer a magical 
solution to the problem of getting reliable information. The process of distinguishing 
between what is real and what is false is difficult and complex. Because the traditional 
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gatekeepers are no longer controlling the distribution of information, unverified 
information and false stories can spread easily on social media networks. This would 
complicate the situation further and create chaos, particularly within a setting that is already 
chaotic and complex such as Libya today, where people encounter challenges to the 
trustworthiness of content on almost every story, post or image, leaving them in doubt and 
confusion.  
In such a complex environment, Tufekci (2017) argued that people often become highly 
sceptical of social media information. Thus, they tend to seek information they agree with 
and that matches their views. Such a tendency, however, could have negative implications 
on the development of the public sphere because it could potentially lead to polarization 
and an echo chamber effect rather than creating the opportunity to form healthy public 
debate. The following section is devoted to discussing the positive and negative sides of 
being sceptical and doubtful in further detail.   
8.5.2 From the hope of democratizing to polarizing?  
On a positive note, scepticism in such a chaotic information environment can be understood 
as a healthy response because it led many participants either pro-or anti revolution to seek 
and verify information from various sources, even opposite to their views. These attempts 
to get reliable information, even from competing sources, is very important to the 
development of the public sphere because it can lead to diversify people’s networks, and 
thus, expose them to ideas and views different from their own. It also might extend their 
engagement and encourage them to establish a conversation with others to discuss certain 
issues, which eventually could contribute to fostering public debate.   
Yet, there is also a downside of scepticism which is consistent with Tufekci’s argument 
mentioned above regarding fostering polarization. Although scepticism led many 
participants to use additional sources to check the validity of information, it simultaneously 
led others to customize their social media feeds in their attempts to avoid confusion and 
misinformation, limiting their digital space of interaction to certain like-minded individuals 
and trusted networks. This filtering effect, on one hand, could reduce the opportunity of 
being exposed to new information and various ideas. On the other hand, it could restrict 
people’s content from reaching wider publics. As a result, they might end up being isolated 
in an environment within the boundaries of their community narratives, creating what is 
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called an “online echo chamber” that often leads to reinforce people’s own views and 
biases.  
A good example of the echo chamber effect could be reflected in the findings that emerged 
from the content analysis of the anti-revolutionary LI Facebook page. The analysis shows 
that the nature of the content was mainly like-minded, providing a very coherent anti-
revolutionary narrative rarely interrupted by the opposite side of the argument. If we 
assume that the page’s users were mainly interacting with like-minded social media content 
and individuals, the possibility of building upon and confirming their pre-existing beliefs 
would be high. Therefore, it would have been difficult for them to break out of these echo 
chambers. According to Tufekci (2017), this could lead to construction of radical opinions 
and views in a way that leads people to go on to carry out vicious battles online, which 
result in more polarization while simultaneously deepening the filter bubble.  
These vicious battles and radical opinion characterised much of the content of the pro-
revolutionary LW Facebook page. The content analysis shows how the page, particularly 
in late anniversaries, degenerated into a space littered with acrimonious interchanges such 
as insults, name-calling and aggressive criticism. The interactions that occurred on this 
page clearly reflect the country’s deep internal conflict in terms of ideological, tribal, and 
regional division. However, despite its fragmentary and fractured atmosphere, this page 
emerged as an environment of participatory free and diverse expression. The range of 
topics, reactions and feelings expressed on this online space reflected multiple and 
overlapping publics, addressing myriad cultural and political issues. Despite being focused 
on one single narrative as showed in the early stage of the revolution, the page was highly 
representative of many points of view in this later stage, and was even inclusive of those in 
favour of the old regime. This, therefore, might better fit within Fraser’s description of 
participatory democracies in which various publics are competing to articulate their voices 
and views within the public sphere (Fraser, 1990).  
Based on the above discussion, the public sphere, therefore, is not a space of homogeneous 
groups, nor a space of only rational-critical thinking, nor a source of consensus. Rather, it 
must be understood as a space composed of heterogeneous groups and ‘multiple 
publics’(Antony & Thomas, 2010) whose thoughts and feelings are deeply intertwined and 
overlapped (Papacharissi, 2015). The goal of the public sphere according to Mouffe (2005) 
is to acknowledge and appreciate differences, and turn ‘antagonism into agonism’. By 
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enabling expressions of dissent and voicing disagreement within the same online space, the 
chances to make a fuller argument, and chances to force other users who are reading to 
reflect and engage in the discussion, can be enhanced. Thus, understanding and tolerating 
the opposed viewpoints is possible, so ‘agonism’ could be a result. 
This is an important issue for future research: to find out whether users of this page have 
developed a more tolerant behaviour after 2016, or turning from being former enemies into 
adversaries. However, this seems to be difficult because of the fluid structure of social 
media platforms that allows for easy creation as well as deletion of online groups or pages. 
Although these digital platforms can serve as archives of memory records or action 
repertoires that might be passed on to other users (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), the study 
found that the LW Facebook page has disappeared from Facebook; thus its content is no 
longer accessible or reachable. Regardless of the reason behind this disappearance or 
deactivation, what is striking is that a huge amount of data and information was lost, and it 
might not be possible for it to be retrieved any longer. Even the internet archive, Wayback 
Machine, cannot not be useful in this case because it is not possible to archive social media 
data through it as they are voluminous. This means that a part of a rich and feverish period 
of digital history has slipped away, and the next generation might not be able to learn about 
it.  
To date, there have been several projects and initiatives to archive online materials that 
invigorated the Arab Spring revolutions, focusing mostly on Egypt, such as R-shief, A 
Dictionary of the Revolution, Tahrir Documents, 18 Days in Egypt, U-shahid, UCLA’s 
HyperCitiesEgypt, Wiki Thawra, the Manshurat and the 858 Archive. However, few have 
survived (Shamel, 2018). Accordingly, much more effort is needed to collect, curate and 
archive materials that narrated certain revolutionary and post-revolutionary moments, 
particularly in this fragile online environment where digital content is vulnerable to loss 
and destruction.  
If technology blows up our digital memories, many things will be forgotten. Thus, the 
development of the public sphere may be hindered because it is difficult for future 
generations to find adequate and reliable information to look back on, resulting in a narrow 
vision of the past and inability to make meaning of many historical events. This indeed is 
not promising and could lead to more confusion and distraction that may potentially result 
in more polarized stances to a given event. 
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Therefore, it is unwise and risky to argue that the internet and social media are 
democratizing because there are many problems and obstacles that need to be overcome 
first. The potential role of social media is much more sophisticated and complex than 
putting forward a single argument to emphasise or refute its democratic potential, 
particularly in Libya’s fast-changing circumstances and its unsettling dynamics.  
8.5.3 Resigning from the networked public sphere?  
According to Davis (1999) and Tufekci (2017), the increase of polarization and conflictual 
disagreements of online environment could limit people’s participation and lead them to 
withdraw from politics. In this study, the interview findings supported this claim and found 
a connection between the polarization of the online environment and the increase in 
resignation from social media among participants. This resignation was mainly from 
Facebook because it was perceived by many participants as a chaotic and polarised online 
space that tended to invite backlash and generate flames between users. Therefore, they 
sought out alternative online platforms that they considered more convenient and friendly 
for political discussion. Twitter was the most popular platform that many of them switched 
to.   
What is interesting is that the conversation that many participants attempted to avoid was 
not only with people with “weak ties” but also with people with “strong ties”. One 
participant, for instance, started to refrain from sharing his beliefs and dissenting ideas with 
his social network of family and close friends on Facebook because of ideological 
differences that in many cases invited argumentation and friction. To avoid that, he 
switched to Twitter due to the fact that the platform was less popular among his social 
circle, so that he could express his own opinion in a less restrictive environment, without 
having to buy in to an ideology that did not coincide with his views.   
Although this reflects flexibility and adaptability of attitude to one’s social reality and 
circumstances, the issue of social relations and bonds could be a real obstacle in tribal 
societies such as Libya which are characterised by strong social bonds between families 
and clans, while simultaneously suffering from deep tribal and regional division since the 
fall of the regime, resulting in complex relationships between society members. This 
complex social relationship, indeed, can complicate the situation further, and add another 
layer to the issue of the political participation and free speech.   
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In war-shattered Libya, political participation and free expression are facing more 
challenges and constraints. Libya’s sad reality of power struggle has resulted in increasing 
threats and violence particularly against activists and bloggers, bringing about more 
restrictions to the online world. In past years, for example, more than six bloggers and 
activists were reported to be killed, while others were forced to flee the country (Freedom 
House, 2015). In addition, Libya now has three competing governments, none of which are 
able to actually govern. This haphazard structure and violent environment has of course 
created fear and confusion as well as distrust in the political process, leading many 
participants to favour engaging in harmless entertainment activities while increasingly 
applying self-censorship to avoid unwanted consequences.  
This attitude of controlling behaviour and self-censorship could be better explained through 
the panopticon, a notion designed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham and which 
has become almost a synonym for surveillance (Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017). The idea 
behind the panopticon is that, through certain centralised architectural arrangements, a 
watchman is allowed to monitor occupants of a specific building such as prisoners, workers 
and children in order to control or correct their behaviour. The occupants in the building, 
however, cannot see the watchman, and therefore have to assume that they are constantly 
under observation, thus they keep self-disciplining. The whole point of the panopticon, 
therefore, is to control and regulate the subject into certain behaviour by constantly making 
them aware of the threat of being observed.  
Similar to the panopticon mechanism, many participants regulated themselves into certain 
behaviour, which is in this study the act of self-censorship. This might have happened 
because participants may have felt they were being watched and monitored. Fear of others 
and uncertainty seemed to demotivate many of participants from practicing politics, 
shifting them from potential contributors into passive recipients and spectators. However, 
what is different here is that surveillance did not seem to follow the traditional panopticon 
style of watching from one direction. In Libya today, it is not a straightforward situation 
where a watchman monitors occupants or a government watches its citizens. It is difficult 
to determine who is watching whom because the command structure is still uncertain in the 
country owing to the internal conflict that has been fed by external regional and 
international interference. It is even difficult to draw a line between the state and militias. 
The act of watching, therefore, is likely to be done by different actors who might want to 
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stay in power or achieve certain ends. These potential watchers could be the rival 
governments, armed militias, individuals, families, clans, tribes, or a mix of all. 
What complicates things further is that we are here talking about panopticon in the digital 
environment, which is often invisible and no longer based on the idea of one watching 
many. Instead, it follows the logic that many are watching many (Galič et al., 2017). 
According to Castells (2009) the public’s actions are “exposed to the decentralised 
surveillance of millions of eyes [which makes all of us] potential paparazzi” (p. 413). This 
logic and the feeling of being exposed to danger seemed to turn off many participants from 
politics, while leading others to engage in a strict form of self-censorship.  
One of the common practices of self-censorship was exploiting the technical affordances 
of social media to interact in a safer environment, such as using pseudonyms or editing 
privacy settings to choose who could see certain posts. In a continuous period of violence, 
this is certainly important because it enables people to speak their opinion and contribute 
to the online flow of information. However, these technology affordances have also 
complex consequences. For example, using pseudonyms to stay anonymous might put 
people at risk. According to Morozov (2011), anonymous communication does not always 
provide safe shelter for political communication because governments and different 
powerful actors can also use these technological innovations to identify people and harm 
them. This of course puts online anonymity as a parameter of safety in question.  
In addition, privacy settings can also be problematic. Although using these settings might 
constitute a safer space for interaction, at the same time it might limit people from 
disseminating information and views to wider public(s), because they do not take actions 
outside of their safe realm, but remain restricted within the boundaries of their limited and 
private networks. Thus, having a real impact on the world could be difficult. This safe style 
of communication could be considered as “slacktivism”, a term used to describe 
unproductive form of activism that involves a mere act of adding a comment or joining 
Facebook discussion, which cannot alone bring about significant change (Gladwell, 2010; 
Morozov, 2011).  
However, online practices do not have to be necessarily geared towards major political 
change or on-the-ground action because they are also important spaces for conversation 
and discourse formation. The expansion of digital spaces to become a host for the different 
publics lends itself to different levels of realities, modes of expression and ideas. In this 
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sense, Tufekci (2017) argues that the easy online actions of adding ‘like’ or ‘comment’ to 
advocate a certain cause or ideology, may over time, contribute into developing a level of 
ideological commitment that is essential for changing culture and transforming the public 
sphere. This is an important issue for future research: to get more insights into the nature 
of the emergent networked public sphere in Libya.   
As mentioned above, the de-centralised forms of digital media allow for both the act of 
“watching and being watched” (Galič et al., 2017, p.27), particularly in this age of 
ubiquitous technology and cell-phone cameras which have increased people’s ability to 
document important moments at crucial times (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Despite the 
attitude of resignation among many participants, the Facebook analysis shows that many 
posts were informational in nature, including first-hand information, reports, and 
announcements, which were not limited to text but often came in visual forms such as 
images and videos. This suggests that there were groups of people (within the time frame 
of this study) who were still contributing into the flow of information, documenting events, 
and providing others with the latest news and updates.  
However, without romanticizing and perhaps overstating the extent of availability and ease 
of access to digital media for either receiving or distributing information, it is important to 
acknowledge the enormous obstacles to internet connectivity in the country. Despite the 
massive growth in public access to various forms of information and communications 
technologies, the ongoing armed conflict has resulted in significant physical destruction to 
vital infrastructure, causing frequent cuts to electricity and physical damage to 
telecommunication networks. The damage in the country’s telecommunications sector 
alone was estimated at over $1 billion in 2015 according to the Freedom House report 
(Freedom House, 2015). This condition clearly limited internet connectivity, leading to 
further withdrawal and exclusion; thus the possibility for a more accessible, universal 
public(s) participation can largely be reduced. 
Overall, this section demonstrates a complex and multifaceted process of people’s 
increased political disengagement which is either affected by external factors out of their 
control such as social, environmental and technical issues, or based on a decision made 
internally by people themselves on fear, polarization or distrust in the political process.  
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8.5.4 Different media uses, different participation   
Paralleling the decrease in people’s involvement in politics, the interview findings show 
that there was an increased tendency towards transforming social media networks, chiefly 
Facebook, to commercial spaces, particularly as a field for advertising and entertainment. 
This shift leads back to Habermas’ argument that commercialized media led to the decline 
of the public sphere. For Habermas, commercial media transformed the public sphere into 
a space of private interests controlled by powerful political and economic elites rather than 
citizens. These private interests were prioritised over political public discussions, in a way 
that affected the quality of information and critical political discussion (1989). Habermas’ 
view was not only in relation to tradition media but also to new media. Habermas doubts 
the democratising impact of the internet because he saw the medium developing towards a 
commercial direction, which for him would result in the decline the public sphere 
(Habermas, 2006). Commercial social media, according to Fuchs (2014) and 
Vaidhyanathan (2018), may fragment us and undermine democracy, and should not be 
considered ‘neutral tools’.  
According to the above discussion, the situation seems to be bleak, and social media may 
not be able to drive the public sphere towards a progressive direction. Commercial social 
media may give way to consumer advertising, rather than public critical discussion, thus 
diminishing the quality of political discourse, and excluding citizens from the decision-
making process. However, although the increased consumerist culture of social media may 
have a negative impact on the development of Libya’s public sphere, it is important to avoid 
a rigid and absolute argument because the reality is multifaceted and complex.  
In Libya’s dynamic and fast-changing environment, new technologies may still have the 
potential to make a difference and contribute to fostering the public sphere and democratic 
change. Despite all types of obstacles discussed above (e.g. commercial use, resignation 
from politics, the destruction of infrastructure, the instability of social media platforms), 
one cannot ignore that social media were still continuing to serve as the main sources of 
information for many participants. This means that there were other groups of people still 
active, contributing to the flow of information, providing others with the latest updates and 
ideas, and raising the possibility for public discussion to develop. Whether these 
discussions are powerful enough to create a public sphere and enhance democracy is still 
far from certain. It is also something not only related to the technology itself, but which is 
also a matter of human agency and will require this to take a certain matter forward. Thus, 
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it is difficult to argue that the tale of Libya is a tale of boom or a tale of doom. It is complex, 
dynamic and unpredictable. It is still unfinished and being shaped as we speak.  
8.6 The nature of the emergent Libyan networked public sphere: looking 
back and looking ahead 
This section attempts to summarise the above discussion, and provide an overall 
understanding of the multiple dynamics and dimensions that define the emergent Libyan 
networked public sphere. By focusing on the unique case of Libya, this study has largely 
moved beyond general analyses of the Arab Spring to study a general or specific context. 
A focus on the Libyan case helped yield insights into rich digital experience of a particular 
context that has not yet been studied. The aim is to demonstrate how the focus on a context 
such as Libya contributed and added to that body of theoretical debates about the role of 
social media in the constitution of digital publics and the public sphere. 
The relationship between social media and democracy has been reviewed in the previous 
chapters by engaging with different classical and contemporary conceptualisations and 
critiques (Fraser, 1990; Papacharissi, 2015; Tufekci, 2017) of the normative Habermasian 
public sphere theory (Habermas, 1989). The review framed social media as having a dual 
function: positive and negative, rather than solely positive (Shirky, 2011) or negative 
(Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011). While the positive aspects highlight the value of social 
media in the democratic process, the existing work also underlines its democratic limits. 
The existing theoretical discussion points to the need for rethinking the democratic 
potential of social media to align with the actual needs of complex and ever-changing 
societies. 
In terms of the theoretical implications of this study: 
The first implication is that this study has confirmed previous studies (Papacharissi, 2015; 
Tufekci, 2017; Vaidhyanathan, 2018) and contributed additional empirical evidence that 
suggests that the internet and social media do not offer the required conditions to achieve 
an ideal speech situation as articulated by Habermas (1989). It was revealed that the 
characterization of the emergent networked public sphere in Libya lacked the ideal set of 
norms that define the Habermasian public sphere such as singularity, rationality, openness, 
inclusivity and equality. In the context of Libya, it was evident that social media networks 
did not often function as a consensual space in which people engaged in dialogue over 
matters of common interest, nor did it serve as a site of fact-based and rational discussion. 
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Contrary to the Habermasian notion of rational-critical discourse, emotional expressions 
constituted an important aspect of political discussion on Libyan social media. This is a 
similar phenomenon as identified by Papacharissi (2015). However, while “networks of 
hope and anger” (Castells, 2012) might have mobilised people during the revolution, this 
study illuminates the difficulty of sustaining these feelings over time and circumstances. It 
demonstrates that while social media may make it easier to mobilise, this does not mean it 
is easier to achieve gains or to sustain movements. The study revealed that Libyans’ 
enthusiasm and hope for change has largely been replaced by frustration, polarisation and 
confusion in a way that has disempowered people and led many to eventually abandon 
political participation. The difficulties in distinguishing between what is real and what is 
false information, fear of free speech and political/institutional distrust also added another 
layer to the problem. While previous studies (Castells, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015) have 
identified the emotional dynamics centred on the moment of revolution, this study has 
illuminated how the emotional content on social media platforms continued to construct 
political expression in the aftermath of the revolution, while also pointing to hostility and 
polarisation in the online environment. 
The second implication is that this study extends our understanding of the nature of the 
emergent networked public sphere as a dynamic process, which did not exist in a vacuum 
free of political, social, ideological and even historical influence. The study shows how 
Libya’s pre-existing divisions might have exacerbated online polarization. More 
specifically, it illustrates how Libya’s complex tribal composition, and its pre-existing 
regional cleavages, mainly the East-West divide, have been revived, and came to 
characterise the online practices and discussions of publics. The tribal and regional division 
has become most distinct in Libya post-revolution, mainly since 2014, due to the power 
struggle that has resulted between two main rival governments (the Tripoli-based 
government in western Libya and the Tubruk-based government in the east). This internal 
conflict often manifested itself in online content, demonstrating several areas of tension 
within the society. The division along tribal and regional lines turned social media networks 
into spaces of contention and conflict, resulting in increased polarization and division. It 
could be argued that Western lenses are insufficient to understand what is happening in 
Libya because the issue of online polarisation in Western studies is often understood in 
terms of issues of class, gender and race inequalities, rather than the tribal issues evident in 
this research (Papacharissi, 2009; Antony & Thomas, 2010; Tufekci, 2017). This 
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demonstrates that to understand online polarisation in particular social contexts, we need 
to understand the underlying socio-cultural dynamics to identify and explain the dynamics 
of fragmentation.  
The third implication is that this research reflects on the evolution of the networked public 
sphere over time and circumstances rather than narrowing the investigation only to the 2011 
watershed year (Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheafer, 2013; Howard & Hussain, 2013;  
Papacharissi, 2015). This study contributes to the literature by revealing a complex picture 
of trends and changes in a digital Libya in relation to three critical phases: before, during 
and after the uprising. Rather than remaining engaged in the social media activities of the 
revolutionary moment identified by several scholars (Howard & Hussain, 2011; Tufekci & 
Wilson, 2012; Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 2014), this study revealed the temporariness of 
this particular form of networked public. The findings demonstrate that the practices of the 
networked publics were temporary in nature. People adapted their level of participation in 
social media networks according to their experiences, life events, and circumstances that 
reflected their identities and views on a range of issues. This means that they changed the 
topics that they posted about, changed their activities and attitudes, displayed different 
emotions, and switched between social media platforms, demonstrating a dynamic and 
shifting nature over time. The study also shows that social media networks themselves are 
fluid and dynamic. While previous studies emphasised the importance of these technologies 
in creating contemporary archives and memory records to preserve words and pictures 
(Castells, 2008; Fahmi, 2009; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Tufekci, 2017), the Facebook 
analysis in this study revealed that the fluid nature of social media, which allows for easy 
appearance/disappearance of pages, rendered them temporary spaces for discussion and 
made their content difficult to preserve.  
Generally, this study conceptualised the evolution of the networked public sphere in Libya 
as a continuous, dynamic and on-going process, rather than static. During the three critical 
phases – before, during and after the uprising – it can be argued that the networked public 
sphere has shifted dramatically, from private to semi-public to chaotic and polarised (see 
table 8.1 below). Instead of enjoying the socio-economic benefits of democratization and 
development, Libya has fallen into chaos and division. Libyan politics are contested 
between rival regional interests and their disagreements are often resolved by the use of 
violence. Building a democracy from scratch in an environment emerging from such civil 
conflict is an extremely challenging task. Since it is hard to reach a level of political 
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consensus in such a contestatory public sphere (Antony & Thomas, 2010), arguably the 
fostering of pluralism, inclusion and constant negotiation between divergent perspectives 
(Chantal Mouffe, 2005) are what is needed in Libya today to promote the development of 
its democratic order. 
Table 8.1 Characteristics of networked publics over time and circumstances 
 
Time  Pre-uprising  2011 uprising  Post-uprising (late 
2011-2014)  
Post-uprising 
(2014-2016) 
Characteristics 
of the public 
sphere  
State-
controlled/closed/ 
private (i.e. no 
public sphere in 
Habermasian 
sense) 
Semi-public/the 
balance of power 
shifted between the 
regime and ordinary 
people 
Vibrant/relatively 
open compared to 
the past but 
revolutionary 
dominant  
Conflictual, 
contested 
and polarised public 
sphere  
Forms of publics  Controlled 
publics/ 
disempowered   
Emergent 
counterpublics  
Active/expressive/ 
deliberative 
publics/enthusiastic     
Competing publics/ 
disempowered/ 
frustrated/distrustful  
Activities and 
forms of 
participation  
Mostly non-
political (e.g. 
entertainment, 
socialising) 
Active or/and 
passive political 
activities  
(e.g. documenting 
protests, sharing 
information and 
solidarity 
comments) 
Mainly 
political/civic (e.g. 
deliberating 
politics, 
documenting 
events, blogging) 
Entertainment/civic/
commercial/political 
(e.g. socialising, 
advertising, charity 
work, knowledge 
exchange)  
Social media 
platforms  
Forums/blogs and 
Facebook  
Facebook/forums/ 
Twitter 
Facebook/Twitter Facebook/Twitter/ 
Instagram/ Snapchat   
(increased switch 
from Facebook to 
Twitter) 
 
8.7 Final remarks 
The final remarks suggest that to understand the nature of emergent networked publics in 
post-revolutionary societies, the theoretical framework ought to:   
 Be situated in the local socio-cultural context because social media networks 
operate and impact differently in different contexts and under different 
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circumstances. For example, the full picture of what happened within the networked 
publics of post-revolutionary Libya could not be understood without knowledge of 
the underlying cultural divisions, many of which are different from the Western 
context. Rather than only applying Western models of social fragmentation, 
researchers should integrate local cultural variables (e.g. tribal and regional 
divisions) into their analyses.  
 Be longitudinal in some way because countries in transition are often experiencing 
fast-paced changes in a way that makes it problematic to generalise from a snapshot 
moment. It is therefore important to gain the necessary distance to illuminate 
general tendencies and overarching trends, and draw out broader theoretical 
implications. 
 Acknowledge that even though the online discussion may not be entirely open and 
democratic, as evident in the more aggressive and insulting messages in the 
Facebook analysis, it does not mean this type of expression is irrelevant to the public 
sphere. Although it by no means constitutes an ideal public sphere in the 
Habermasian sense, the emotional expressions were nevertheless a crucial element 
to understand opinion formation and mobilization, and constitute an important 
aspect of interaction and political engagement.  
 
To conclude, this study critiques the applicability of Habermas’s public sphere theory 
(Habermas, 1989) as a lens to illuminate the political expressions and digital experiences 
of fast-changing Libya. Rather than the concept of a singular-rational public, this thesis 
expands on the idea of competing, complex, and affective publics (Tufekci, 2017; 
Papacharissi, 2015) to consider the nature of the emergent networked public/public sphere 
post-Arab Spring. While both Tufeki and Papachariss centred on the moment of revolution, 
this study has extended its time frame to include the aftermath of the revolution. It is clearly 
distinguished from these earlier studies in terms of its focus, sample, timeframe and 
methodological approach. Overall, this study contributes to the narrative of the Arab Spring 
uprisings by emphasising that networked publics are dynamic, shifting and constantly 
changing and developing over time and circumstances. This dynamic nature points to the 
need for further research to align with the needs of complex and ever-changing societies. 
The above points set the scene and provide a point of departure for designing future 
research.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis has been to advance our understanding of the nature of the 
Libyan networked public sphere, and how it has evolved over the past few years, mainly 
between 2011-2016, with a brief a glance at its nature in the pre-uprising period. This topic 
is important because of the many transitions and changes that Libya has been witnessing 
since the revolution began in February 2011. In this concluding chapter, a summary of the 
findings is presented through revisiting the research questions. In light of the findings, the 
contributions to knowledge in relation to theory, methods and practice are discussed, before 
ending the chapter with recommendations and suggestion for future research. 
9.2 Research questions revisited  
The current study set out to address the following main research question: what is the nature 
of the emergent networked public sphere in Libya, and how has it evolved since the 
revolution? 
In order to answer this research question, the following sub-questions were pursued: 
Research Question No. 1. To what extent did social media play a role in facilitating 
political change and creating a space for political discourse in the governmental-controlled 
public sphere during the Libyan uprising? 
Regardless of the early indications which suggest that social media cannot be regarded as 
a phenomenon of importance in the Libyan uprising, such as the low internet penetration 
rates (Salem & Mourtada, 2011) and internet and telecommunication services disruption 
during the uprising (Scott-Railton, 2011), evidence that emerged from the study challenged 
this preconception and confirmed that social media was vital in driving the uprising. For 
example, despite the government’s vigorous efforts of internet surveillance and censorship, 
the regime lost its capability to monitor citizens’ online activities, particularly in the 
opposition-controlled areas (e.g. Benghazi). Circumvention technologies helped citizens to 
break through the information blockades and counter barriers that were used by the 
government to block the flow of information.  
User-generated content was often a source of news and information for the traditional 
media, which in turn helped to maximize the presence of such content, and bring it to public 
attention. Otherwise, this content would have not reached an audience, particularly that 
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posted from the dangerous front lines or the regime-controlled areas, where certain 
traditional media outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, were banned. What is interesting in this study 
is that some participants with internet access became connecting points, enabling video, 
photos and news to be collected through their non-internet networks of trusted family and 
friends. This meant that even individuals with no internet access were able to contribute to 
the process of disseminating revolutionary information. Mobile phone devices, therefore, 
do not necessarily have to be internet-enabled to be a part of the new system of political 
communication. Only a few points of internet connection can be effective to enable political 
information and voices to spread widely. Although the internet and social media may not 
have been credited with playing a key role in organizing and coordinating events during 
the uprising, their importance lies in their use as a means of publicity to increase the 
visibility of the rebels’ actions and activities. In this sense, the role of digital technology in 
reporting the events of the Libyan uprising appears to support the idea that the new 
information environment, created by a mix of traditionally and digitally mediated forms of 
communications, could fundamentally challenge and create a space in the governmental-
controlled public sphere by bringing in new voices. 
Research Question No. 2. To what extent has social media facilitated the emergence of a 
networked public sphere in Libya’s post-uprising period: has it helped foster a more 
democratic environment? 
The internet and social media are now reaching a broader-cross section of Libyan society, 
and is no longer limited to digital pioneers or elite bloggers (Freedom House, 2015). 
Whether that is good or bad in relation to the development of the democratic process 
remains uncertain and impalpable. The optimism and hope that seemed to shine on 
everything in the immediate stage of Libya’s post uprising have been tempered over the 
past few years, particularly since the conflict took a new turn in 2014. The vibrant political 
environment marked by young participants practising different forms of online activities 
transformed into a space of caution, disillusionment and uncertainty. 
The study shows that the networked public sphere became a mirror or a reflection of what 
was happening on the ground, accentuating the country’s political, social and ideological 
divisions, rather than creating a better reflection of life underlying it. People seemed simply 
to take their biases and prejudices online, turning the space into an aggressive and hostile 
environment, that led many to eventually abandon political participation. Five years after 
211 
 
the uprising, the study highlighted that stability was prioritised over democracy, in the sense 
that most participants wanted to turn the clock back to 2010 before the revolution.  
Therefore, this study avoids exciting narratives about the role of technology in rejuvenating 
the public sphere because the technological hope and the reality of the Libyan context clash. 
It is true that the internet and social media heralded a new era of political participation 
never experienced before in Libya, and there might have been a successful production of 
discourse at certain times, but the internet cannot be regarded as a new public sphere. The 
ebb and flow tendencies of digital technology suggest paradoxical and uncertain effects on 
the development of the democratic process in the country. Digital technology is in the best 
of times and the worst of times. It is in the best of times because online spaces may be 
democratising in providing opportunities for many people to access information and 
comment on events; this turn of events has indeed materialized. But it is also in the worst 
of times because the same technology seems to push towards commercialization, 
polarization, political resignation, and create confusion and distraction. The fact that Libya 
is in the throes of change, and fraught with considerable political, social and economic 
challenges, cannot be ignored. Digital technology perhaps will help in some sense but 
allowing a more democratic environment is not only a technical problem. It is also a human 
problem to take a certain matter forward. Hence, putting forward a single argument to 
emphasise or refute the democratic potential of the internet and social media is risky, 
particularly within an environment that is still dynamic and evolving constantly.  
9.3 Contribution to knowledge 
This study is highly interdisciplinary and might be of interest to scholars from a variety of 
fields within social science research (e.g. information studies, internet studies, media and 
communication, and politics). It is located in an increasingly important debate about how 
digitally networked technologies might — or might not — contribute to the development 
of the democratic process in non-democratic societies, specifically in the Arab Spring 
countries. While much of the existing literature so far has focused upon Egypt and Tunisia, 
very little is known about the democratic potential of these technologies within the Libyan 
context. By reflecting on emergent tendencies and trends that came to characterize a digital 
Libya, and its evolution over time, this study fills some gaps in the body of knowledge. It 
provides new insights into a particular context at a particular time in history by extending 
the scope of investigation to cover not only the time of the uprising but also the post-
uprising period (2011-2016), with a glimpse into the pre-uprising Libyan context.  
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This research goes beyond the two opposing models of understanding the democratic 
potential of internet and social media: ‘cyber-optimism’ (Shirky, 2011) versus ‘pessimism’ 
(Morozov, 2011). Rather, it attempts to understand the technology’s complex impact, and 
even sometimes its contradictory effects on social change and democratic transformation. 
Most importantly this research was the first that explored digital media within the Libyan 
context using Habermas’ (1989) public sphere concept as a starting point, before exploring 
different critiques and alternative arguments around it, and how the technology 
advancements have transformed and redefined people’s conceptualisations of it. The 
importance of this research lies in drawing on empirical data rather than only engaging with 
theoretical debates and arguments, because the reality is more nuanced. 
Through its theoretical and empirical engagement, this study has contributed to the 
academic debate by expanding on the idea of competing, complex, and affective publics 
(Fraser, 1990; Tufekci, 2017; Papacharissi, 2015) to consider the nature of the emergent 
networked public and public sphere post-Arab Spring, rather than the single, overarching 
notion of the original Habermasian public sphere (Habermas, 1989). It highlighted the 
shifting and dynamic nature of publics by tracing how over time the Libyan emergent 
networked public sphere evolved, changing digital use, practices, and attitudes. This study 
extends the understanding of the nature of the emergent networked public sphere as a 
dynamic process that does not exist in a vacuum, free of political, social, ideological and 
even historical constraints. It offers a richer account of how historical complex issues 
continued to define and shape present narratives online and offline in Libya, although it 
described a different conflict. Libyan society has been developed through a period of 
history full of challenges: from colonization, to an authoritarian regime, to a bloody 
revolution that turned into a civil war. The society suffers from longstanding regional and 
tribal cleavages, where the country was organized into three regions back to the colonial 
era: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east, and Fezzan in the south. These cleavages 
were reanimated and brought to the fore in the post-uprising period, and the existence of 
rival governments, one in the east and the other in the west reflects this. As a result, the 
networked public sphere became merely a reflection of what was happening on the ground, 
rather than creating an alternative layer that would have somehow been better for debate 
and deliberation. This demonstrates that to understand online polarisation, in particular 
social contexts, we need to understand the underlying socio-cultural dynamics to identify 
and explain the dynamics of fragmentation. Rather than only applying Western models of 
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social fragmentation (Papacharissi, 2009; Antony & Thomas, 2010; Tufekci, 2017), 
researchers should integrate local cultural variables (e.g. tribal and regional divisions) into 
their analyses.  
This study has also contributed to the academic debate by showing how the advent of 
technology within the Libyan context was fraught with formidable political, social, and 
economic challenges, that hindered the development of the public sphere. New 
technologies might have helped to challenge the government’s control over the public 
sphere, creating publics and progressing their participation, but were not, on their own, 
sufficient for democratic advancement. It was shown that the success or failure of digital 
media to effect democratic transformation is highly dependent on what users can do with 
digital tools rather than how many users there are. While social media may help to mobilise 
populations, this does not mean itself lead to achieving gains or to sustaining movements. 
The massive growth in public access to social media is not enough for democracy to be 
fully and entirely exercised. After around five years of struggle, the revolutionaries 
appeared to lose their enthusiasm for change and have not yet produced the radical change 
of the Libyan political system that they had hoped for. The struggle for democracy, 
therefore, is not only a technical problem; it is also a human problem with much more 
complex challenges, not least the issue of bringing together a complex society.  
This research also took part in the debate (Castells, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012; Papacharissi, 
2015) regarding how the emotional register was key in shaping communities and driving 
movements particularly during the Egyptian uprising. As part of the findings this research 
expanded further on this and discussed how the nascent transitional public sphere remained 
emotional after the uprising but was characterised by uncertainty rather than conformity. 
Within the Libyan context, the networked publics saw a dynamic shift – from euphoric in 
the immediate aftermath of the revolution to chaotic, uncertain and polarised in the 
following years. This development suggests that the emotional aspect has always been a 
part of the construction of the political expression in Libya, and has never been akin to that 
of a rationally based democratic discussion in Habermas’ sense (Habermas, 1989). This 
study makes it clear that technology has fundamentally transformed the public sphere, but 
the direction of that transformation has remained uncertain.  
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9.4 Methodological contribution 
This study draws its conclusions from a large volume of data, employing a triangulation of 
data-collection techniques: qualitative semi-structured interviews with young people and 
Facebook content analysis of two selected pages. The combination of different types of 
data was the most effective in providing a more comprehensive understanding of the subject 
matter from different angles. It has also increased the validity of the research because young 
participants’ stories and their lived experiences were combined and checked against actual 
Facebook messages, offering in-depth explanations of a less-researched area among the 
Arab Spring countries. The success in gathering interview data in particular while the 
country was under ongoing conflict, to make this research possible, is itself a major 
contribution due to difficulties in recruiting participants (see Section 4.5.1.3 for recruitment 
difficulties). What is also unique about this research is that its focus was not limited to the 
uprising time. Rather than focusing on immediate events (Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 
2014; Papacharissi, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2016; Tufekci, 2017), this study has extended its time 
frame to include the aftermath of the revolution, providing a longer view and 
comprehensive picture of changes of Libya’s political transformation and the roles digital 
media played in it.  
The study also contributes to knowledge by dealing with a variety of data that represented 
different perspectives and views rather than focusing on a certain group. Unlike previous 
research which mainly focused on the revolutionary side such as interviewing protesters or 
analysing certain revolutionary hashtags or Facebook pages (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 2014; Papacharissi, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2016), 
this study extended the scope of investigation to include a broad range of existing political 
groups, mainly revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. By doing so, this study 
captured various perspectives, emotions and different lived experiences, enabling 
interested readers to have a better understanding of the ways in which ideologies, political 
views, and narratives of competing camps were manifested in the networked public sphere 
in Libya.  
Another area of methodological contribution is that this research adds to the existing 
literature on research ethics through developing important methodological insights around 
the challenges of conducting social media research, and the ethics of research in conflict 
zones. Considering the haphazard situation in Libya, the study applied ‘situational ethics’, 
an approach that entails constant reflections on the used methods and the data worth 
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exposing in an unpredictable field (Tracy, 2010). By doing so, this study contributes to the 
existing knowledge by further highlighting the importance of building contingency plans 
for any unanticipated problems with data collection and presentation (e.g. removal of public 
Facebook pages, inability to recruit participants in person). For example, due to the removal 
of the ‘Day of Rage’ Facebook page which was initially planned to be analysed, another 
strategy was adopted which involved a selection of a sample of the most popular public 
Facebook pages, where online discussion is mostly of a political nature. Given the 
increasing violence in Libya, the ‘situational ethics’ also resulted in changing the plan of 
conducting interviews in person to conduct Skype interviews to avoid putting the researcher 
and participants at risk.  
This study also adds to the existing literature on internet research ethics by addressing 
ethical concerns in relation to the fragility of social media. The dynamic nature of digital 
content brought a number of methodological challenges and consequences for the research 
that required new methodological considerations. In this research, the disappearance of the 
LW Facebook page had ethical implications for those whose social media information was 
gathered and analysed, entailing further critiques on the researcher’s ethical decisions in 
the presentation of the research findings to protect unaware participants (Light & McGrath, 
2010; Tracy, 2010; Reilly & Trevisan, 2016). Therefore, rather than only anonymising the 
Facebook data, it was also decided to anonymise the Facebook pages themselves. The focus 
was not only in relation to exploring the nature of the Facebook content, but also focused 
on how best to convey opinions and narratives without exposing unaware participants to 
potential harm, also taking into account their ‘right to be forgotten’ (Sarikakis & Winter, 
2017). Examining these ethical implications is one of the most important methodological 
contributions of this research (see Section 4.7 for further details).  
9.5 Practical implications  
Understanding the complex and contested nature of the emergent networked public sphere 
in Libya cannot overnight provide a magic solution for democratizing the country or turning 
its tragedy to joy. However, the insights gained from this research could offer practical 
implications for local governments and international community in order to shape social 
media to be a more positive aspect of the political sphere.  
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9.5.1 Local government 
Since the presence of rival governments in the country is creating a real barrier for the 
effective functioning of central authority, local government could contribute to the 
improvement of the democratic and reconstruction process in the country. Social media 
should be at the heart of any activities for these local governments to engage audiences, 
and breed trust in the political process that appeared to be lost recently according to the 
study findings. This might benefit political practice in Libya and could form a bridge 
between the governments and citizens. Multiple actions could be undertaken such as: (1) 
supporting NGOs and engaging with them in many sectors and activities such as politics, 
education, health, digital inclusion, human rights, youth empowerment and dialogue 
initiatives, etc.; (2) making information about these activities available for publics in both 
forms, digital and traditional, due to the fact that internet is not universally available across 
the country. In this way, citizens can monitor and evaluate governments’ activities, thus 
holding leaders accountable and increasing communication and transparency between 
government and citizens.  
9.5.2 International community 
The findings would also be of direct interest to international organisations that work 
directly with digital media and engage with young people for the purposes of peace-
building and conflict transformation. Although there are many international organizations 
have been working in Libya to promote national reconciliation such as the United Nations 
Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL)33, the study shows that there is an increase distrust 
in Western organisations missions as well as the political process in general. Since this is 
the case, such organisations should place importance on how to design and conduct their 
future activities particularly those directed towards Libyan youth, being aware that young 
people are increasingly resigned from practicing politics. This could be through using social 
media as a tool of persuasion and outreach campaigns through tailoring personalised 
campaign messages to young people’s needs and interests. What is needed is motivating 
people to deliberate politics and even compete against one another, with the aim of 
translating these online deliberations into offline actions, otherwise social media can “too 
easily just remain words in the air” (Lynch, 2006, p.54), without necessarily causing 
changing on the ground.  
                                                          
33 This is an integrated special political mission established on 16 September 2011 by UN Security Council 
Resolution 2009 (2011) to support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts.  
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More efforts and assistance are also greatly needed to reach out young people from different 
actors and organizations such as Libyan diaspora activists. These actors should harness 
their potential through: (1) funding and developing projects for local activists from across 
the country in order to bring them together in an inclusive atmosphere that is important for 
reconciliation and dialogue; (2) providing them the necessary trainings on digital media use 
and digital security so that they can create local networks able to produce high quality 
information without being exposed to threats, specifically at critical moments and in the 
absence of digital rights legislation. This could also help to mitigate the spread of rumours 
and fake news at a national level, thus allowing for healthy debate and discussion to emerge 
based on reliable information and news. However, providing reliable information and 
reaching out communities could be a challenge due to the fact that the internet connectivity 
is still limited in Libya despite the growth in the number of internet users. Therefore, (3) 
enhancing digital inclusion in the country is an important issue that international actors 
should aim to work on. They can work together with NGO members and local governments 
to contribute to building a more inclusive information society by providing the necessary 
technical and financial support (e.g. digital equipment, training). They can also learn about 
some successful examples and models around the world, and then copy and apply them in 
Libya. One approach, for example, that could be very useful is the use of mesh networks, 
a type of network that has been successfully used in Cuba. It is a workaround that allows 
people to connect with one another by opening their Wi-Fi networks to incoming traffic 
(Rushkoff, 2011). One important advantage of this network is its resistance to surveillance, 
which is very important within the Libyan context to help people avoid possible threats. It 
is also a highly adaptable network because it can simply re-connect through a different 
route if one connection fails. This flexibility is certainly useful in the Libyan environment 
which is witnessing frequent electricity outages and recurrent damage in the 
telecommunication infrastructure due to the ongoing conflict.   
9.6 Limitations and future research  
While this study has successfully advanced our understanding of the nature of the Libyan 
networked public sphere and its evolution over the past years, there were a number of issues 
that must be acknowledged to be taken into consideration and pursued in future research. 
Firstly, the demographic scope of this study was deliberately limited to young people, as 
they were the dominant group using the internet in the country (Salem, Mourtada, & Al-
Saher, 2014). Therefore, future work can expand to other age groups to explore their use 
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of digital technology and compare the findings. For example, the generation that is growing 
up who were children in the revolution might reveal interesting findings as they are growing 
up in intense, violent and polarised environment, where tribalism is not any longer buried 
deep under the surface. It would be useful to explore the consequences of the fighting today 
and the legacy it will leave for these generations, and whether this impact their social media 
use and practices that could produce further polarisation and feud. 
This study collected its data from three main cities across the country to ensure diversity 
and obtain a variety of thoughts and experiences. However, more studies and efforts are 
needed to explore how citizens in other cities or non-urban areas with no or less internet 
access experienced the revolution and its aftermath such as displaced communities (e.g. the 
citizens of Tawargha city34 or those people of West Libyan origin who claimed to be kicked 
out of Benghazi at the height of Operation Dignity in 2014). Exploring the experiences of 
these groups can help to produce a wider picture and understand in more depth the complex 
Libyan context. An important extension of this research would be taking the investigation 
outside the country to explore whether Libyans in exile (e.g. Libyan diasporic 
communities) continue using technology to play a role in Libya’s transition, or whether 
they have lost interest in politics as locals. This would be a fruitful area for further work.  
Another important area for future research is including different types of social media data. 
In this study, the digital content was limited to Facebook due to the popularity of the 
platform among young Libyans (Salem et al., 2014). Thus, it would be interesting if further 
work extended to other Facebook pages as well as other types of platforms. Twitter could 
be a good choice for future work, particularly the findings showing that Twitter became 
increasingly popular among the study participants. It would be also beneficial to apply a 
mixed methods approach to provide a richer picture of the relationship between technology 
and the development of the democratic process in non-democratic societies. This study also 
revealed directions for further work on the fragility and the fluidity of social media data, 
and how social media content are dynamic, which is an important topic that has many 
ethical and methodological implications.  
Taken together, this study serves as a good foundation for further research in the country, 
and opens up many opportunities for additional research in the area of how digitally 
                                                          
34 A ghost town in Libya that was used as a centre of military operations against Misrata, which rose up 
against Gaddafi in February 2011. It was the site of intense fighting during the uprising before its ethnic 
cleansing by anti-Gaddafi forces in August 2011.  
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networked technologies might — or might not — contribute to the development of the 
public sphere. As the situation in Libya is dynamic, and the internet and social media 
landscape continue to evolve, the need for more research remains fundamental to contribute 
to the narrative of the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath.  
9.7 Closing statement   
In each revolution “a short ‘honeymoon’ period follows the fall of the old regime, lasting 
until the ‘contradictory elements’ among the victorious revolutionaries assert themselves” 
(Brinton, 1965, p. 91). This suggests that the failures, chaos and polarisation illuminated in 
this thesis are perhaps an inevitable part of the political or social change. Although it is 
important to take into account that democratizing a complex society such as Libya might 
be elusive, unpredictable and could take different paths and trajectories, there were many 
examples of struggles that eventually succeeded were often chaotic and preceded by 
violence and war such as the French Revolution and Rwanda civil war. Digital technology 
might help but of course it is not the only element or driver to achieve the ultimate goal, 
and understanding its effects may still require a long stretch of time.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Libya profile – Timeline  
A chronology of key events: 
Anti-regime uprising 
2011 February - Inspired by revolts in the neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia, street protests 
break out in Benghazi, spread to other cities, leading to escalating clashes between Gaddafi 
forces and rebels. 
2011 March - UN Security Council authorises a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes to 
protect civilians, over which NATO assumes command. 
2011 July - The International Contact Group on Libya formally recognises the main 
opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate government 
of Libya. 
2011 August - Col Gaddafi goes into hiding after rebels swarm into his fortress compound 
in Tripoli. 
2011 August-September - African Union joins 60 countries which have recognised the 
NTC as the new Libyan authority. 
2011 20 October - Col Gaddafi is captured and killed as rebel fighters take his hometown 
Sirte. Three days later, the NTC declares Libya to be officially "liberated" and announces 
plans to hold elections within eight months. 
2011 November - Saif al-Islam, the son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, is 
captured. 
2012 January-March - Clashes erupt between former rebel forces in Benghazi in sign of 
discontent with the NTC. Benghazi-based NTC officials campaign to re-establish 
autonomy for the region, further increasing tension with the NTC in Tripoli. 
2012 August - Transitional government hands power to the General National Congress, 
which was elected in July. 
Benghazi attack 
2012 September - US ambassador and three other Americans are killed when Islamist 
militants, including Ansar al-Sharia, storm the consulate in Benghazi. 
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2013 August - Petroleum Facilities Guard militia begins blockade of oil export terminals. 
Civil war 
2014 February - Protests erupt in response to the General National Congress refusal to 
disband after mandate expires. 
2014 April - Petroleum Facilities Guard militia lifts closure of two oil terminals. 
2014 May - "Libyan National Army" renegade general Khalifa Haftar launches military 
assault including airstrikes against militant Islamist groups in Benghazi; tries to seize 
parliament building, accusing Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteg of being in thrall to Islamist 
groups. 
2014 June - Prime Minister Maiteg resigns after supreme court rules his appointment 
illegal. 
New parliament chosen in elections marred by a low turn-out attributed to security fears 
and boycotts; Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out between forces loyal to 
outgoing GNC and new parliament. 
2014 July - UN staff pull out, embassies shut, foreigners evacuated as security situation 
deteriorates. Tripoli international airport is largely destroyed by fighting. 
Ansar al-Sharia seizes control of most of Benghazi. 
Islamic State intervenes 
2014 October - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits to continue UN-brokered talks 
between the new parliament and government based in Tobruk and Islamist Libya Dawn 
militias holding Tripoli. UN says 100,000s displaced by clashes. 
Islamic State extremist militia seizes control of port of Derna in eastern Libya. 
2015 January - Libyan army and Tripoli-based militia alliance declare partial ceasefire 
after UN-sponsored talks in Geneva. 
2015 February - Egyptian jets bomb Islamic State targets in Derna, a day after the group 
there released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians. 
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Libyan Army offensive to retake Derna in March fails to dislodge the group. IS 
establishes control over port-city of Sirte, halfway along coast between Tripoli and 
Benghazi. 
2015 July - A Tripoli court sentences Gaddafi's sons Saif al-Islam and eight other former 
officials to death for crimes committed during the 2011 uprising against his father. He is 
later freed by an armed group. 
2016 January - UN announces new, Tunisia-based interim government, but neither 
Tobruk nor Tripoli parliaments agree to recognise its authority. 
Islamic State group attacks Ras Lanuf oil terminal, threatens to move on to Brega and 
Tobruk. 
Rise of General Haftar 
2016 March - New UN-backed Government of National Accord arrives in Tripoli by 
boat after opposing forces block airspace. 
2016 April - UN staff return to Tripoli after absence of nearly two years. 
2016 September - Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar seizes key oil export 
terminals in the east. 
2016 December - Pro-government forces oust Islamic State militants from coastal town 
of Sirte, which they had seized 18 months previously. 
2017 July - Islamic State group ejected from Benghazi after three years of fighting. 
2018 July - Khalifa Haftar claims that his forces are fully in control of Derna, the last 
Islamist stronghold in the east and the only city in the region hitherto outside his control. 
2018 September - Libya's UN-backed government declares a state of emergency in 
Tripoli, after dozens of people are killed in clashes between rival militia groups in the 
city's southern suburbs. 
2019 April - The Haftar Libyan National Army advances on Tripoli, sparking clashes 
with the forces of the internationally-recognised Government of National Accord. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Starting the interview  Interview stages 
 
Introducing the research topic 
 Reminding the interviewee about the voluntary nature 
of the interview and the right to withdraw at any time  
 Ensuring that the environment is secure for 
confidentiality 
 Introducing the research topic  
 Reading the information sheet 
 Requesting verbal consent while asking the participant 
to sign the consent form if it has not been already sent 
by email 
 Asking for their permission to record the interview 
 
Starting the interview 
Interview questions   
 
Can you tell me when you began using social networking 
websites? Why? 
 Which social media platform did you use most? Why? 
 From where did you log in for the internet? 
 What did you use social media for at this time? Why?   
 
Questions about the 
pre-uprising period  
Could you tell me about your experience of the uprising, and 
how did you use social media in that time? 
 How did you find out about the revolution? 
  What were the main sources of information on 
events? (including other types of media and 
communication channels) 
 What social media did you use? How did you use it? 
Why? 
 How reliable was information? Could you find the 
information you needed? 
Questions about 
revolutionary times  
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 Did you get involved in the uprising? How? What was 
your motivation and what you were trying to achieve? 
 Tell me about your experience during the internet cut-
off? What was your source of information during the 
internet blackout? Did you manage to circumvent the 
government censorship?  
Could you tell me about your experience of the post-uprising 
period, and how did you use social media in that time? 
 Could you tell me where you were and what you were 
doing in that time? Were you involved in the post-
uprising period events? How? 
 What were your main sources of information on 
events? Why? (including other types of media and 
communication channels)  
 What social media networks did you use? How did 
you use them? Why? Could you tell me what types of 
pages, groups or accounts you follow? Why? 
 What sort of political issues have you discussed 
online? Are there constraints on what you say? Are 
political issues discussed respectfully?  
 When emotions were running high, how did you use 
social media? Did you engage in hostile arguments? 
 Were you able to criticize or express your opinion 
about the events or government without fear? Were 
there any restrictions? 
 Do you think that social media websites are credible 
information and news sources? How do you perceive 
the credibility of social media? How do you verify 
information you receive through social media? What 
about TV?  
 What are your thoughts about social media: whether it 
is a united tool bringing people closer together or a 
divisive tool causing rifts within society?  
Questions about the 
post-uprising period 
243 
 
 What do you believe that the role of social media in 
Libya should be? 
 
Do you have anything else to add about this topic?  Closing statement, to 
end the interview 
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Appendix 3: Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher: Skina Ehdeed 
Information School, University of Sheffield 
Research project title: The Emergence of Libyan Networked Publics: Social Media Use 
Before, During and After the Libyan Uprising  
Invitation: 
You are being invited to take part in this research project about better understanding of the 
Emergence of Libyan Networked Publics: Social Media Use Before, During and After the 
Libyan Uprising. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research 
is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully. Please ask us if there is anything you do not understand or if you would like 
further information. 
What will I do?  
I will conduct a 60-90-minute interview about how social media has been used during the 
revolution and recent events and how young Libyans perceive the impact of social media 
on their views and attitudes in relation to the uprising and post-uprising period. 
When I talk to you I will record your answers and I will collect your personal details. You 
can decide how much you want to take part. You can also decide not to take part at all.  
How will the information be used? 
I will use your answers to help me to understand how young Libyans have used social 
media over time and circumstances. The findings of this study will be published as a part 
of my Ph.D. thesis.  
Your rights: 
- I will not use your real name in my report thesis. 
- All data will be anonymised and kept safe and private. 
- You do not need to take part and you can stop at any time during the interview. 
- No one will listen to any records apart from me and my supervisors. 
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What are the potential risks? 
Some emotional pain could be inadvertently caused through the re-opening of old wounds. 
This may affect you in different ways. It might be annoying and inconvenient for you and 
you may feel distressed. So, if you feel unhappy or uncomfortable and you want to 
withdraw during the interview, you can do at any point without giving any explanation. I, 
as a researcher, can offer rest breaks during the interview if you need. You can invite your 
close friend or family member to attend the interview if this helps you and makes you feel 
more comfortable.   
There is also a low possibility that discussing politics can lead to threats if you are 
identified. However, your participation will be totally anonymised. I will not be asking you 
to sign this consent form with your real name. I will keep your contact details and the 
interview record separate from each other and they will be uploaded to a safe location.  
If you are not happy or have questions you can speak or write to the university: 
Skina Ehdeed, the researcher               smtehdeed1@sheffield.ac.uk         +44(0)7475073248 
Dr Jo Bates, first supervisor                    jo.bates@sheffield.ac.uk              +44 (0)114 222 
2648  
Dr Andrew Cox, second supervisor         a.m.cox@sheffield.ac.uk             +44 (0)114 222 
6347                    
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Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form 
Participant consent form 
The University of Sheffield. 
Information School 
 
The Emergence of Libyan Networked Publics: Social 
Media Use Before, During and After the Libyan Uprising 
 
Researchers 
 
Skina Ehdeed, the researcher         smtehdeed1@sheffield.ac.uk                         Room 318  
Dr. Jo Bates, first supervisor                   jo.bates@sheffield.ac.uk                       Room 
236   
Dr. Andrew Cox, second supervisor           a.m.cox@sheffield.ac.uk                   Room 
222 
 
Purpose of the research 
 
The purpose of the research is to investigate the nature of the emergent Libyan networked 
public sphere, and how has it evolved over the past few years. More specifically, it focuses 
on three critical phases: immediately before, during, and after the uprising, covering 
primarily the period between 2011-2016, with a brief a glance at Libya’s public sphere in 
the pre-uprising period.    
 
Who will be participating? 
 
We are inviting young people between the ages of 25 and 35 to participate in this study.  
 
What will you be asked to do?  
 
We will conduct a 60-90 minute interview about how social media has been used and 
experienced during the Libyan uprising and its aftermath.  
 
What are the potential risks of participating? 
 
Some emotional pain could be inadvertently caused through the re-opening of old wounds. 
This may affect you in different ways. It might be annoying and inconvenient for you and 
you may feel distressed. So, if you feel unhappy or uncomfortable and you want to 
withdraw during the interview, you can do at any point without giving any explanation. I, 
as a researcher, can offer rest breaks during the interview if you need. You can invite your 
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close friend or family member to attend the interview if this helps you and makes you feel 
more comfortable.   
Your participation will be completely anonymised. I will not ask you to sign this consent 
form with your real name. I will keep your contact details and the interview record separate 
from each other and they will be uploaded to the University of Sheffield Google drive.   
 
What data will we collect? 
 
We are audio recording the interviews and we are collecting personal details.  
 
What will we do with the data? 
 
The interview will be transcribed for analysis to be later included in my Ph.D. thesis or an 
academic publication in the future. After this point, the data might be stored in a secure 
place to be used later for conducting future research. Apart from me and the project’s 
supervisors nobody else will have access to these data. 
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
 
We are anonymising the data and uploading the records to a safe location on the University 
of Sheffield Google drive. I will not ask you to sign this consent form with your real name. 
I will keep your contact details and the interview record separate from each other. Both of 
them will be uploaded to the University of Sheffield Google drive which is secure and safe. 
My laptop is also protected by password. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
 
The results of this study will be published as a part of my Ph.D. dissertation. The results 
of this research also may be reported in journal papers and conferences. 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the description of the research project, and that I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without any negative consequences. 
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I understand that I may decline to answer any particular question or questions, or to do any 
of the activities. If I stop participating at all time, all of my data will be purged. 
 
I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential, that my name or identity 
will not be linked to any research materials, and that I will not be identified or identifiable 
in any report or reports that result from the research. 
 
I give permission for the research team members to have access to my anonymised 
responses. 
 
I give permission for the research team to re-use my data for future research as specified 
above. 
 
I agree to take part in the research project as described above. 
   
Participant Name  Participant Signature  
 
 
  
 
Researcher Name   Researcher Signature  
 
Date  
 
 
Note:  If you have any difficulties with, or wish to voice concern about, any aspect of your 
participation in this study, please contact Dr. Jo Bates, Research Ethics Coordinator, 
Information School, The University of Sheffield (ischool_ethics@sheffield.ac.uk), or to the 
University Registrar and Secretary. 
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Appendix 5: Research Ethics Approval Letter  
 
 
